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States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their
free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative
or administrative measures that may affect them.
American Indian law scholar Rick Collins first theorized the utility of
consent theory in American Indian law and policy in his important essay,
Indian Consent to American Government.2 Professor Collins questioned
whether Indian tribes ever "consented" to American government, and whether
usual principles of consent theory "applied to Indians."3 He noted that Indian
treaties could have served as a proper vehicle for demonstrating consent, but so
many of them involved "substantial coercion of the tribal party."4 Collins
concluded that while the United States often respected principles of consent
with Indian tribes, violations of those consent principles have left some Indian
tribes and individual Indians in "oppressive conditions." 5 Collins expressed
dissatisfaction with strategies to eliminate these concerns about tribal consent
such as the pursuit through the courts of true "tribal independence" due to the
failures of such efforts in the past and poor likelihood of the success of those
efforts in the future.'
Professor Collins' paper was prescient in many ways, especially in his
conclusion that "[m]uch more tribal independence can be achieved within the
existing system, by doing the hard work of building up tribal governments and
improving tribal economies."' But the ability of Indian tribes to engage in that
developmental process, while succeeding in many ways,' is significantly
1. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295,
art. 19, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sep. 13, 2007).
2. Richard B. Collins, Indian Consent to American Government, 31 ARIZ. L. REv. 365
(1989).
3. Id.at 371.
4. Id. at 373.
5. Id. at 386.
6. Id. at 386-87.
7. Id. at 387.
8. For studies of many tribal successes (and failures), see CHARLES F. WILKINSON,
BLOOD STRUGGLE (2005), and HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, THE STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIONS: CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF
SELF-DETERMINATION (2008).
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hampered by the continued lack of tribal consent in modern American Indian
law and policy. Now is an excellent time to return to Professor Collins' analysis
-more than 20 years have passed since his prescription. I argue in this Article
that the fundamental question of tribal consent continues to haunt Indian
affairs, and will continue to do so unless it is rectified.
Consider the following hypotheticals that frame the outer limits of this
discussion of consent theory and federal Indian law:
A federally recognized Indian tribe9 executes a treaty with the President of the
United States, later ratified by the Senate, reserving a homeland for the tribe
and its members for all time. The treaty requires the express consent of three-
fourths of the adult males of the tribe to amend the treaty. The government
seeks such consent at a later time for purposes of acquiring the tribal land
base, procures the consent through arguably fraudulent means, and Congress
enacts legislation effectuating the sale.' 0
A non-Indian driving on a dirt road in the west crosses into Indian Country
without even knowing it, although there is a sign posted at the reservation
border that states: YOU ARE NOW ENTERING INDIAN COUNTRY AND
CONSENT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIBE. The tribe in question
has enacted an ordinance that holds any person who enters the reservation
willingly has impliedly consented to tribal regulatory and adjudicatory
authority."
Both fact patterns involve issues of consent. Did the tribe consent to the
sale of the land in the first case? According to the Supreme Court in Lone Wolf
v. Hitchcock,12 it doesn't even matter because Congress has plenary authority as
trustee of tribal property to sell Indian lands (even to itself) and remit the
9. A federally recognized Indian tribe is a legal term of art in federal Indian law. It
means that the United States recognizes a legal and political relationship between the tribe
and the federal government. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.02[4], at
140 (2005 ed.). There currently are 566 federally recognized tribes. See Press Release,
Office of the Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs, Echo Hawk Issues Reaffirmation of the
Tejon Indian Tribe's Government-to-Government Status (Jan. 3, 2012), available at
http://www.bia.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/textlidc015898.pdf (discussing the recent
reaffirmation of the Tejon Tribe's status as a federally recognized Indian tribe); Indian
Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of
Indian Affairs, 75 FED. REG. 66124, 66124 (Oct. 27, 2010) (listing the Shinnecock Indian
Nation as the 565th tribe); Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from
the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 75 FED. REG. 60810 (Oct. 1, 2010) (listing 564
Indian tribes).
10. This hypothetical is based on Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). See
generally BLUE CLARK, LONE WOLF v. HITCHCOCK: TREATY RIGHTS & INDIAN LAW AT THE
END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 38-66 (1994).
I1. This hypothetical is based on the recommendation of Indian affairs observers in the
1970s that tribes enacted implied consent ordinances in order to authorize assertion of tribal
authority over nonmembers. E.g., NATIONAL AMERICAN INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION,
JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN, VOL. 4: EXAMINATION OF THE BASIS OF TRIBAL LAW AND
ORDER AUTHORITY 50-56 (1974).
12. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
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proceeds to the tribe (or to itself as guardian or trustee).' Consent is irrelevant.
Did the nonmember consent to the tribe's jurisdiction by entering the
reservation? What if he had seen the sign and still crossed into the reservation
anyway? According to the Supreme Court in cases such as Atkinson Trading
Co., Inc. v. Shirley,14 consent to tribal jurisdiction must be express, and is
limited to the narrow subject areas of the express consent. 5 Otherwise the tribe
has no jurisdiction. Literal, express consent is highly relevant."
Tribal consent to federal statutes, regulations, and cases that decide matters
critical to American Indian people and tribes long has been lacking. The
nineteenth and twentieth century Supreme Court cases are replete with efforts
by Indians and tribes to avoid the dictates of many of these laws and
regulations that directly injured tribal interests, almost always to no avail. 7
Congress legislated, the Executive branch acted, and the Supreme Court either
declined to act or upheld the law and its enforcement.'8 As recently as 1955, the
Supreme Court has held that the taking of tribal property by federal agencies
was a non-compensable taking.
Federal Indian law-the law that governs federal-state-tribal relationS20
13. See id. at 568 ("In effect, the action of Congress now complained of was but an
exercise of such power, a mere change in the form of investment of Indian tribal property,
the property of those who, as we have held, were in substantial effect the wards of the
government."). See also United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 44-45 (1985) (holding that a
tribal claim to land is extinguished under the Indian Claims Commission Act "when
[judgment] funds are placed by the United States into an account in the Treasury of the
United States for the Tribe pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 724a").
14. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
15. See id. at 656 (quoting E. RAVENSCROFT, THE CANTERBURY GUESTS; OR, A
BARGAIN BROKEN act v, sc. 1.) ("A nonmember's consensual relationship in one area thus
does not trigger tribal civil authority in another-it is not 'in for a penny, in for a Pound."')
16. There was a time when consent was readily recognized. An 1834 legislative report
includes the following language: "As to those persons not required to reside in the Indian
Country, who voluntarily go there to reside, they must be considered as voluntarily
submitting themselves to the laws of the tribes." H. R. Rep. No. 23-474, at 18 (1834),
excerpted in MONROE E. PRICE, NATIVE AMERICAN LAW MANUAL 465 (1970).
17. For surveys of older cases, see RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH & JAMES YOUNGBLOOD
HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 31-134 (1980), and DAVID
E. WILKINS & K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY
AND FEDERAL LAW 98-215 (2001).
18. The Court's invocation of aspects of the political question doctrine-as in, if the
tribe loses, it can always petition Congress- is legion in Indian law cases. See Matthew L.M.
Fletcher, The Original Understanding of the Political Status of Indian Tribes, 82 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 153, 178-79 n.131 (2008) (collecting dozens of cases).
19. See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955); see also WALTER
R. ECHO-HAWK, IN THE COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR: THE 10 WORST INDIAN LAW CASES
EVER DECIDED 358-94 (2010); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY § 15.4.1, at 766-69 (3rd
ed. 2010) (criticizing Tee-Hit-Ton).
20. See DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON, ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., AND
MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1-8 (6th ed.
2011).
[VIll: 1
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has been dramatically altered in recent decades in part by the notion that non-
Indians and non-tribal entities have not consented to assertions of tribal
government authority over them. 2 1 This lack of consent is meaningful because
Indian tribes are not beholden to the dictates of the American Constitution (nor
could they be),22 and so the nonmembers could be subject to governmental
authority unfettered by individual constitutional rights. 23 The problem has best
been identified by Professor Alex Aleinikoff as a "democratic deficit,"2 4
wherein these nonmembers and nonmember-controlled entities have not
participated in the tribal political process, and therefore should not be subject to
tribal sovereign powers.25 On the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy long has
been a champion of consent theory in relation to tribal government power,
dating back to his days on the Ninth Circuit.26
All of this comes as the federal government slowly vacates many aspects of
its on-the-ground governance, a process begun in the mid-1970s when
Congress authorized Indian tribes to contract with the Bureau of Indian Affairs
to administer on-reservation services.27 Indian tribes now are the primary
government authorities in Indian Country, a political fact that should seem
inevitable but has been a long, long time in coming.28 In an article describing an
21. E.g. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990). See Katherine J. Florey, Indian
Country's Borders: Territoriality, Immunity, and the Construction of Tribal Sovereignty, 51
B.C. L. REv. 595, 609-13 (2010).
22. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316,
337 (2008); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384-85 (1896).
23. However, Congress's enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act is an effort to apply
many (but not all) of the major individual rights of the American Constitution to those under
tribal jurisdiction. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2006). See generally THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT AT FORTY 133 (Kristen A. Carpenter, Matthew L.M. Fletcher, and Angela R. Riley eds.,
2012).
24. T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION,
THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 115 (2002).
25. Interestingly, in two recent cases that attracted a great deal of attention,
nonmembers were eligible to sit on juries in tribal court cases where nonmembers were
defendants. See Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 316; Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d
924 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 952 (2006). At least some tribes are taking the
"democratic deficit" seriously.
26. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Duro v.
Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1014-19 (9th Cir. 1976)
(Kennedy, C.J., dissenting); see also Samuel E. Ennis, Implicit Divestiture and the Supreme
Court's (Re)Construction of the Indian Canons, 35 VT. L. REV. 623, 635 (2011) (discussing
Duro).
27. See generally Philip S. Deloria, The Era of Indian Self-Determination: An
Overview, in INDIAN SELF-RULE: FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS
FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 191 (Kenneth R. Philp ed., 1986); Michael P. Gross,1ndian
Self-Determination and Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of Recent Federal Indian
Policy, 56 TEx. L.REV. 1195 (1977).
28. See John C. Mohawk, Indian Economic Development: An Evolving Concept of
Sovereignty, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 495, 495-97 (1991). The Bureau of Indian Affairs, and
occasionally state agencies, were the primary governmental units in Indian Country going
Apr. 2012] 49
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early version of the legislation that would become the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act,29 Bobo Dean wrote in the early
1970s that, for the first time, the "consent of the governed" would be a part of
Indian affairs.30 Self-determination meant that Indian people would be
governed by Indian people, a concept that the Supreme Court had recognized as
a matter of federal common law in 1959,31 but had not quite reached Congress
or the bureaucracy. So while tribal governments begin to develop and exercise
their governance authority and competence, the nonmembers residing and
working within Indian Country are largely free of tribal regulation.32
Of course, observers who argue that it makes sense to decide federal
common law cases with consent theory in mind (Professor Aleinikoff
excepted33) fail to note the incredible irony of importing consent theory into
federal Indian law. The irony comes on two levels. First, consent theory is of
course a pure fiction, in that no one person has ever "consented" to the
American federal government's authority except in symbolic or meaningless
ways.34 Moreover, consent theory is not a favored part of modern American
high political theory and has been subject to powerful and persuasive
theoretical and practical attacks.
The second source of irony is perhaps even more fundamental and simple;
Indian nations and Indian people literally have not consented to most of the
vastly broad and deep assertions of federal and state government that modern
policymakers and judges assume exists.36 Indian tribes were not invited to the
back over 100 years. See STEPHEN J. ROCKWELL, INDIAN AFFAIRS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 246-302 (2010); Duane Champagne, Organizational
Change and Conflict: A Case Study of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 7:3 AM. INDIAN
CULTURE AND RES. J. 3, 4-7 (1983).
29. Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Pub. L. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified in relevant part
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450f (2006)).
30. S. Bobo Dean, The Consent of the Governed -A New Concept in Indian Affairs?,
48 N.D. L. REV. 533, 538-39 (1971-72).
31. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) ("Essentially, absent governing
Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.") (emphasis
added).
32. See N. BRUCE DUTHU, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE LAW 6-7 (2008) (canvassing
several cases involving torts of non-Indians against Indian people).
33. See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 24, at 144-45; see also Peter J. Spiro, The Impossibility
of Citizenship, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1492, 1499-1500 (2003) (reviewing ALEINIKOFF, supra
note 24).
34. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 192-93 (1986); C.W. Cassinelli, The
"Consent" of the Governed, 12:2 W. POL. Q. 391, 391 (1959). Contra Steven D. Smith,
Radically Subversive Speech and the Authority of Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 348, 366-67 (1995)
("On the contrary, the notion that legitimate government may and must be based upon the
consent of the governed still appears to command widespread support.").
35. E.g., DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY (1989).
36. Examples of federal legislation restricting tribal governance and expanding state
regulation into Indian Country includes the Major Crimes Act of 1885, 18 U.S.C. § 1153
HeinOnline  -- 8 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 50 2012
TRIBAL CONSENT
constitutional convention, nor could they sign or ratify the Constitution.
Indian people, with relatively few exceptions largely relating to land tenure,38
never consented to federal citizenship, 39 and to this day could be the only
persons the Fourteenth Amendment excludes from citizenship (the so-called
"Indians not taxed").40 Indians who asserted treaty rights, for example, typically
had been considered "uncivilized" and therefore ineligible for citizenship.4 1
Indians who declined to "abandon their tribal relations," for another example,
were in the same category.42 It is further ironic that there is an established
method for acquiring the factual consent of Indian tribes and individual Indians
to government control through a treaty or other agreement,4 3 but the United
(2006), which extended federal criminal jurisdiction over "major crimes" into Indian
Country; the General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), which broke up tribal
landholdings without the consent of tribal governments or individual Indians; and Public
Law 280, 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006), which extended state jurisdiction into massive parts of
Indian Country. For a powerful work of scholarship on the origins and foundations of
thought justifying the imposition of outsider law on American Indians and Indian tribes, see
ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT (1990).
37. The Supreme Court has often used this kind of phrasing in recent decades. See,
e.g., Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998) ("tribes were
not at the Constitutional Convention"); Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S.
775, 782 (1991) (noting that Indian tribes could not have surrendered sovereignty "in a
[Constitutional] convention to which they were not even parties"). See also Agua Caliente
Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 4th 239, 251 (2006) (quoting Kiowa
Tribe).
38. General Allotment Act § 6, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887). Other statutes are noted in
Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 671, 673 n. 6 (1989).
39. Congress extended federal, but not state, citizenship to American Indians in the
Indian Citizenship Act of 1924. Ch. 233, 43 Stats. 253 (1924) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. §1401(b) (2006)). The distinction is important because many western states
continued to deny American Indians the right to vote in state elections until the mid-1950s.
See Willard Hughes Rollings, Citizenship and Suffrage: The Native American Struggle for
Civil Rights in the American West, 5 NEV. L. J. 126, 135 (2004). See also DANIEL MCCOOL,
SUSAN M. OLSON, AND JENNIFER L. ROBINSON, NATIVE VOTE: AMERICAN INDIANS, THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT, AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE 14-18 (2007). For scholarship on the lack of
consent relating to American Indian citizenship in the United States, see Robert Porter,
The Demise of the Unguehoweh and the Rise of Native America: Redressing the Genocidal
Act of Forcing American Citizenship Upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACKLETTER
L.J. 107 (1999).
40. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
41. E.g., MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, THE EAGLE RETURNS: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE
GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA INDIANS 114-15 (2012) (describing how
local officials refused to allow Grand Traverse Band members to vote in 1866 because they
had treaty rights to hunt and fish).
42. But see Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884), where the petitioner argued he had
"severed his tribal relation to the Indian tribes" and was still denied the right to vote in
Nebraska. See id. at 98, 109.
43. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN
TREATY VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600-1800 (1997).
Apr. 2012] 51
HeinOnline  -- 8 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 51 2012
52 STANFORD JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES [VIll: I
States often does not take the time or effort to acquire the needed consent.44
And yet Indian nations and individual Indians remain under the control and
authority of federal and many state governments. 45 Anyone with even a
superficial knowledge of American political theory would have to shake their
head at the irony of a group of people subject to the control of a government
only through what could charitably be described as acquiescence, and less
charitably as violent conquest.46 One key tenet of consent theory is that the lack
of consent to government action in the context of conquest is mere tyranny.47
Tyrannical, totalitarian governance by the United States has been at the heart of
American Indian affairs over the last two centuries.48
To be sure, in numerous instances American Indian tribes have freely given
their consent to American action, usually through some sort of treaty
arrangement or federal-tribal agreement, typically codified in acts of
Congress.49 But all too often, the federal government (along with the states)
44. It should be said, however, that tribal interests in recent decades have become
formidable lobbyists and negotiators, and so lack of consent in much recent legislation is
somewhat illusory. See DANIEL M. COBB, NATIVE ACTIVISM IN COLD WAR AMERICA: THE
STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY (2008); Andrew Ramonas, Akin Gump's Tribal Campaigns:
Firm's Specialized Practice Group Aided by Many American Indian Lobbyists, NAT'L L.
J., Aug. 15, 2011, at 1.
45. See generally Angelique EagleWoman, Tribal Nation Economics: Rebuilding
Commercial Prosperity in Spite of U.S. Trade Restraints-Recommendations for Economic
Revitalization in Indian Country, 44 TULSA L. REv. 383 (2009) (reviewing federal limits on
reservation economies); Carole Goldberg, In Theory, In Practice: Judging State Jurisdiction
in Indian Country, 81 U. CoLo. L.REV. 1027 (2010) (reviewing state jurisdiction over Indian
Country in Public Law 280 states); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Formalism and Judicial
Supremacy in Federal Indian Law, 32 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 391 (2007-2008) (reviewing
multiple cases recognizing state jurisdiction over Indian Country affairs).
46. See generally WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND-WHITE MAN'S LAW: A
STUDY OF THE PAST AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 25-97 (1971).
47. See John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil
Government, in SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME, & ROUSSEAU 1, 103-15
(Oxford University Press 1980) (1690).
48. See, e.g., ANDREA SMITH, CONQUEST: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND AMERICAN INDIAN
GENOCIDE (2005) (cataloguing the impacts of tyranny on American Indian women); Felix S.
Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy, 62 YALE L.
J. 348 (1953) (surveying federal bureaucratic acts of tyranny, including suppression of free
speech and religious freedom, in Indian Country from 1950-1953, in the words and
admissions of federal officials). See generally Robert A. Williams, Jr., Gendered Checks and
Balances: Understanding the Legacy of White Patriarchy in an American Indian Cultural
Context, 24 GA. L. REV. 1019 (1990).
49. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 36 (describing history of treaty relations
through 1800); Collins, supra note 2, at 372-73 (describing Indian consent through treaties,
sovereign-to-sovereign agreements, and federal statutes allowing tribes to opt-in); G.
William Rice, 25 U.S.C. §§71: The End of Indian Sovereignty or a Self-Limitation of
Contractual Ability?, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 239 (1977) (arguing that the 1871 statute ending
the treaty period of Indian affairs still allows for the United States and Indian tribes to enter
into treaty-like agreements, and describing several such arrangements).
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disregarded the limits of that consent to government action.o In recent decades,
however, Congress and the Executive branch have dramatically improved their
recognition and respect of the limits of tribal consent to federal government
action (with some equally dramatic negative action as well).1 Moreover, the
last few presidential administrations have ordered federal agencies to consult
with tribal governments before making significant policy choices affecting
tribal interests.52 And yet, the Supreme Court's decisions in recent decades
have replaced Congress and the federal bureaucracy as the leading federal
policymaking entity in many aspects of Indian affairs. Many of the Court's
decisions have enabled and actively encouraged state governments to oppose
tribal sovereignty, putting tribes and states in a prisoner's dilemma game where
states have all of the bargaining chips.54 In short, Justice Kennedy's vision of
50. Many of the lack of consent cases involve dispossession of Indian lands. See
generally JANET A. MCDONNELL, THE DISPOSSESSION OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN, 1887-1934
(1991) (reviewing nonconsensual allotment and its impacts). Other consent cases involve the
termination of Indian tribes by Congress. See generally Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric Biggs,
The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 139 (1977).
51. A prime example of how modern congressional statutes have incorporated tribal
consent into Indian affairs are "opt-in" statutes, such as the Tribal Law and Order Act
(TLOA), which allow tribes to exert greater law enforcement authority if they provide
adequate constitutional safeguards. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(7)(a)-(d) (2006). Tribes that
choose to continue exercising criminal jurisdiction under the older version of the Indian
Civil Rights Act, with its one-year limitation on sentencing authority per offense, may do so.
E.g., Miranda v. Anchondo, 654 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 2011) (upholding tribal court sentence
for violent crimes under pre-TLOA version of Indian Civil Rights Act).
52. E.g., Press Release, President Barack Obama, Memorandum for the Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies: Tribal Consultation (Nov. 5, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/memorandum-tribal-consultation-signed-
president. For a laundry list of other administrative materials on tribal consultation in the last
several administrations, see Thomas Schlosser, Orders and Policies Regarding Consultation
with Indian Tribes, MORISSET, SCHLOSSER & JOZWIAK, available at
http://www.schlosserlawfiles.com/consult/PoliciesReConsult%20w-IndianTribe.htm (last
visited March 18, 2012).
53. "Judicial plenary power" is a phrase introduced into the field by professor and
tribal judge Frank Pommersheim. See Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts and the Federal
Judiciary: Opportunities and Challenges for a Constitutional Democracy, 58 MONT. L. REV.
313, 328 (1997). See generally FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE: INDIANS, INDIAN
TRIBES, AND THE CONSTITUTION 211-56 (2009); Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal
Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIz. ST. L.J. 113, 214 (2002); Frank
Pommersheim, At the Crossroads: A New and Unfortunate Paradigm of Tribal Sovereignty,
55 S.D. L. REv. 48, 52 (2010); Frank Pommersheim, Lara: A Constitutional Crisis
in Indian Law?, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 299, 304 (2003-2004); Frank Pommersheim, Tribal
Courts and the Federal Judiciary: Opportunities and Challenges for a Constitutional
Democracy, 58 MONT. L. REV. 313, 328 (1997); Skibine, supra note 45, at 392-93; Gloria
Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court's Indian Law Decisions: Deviations from
Constitutional Principles and the Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 405,412 (2003).
54. See generally Skibine, supra note 45, at 416-36. The best examples of granting
wins to state governments that have intruded on tribal sovereignty because they can are
Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058 (2009) (holding that the Department of Interior cannot
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consent in Indian affairs only works one way, and hearkens back to 19th
century and early 20th century Indian affairs policies of assimilation and
destruction of tribal governments and sovereignties."
The first Part of this paper is a short history of the incorporation of Indian
tribes into the American polity, largely without the consent of Indian tribes and
Indian people. The second part moves beyond the discussion of the lack of
tribal consent to federal and state governance, and how that lack of consent
actually generated the legal and political justification for congressional (and
federal) plenary power over Indian affairs. The third Part describes how express
and literal consent has come to dominate federal common law on tribal
authority over nonmembers. This Part explores the irony of introducing
nonmembers in vast numbers into Indian Country without tribal consent, and
then forcing tribal governments to acquire literal consent from those
nonmembers in order to govern them. The lack of authority over nonconsenting
nonmembers has led to sometimes devastating consequences for Indian people.
The fourth, and last, Part argues for a theory of tribal consent. Unlike the vague
and even fictional consent espoused by thinkers such as Justice Kennedy, and
denigrated by critics who bemoan its limitations, tribal consent theory should
be explored and integrated in federal Indian law. In fact, the United Nations
Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples requires that states acquired
the free and informed consent of indigenous governments and people before
taking action detrimental to those peoples, 6 giving rise to a kind of literal
consent theory and practice desperately needed in American Indian affairs.
take land into trust for the Narragansett Tribe, despite seventy years of agency precedent
affirming that authority); Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005)
(affirming state authority to tax on-reservation gasoline sales after the State of Kansas
unilaterally cancelled a viable tax agreement with the Nation); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v.
New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (affirming state authority to tax nonmember entity doing
business on tribal trust lands).
55. See generally ECHO-HAWK, supra note 19, at 161-216 (describing two important
Supreme Court decisions from the 19th century that went a long way toward assimilating
Indian people and destroying tribal governments: Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 118 U.S. 556
(1903), and United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913)).
56. Six times the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
requires consent by indigenous peoples for state action. See United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note I, atarts. 10, I1, 19, 28, 29, 32.
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I. TRIBAL CONSENT PRIOR TO THE MODERN ERA OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
(1789-1959)"
A. The Non-Consensual Incorporation of Indian Tribes into the American
Polity
The Founders of the United States did not invite American Indian nations
(or tribes) to the Constitutional Convention, nor did they ask Indian nations to
ratify the Constitution." Indian nations likely would not have chosen to ratify
the Constitution," as it does relatively little to recognize and preserve the
sovereignty of Indian nations.60 Indian tribes originally had almost no part to
play in the dual-sovereignty system of federal and state government established
by the Constitution.6 ' The text of the Constitution expressly treats Indians and
tribes as outsiders.62 They were outsiders, just like foreign nations, although
most Indian tribes were considered domestic, not foreign, nations after the
1830s. And yet, like foreign nations, Indian tribes were parties to hundreds of
Senate-ratified and President-proclaimed treaties with the United States, the
same treaties that form the basis for modern American Indian law and policy.,6
These treaties established a blurry dividing line between the American and
65tribal sovereignties, a line that persists in various forms in the 21st century.65
57. Charles Wilkinson argues that 1959 is the beginning of the "modern era" of
American Indian law. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW:
NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 1 (1987).
58. See generally RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2009) (no reference to Indians or Indian tribes at all in this
history of the Constitutional Convention). Women, slaves, and non-landowners weren't
invited either. See generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 42-58 (3rd ed. 2008).
59. At the time of the Founding, scholars agree that Indian tribes were the equivalent of
foreign nations. E.g., Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
1069, 1082-86 (2004); Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L.
REV. 799, 821-25 (2007).
60. There is no express constitutional safeguard for tribal government authority
contained in the Constitution, nor is there is an express limit on congressional authority in
Indian affairs. See FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 44 (1995).
61. See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 24, at vii.
62. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Indian commerce clause); art. I, § 2, para. 3
("Indians not taxed" clause); POMMERSHEIM, supra note 53, at 165.
63. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. I (183 1) (labeling tribes "domestic dependent
nations"). All federally recognized tribes now are "domestic," but our current situation was
not complete until the final settling of the West. See generally EDWARD H. SPICER, A SHORT
HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 66-146 (Krieger reprint ed. 1983) (1969).
64. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 53, at 63 ("more than 350"). See generally
WILLIAMS, supra note 43; Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of
Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth" -
How Long a Time is That?, 63 CAL. L REv. 601, 602-17 (1975).
65. Charles Wilkinson coined the phrase, "measured separatism," to describe the
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Justice Kennedy recently suggested (though he was not the first6 6 ) that Indian
tribes are an "extraconstitutional" part of the American constitutional
structure.
However, something amazing has happened in American constitutional law
in the centuries that have followed. Indian tribes are a part of the American
constitutional polity-they are the "Third Sovereign," as Justice O'Connor
famously noted after visiting two American Indian tribal courts in 1999.61
Somehow, Indian tribes have been at least partially incorporated into the
American constitutional polity, playing a part alongside the states and the
federal government.6 9 Tribes operate federal government programs and
services, 70 negotiate inter-governmental cooperative agreements with states and
local governments,7 ' and exercise government authority over numerous classes
of American citizens, 72 including the authority to send people to prison.7 ' All of
negotiated line between Indian tribes and the American polity. WILKINSON, supra note 57, at
14-19.
66. Once again, Charles Wilkinson was likely the first. See WILKINSON, supra note 57,
at 14. See also Frank Pommersheim, Lara: A Constitutional Crisis in Indian Law?, 28 AM.
INDIAN L. REv. 299, 302 (2003-2004); Rebecca Tsosie, Tribalism, Constitutionalism, and
Cultural Pluralism: Where Do Indigenous Peoples Fit Within Civil Society?, 5 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 357, 359 (2003).
67. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 213 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
68. Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33
TULSA L.J. 1 (1997).
69. E.g., Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1919 (2006) (authorizing
intergovernmental agreements between tribes and states to regulate Indian child welfare
cases); Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (2006) (requiring state
governors and tribes to negotiate gaming compacts at the tribes' request); Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C § 7601(d) (2006) (authorizing the EPA to treat tribes "as states" for the purpose of
maintaining and protecting air resources).
70. See generally Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton, Self-Governance for Indian
Tribes: From Paternalism to Empowerment, 27 CONN. L. Riv. 1251, 1262-78 (1995)
(describing the rise of tribal self-governance from "638 contracts" to "self-governance
contracts").
71. See CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATrORNEYs GENERAL, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW
DESKBOOK 620-60 (4th ed. 2008); GETCHES, ET AL., supra note 20, at 634-35.
72. E.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408 (1989) (tribal civil regulatory authority over nonmembers living in "closed" portion
of reservation); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (tribal taxing
authority over nonmembers); Smith v. Salish Kootenai College, 434 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1209 (2006) (tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmember Indians);
PacifiCorp v. Mobil Oil Corp., 8 Navajo Rep. 378 (Navajo Nation Supreme Court 2004)
(tribal civil adjudicatory and regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers); Nat'l Aerospace
Museum v. Seneca Niagara Falls Gaming Corp., No. 0179-05-01 (Seneca Nation of Indians
Court of Appeals 2007) (unreported) (tribal civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonmember
entity), excerpted in MATTHEw L.M. FLETCHER, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW 524-26
(2011).
73. E.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S.
376 (1896); Miranda v. Anchondo, 654 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 2011); Means v. District Court of
Chinle Judicial District, 7 Navajo Rep. 383 (Navajo Nation Supreme Court 1999); Eastern
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this authority derives from an inherent sovereign authority possessed by all
Indian tribes, but still subject to limitation by Congress or the Supreme Court-
a structure that presumes tribal incorporation to the American political
structure, despite the complete lack of a Constitutional amendment that would
codify such an arrangement.74
How did this happen?
There is no easy answer to this question, but an understanding of the
meandering and complicated route by which Indian tribes started out as purely
outsiders but eventually found themselves a part of the American constitutional
structure can be reached by a review of the history of American Indian affairs.
B. Exclusion of Indian Tribes
Early American politics established the outsider status of Indian tribes in
what would become the American constitutional polity. The weakened nascent
American state had reason to fear the Indian military presence on the borders of
the Western lands.76 Decades later, Chief Justice John Marshall would imply
that the infant American Republic had every reason to fear a massive Indian
military offensive that could push the United States into the Atlantic Ocean.n
President Washington articulated a strong policy favoring purchasing Indian
Band of Cherokee Indians v. Torres, 4 Cherokee Rep. 9, 2005 WL 6437828 (Eastern Band
of Cherokee Indians Supreme Court 2005) (tribal criminal jurisdiction over Mexican
national).
74. Professor Pommersheim proposes just such an amendment. See POMMERSHEIM,
supra note 53, at 295-312.
75. See generally FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS (1984); S. LYMAN TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN
POLICY (1973).
76. "The Indians are not mentioned in the treaty of 1783, yet they were a very
influential factor in the negotiations." WALTER H. MOHR, FEDERAL INDIAN RELATIONS, 1774-
1788, at 93 (1933).
77. Well, to be more accurate, the Indian tribes and the Americans were at a state of
equipoise. Jack Blair, Demanding a Voice in Our Own Best Interest: A Call for a Delegate of
the Cherokee Nation to the United States House, of Representatives, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
225, 227 (1995-1996). See also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 548 (1832) (noting the
desire of Congress to avoid hostility); RICHARD C. BROWN, ILLUSTRIOUS AMERICANS: JOHN
MARSHALL 213 (1868) ("The Indians were a fierce and dangerous enemy whose love of war
made them sometimes the aggressors, whose numbers and habits made them formidable, and
whose cruel system of warfare seemed to justify every endeavor to remove them to a
distance from civilized settlements." (quoting Letter from Chief Justice Marshall to Justice
Story (Oct. 29, 1828)); ROBERT KENNETH FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN
MARSHALL 54-55 (1968) ("Instead [Marshall] excused the displacement which had occurred
by the most narrow argument possible: the Indians' war-like savagery made their physical
proximity a mortal danger to the conquering settlers, and only to the extent of that danger
might their lands be appropriated." (emphasis added)); Robert J. Miller, American Indian
Influence on the United States Constitution and Its Framers, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 133,
138 (1993) (arguing that the weak post-Revolutionary United States was ill-equipped to deal
with "Indian troubles").
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lands, and causing the "savage, as the wolf, to retire.' 7 ' The United States in its
early years dealt with Indian tribes as it would any foreign nation-through
treaties and diplomacy," and still occasionally war.80
And so, during the short period after the Revolution but before the
ratification of the Constitution-the Confederation period-the Americans
continued to engage Indian tribes as foreign nations."' They continued to enter
into diplomacy and treaties, even as the tribes became weaker and weaker
absent the economic and political buttressing of their British allies. During
this period, some Americans suggested offering a political stake in Congress to
the Cherokees and other tribes, even dangling statehood. The Articles of
Confederation, in a famously contradictory provision, reserved Indian affairs to
the federal government subject to state legislative prerogatives.84 Indian tribes
remained complete outsiders in the American polity. 5
The text of the Constitution establishes that there would be little change in
78. Letter from George Washington to James Duane (Sept. 7, 1783), as reprinted in
GETCHES, ET AL., supra note 20, at 88.
79. See STUART BANNER, How THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON
THE FRONTIER 114-49 (2005). E.g., Treaty of Hopewell with the Cherokees, excerpted in
GETCHES, ET AL., supra note 20, at 89-90.
80. See WILEY SWORD, PRESIDENT WASHINGTON'S INDIAN WAR: THE STRUGGLE FOR
THE OLD NORTHWEST, 1790-1795 (1985).
81. See IPRUCHA, supra note 75, at 44-50, 52-58. See, e.g., Richard B. Collins, Implied
Limitations on the Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 54 WASH. L. REV. 479, 488 n. 55 (1979)
(listing a few Confederation-period treaties). The States were also active during the
Confederation period in treating with Indian tribes, and interfering with federal-tribal treaty
negotiations. See Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L.
REV. 1055, 1138 (1994); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become
Law?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3, 31-35 (2001).
82. The weakening of tribes in the western Great Lakes was especially acute. See
Donald L. Fixico, The Alliance of the Three Fires in Trade and War, 1630-1812, 20:2 MICH.
HIST.REv. 1, 19-23 (1994).
83. See Blair, supra note 77, at 227-28; H. David Williams, Gambling Away the
Inheritance: The Cherokee Nation and Georgia's Gold and Land Lotteries of 1832-1833, 73
GA. HisT. Q. 519, 523 (1989). Even 100 years later, Congress was talking about statehood
for the Oklahoma tribes; Robert N. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of
Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REv. 979, 983
(1981).
84. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 4 ("The United States in
Congress assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive right and power of ... regulating
the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the States,
provided that the legislative right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or
violated . . . ."); See also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 558 (1832) (arguing that the
reservation of state authority "annul[led]" the federal power); Robert S. Pelcyger, Justices
and Indians: Back to Basics, 62 OR. L. REv. 29, 35-37 & n.38 (1983) (describing the need
for, and proposals to ensure, federal control over Indian affairs).
85. See Ann E. Tweedy, 'Hostile Indian Tribes . . . Outlaws, Wolves, . . . Bears ...
Grizzlies and Things Like That?' How the Second Amendment and Supreme Court
Precedent Target Tribal Self-Defense, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 687, 698-703 (2011).
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the status of Indian tribes as political outsiders.6 The Constitution mentioned
Indian tribes only once, in a provision reserving exclusive congressional
authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and Indian tribes, and
among states.87 And so while tribes could therefore not be states or foreign
nations under American constitutional law by virtue of the negative implication
in the Commerce Clause,8 they were something. Chief Justice Marshall's
opinions in the Cherokee Cases recognized as such, but waffled between
labeling tribes "domestic dependent nations" and "distinct, independent
political communities." 89 Regardless, Indian tribes remained constitutional
outsiders,90 as evidenced by the Cherokees eventual "removal" to western lands
in the Trail of Tears. 91
The federal government cemented the outsider status of Indian tribes after
the enactment of the Constitution by maintaining and expanding treaty
relationships with tribes." In all, over 200 treaties with Indian tribes remain at
least partially extant, and perhaps over 400 such treaties reached at least the
stage where the parties executed them (although the Senate might not have
ratified every one).93 There can be no greater expression of distance between
the United States and another political entity than that of a treaty relationship
under the Constitution.94 Despite Congress's decision to stop treating with
86. See generally Clinton, supra note 53.
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For a detailed history of the origins of the Indian
Commerce Clause, and a survey of the scholarly debates surrounding its meaning, see
Richard D. Pomp, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Indian Commerce Clause and State
Taxation, 63 TAx LAW. 897, 932-46 (2010). See also Lester Marston & David A. Fink, The
Indian Commerce Clause: The Reports of its Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 16
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 205 (1986).
88. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 18 (1831) (Marshall, C.J.) ("In this
clause they are as clearly contradistinguished by a name appropriate to themselves, from
foreign nations, as from the several states composing the union. They are designated by a
distinct appellation; and as this appellation can be applied to neither of the others, neither can
the appellation distinguishing either of the others be in fair construction applied to them.").
89. Compare Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17 (Marshall, C.J.) ("domestic dependent
nations"), with Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 557 (1832) ("distinct political
communities"); id. at 559 ("distinct, independent political communities").
90. In 1830, Congress passed the Indian Removal Act, 4 Stat. 411, establishing federal
policy in support of "removing" Indians to the western lands, authorizing the President to
execute treaties with Indians to that effect, and even authorizing the President to use force
against Indians who refused to comply with a removal treaty. See generally Alfred A. Cave,
Abuse of Power: Andrew Jackson and the Indian Removal Act of 1830, 65 HISTORIAN 1330,
1331-36 (2003) (examining the enactment of the Indian Removal Act).
91. See THEDA PERDUE & MICHAEL D. GREEN, THE CHEROKEE NATION AND THE TRAIL
OF TEARS (2007).
92. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 43, at 14-39 (detailing origins and policies of
American treaty policy).
93. See WILKINSON, supra note 65, at 8.
94. See Mike Townsend, Congressional Abrogation of Indian Treaties: Reevaluation
and Reform, 98 YALE L. J. 793, 797-98 (1989).
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Indian tribes in 1871 " Indian treaties remain the cornerstone of the
relationship of Indian tribes and the federal government. And, while many
Indian tribes currently recognized as sovereigns by the United States do not
have a treaty relationship (at least according to the United States), as a
practical matter the federal government deals with them as independent
political entities akin to treaty tribes.98
The exclusion of Indian tribes from the American constitutional structure
made good sense from the point of view of the Americans so long as "Indian
Country" remained outside of the exterior boundaries of the United States."
American Indian law and policy during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
and likely as late as the 1960s, almost always involved efforts to exterminate
the political existence of Indian tribes, not to mention the cultures of Indian
communities."" But a difficult tension arose-and continues to exist-as
Indian tribes became physically (but not legally) incorporated into the United
States by virtue of refusing to disappear.' 0
The Constitution's Framers spent little time debating how to handle Indian
affairs.1 02 James Madison's Federalist No. 42 indicates that the Framers' main
preoccupation was ensuring that the federal government would retain exclusive
authority to deal in Indian affairs, keeping the states and American citizens at
95. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120,§ 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (1871), codified at 25 U.S.C. §
71 (2006). See generally Rice, supra note 49.
96. See Vine Deloria, Jr., Reserving to Themselves: Treaties and the Powers of Indian
Tribes, 38 ARiz. L. REV. 963, 974-79 (1996).
97. See Sharon O'Brien, Tribes and Indians: With Whom Does the United States
Maintain a Relationship, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1461, 1472-74 (1991).
98. See William W. Quinn, Jr., Federal Acknowledgment of American Indian Tribes:
Authority, Judicial Interposition, and 25 C.F.R. 83, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 37, 43-44 (1992).
99. See Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M'Intosh and the
Expropriation of American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1110-18 (2000); cf
generally Ed White, Early American Nations as Imagined Communities, 56 AM. Q. 49, 63-
67, 69-73 (2004) (contrasting "early American nations" with Indian tribes).
100. See, e.g., MICHAEL PAUL ROGIN, FATHERS AND CHILDREN: ANDREW JACKSON AND
THE SUBJUGATION OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 113-250 (1975) (recounting program of removal
and occasionally extermination of southeastern Indian tribes); Rennard Strickland, The
Genocidal Premise in Native American Law and Policy: Exorcising Aboriginal Ghosts, I J.
GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE 325, 326 (1998) (noting American policymakers saw "destruction
as weapons of salvation").
101. E.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Same-Sex Marriage, Indian Tribes, and the
Constitution, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 53, 83 (2006) (arguing that American policy debates on
same-sex marriage excluding the import of Indian tribes may create unanticipated
consequences on the constitutional status of Indian tribes); Alex Tallchief Skibine,
Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes Within Our Federalism: Beyond the Dependency
Paradigm, 38 CONN. L. REV. 667, 669-77 (2006) (discussing different theories of
incorporation of Indian tribes into the constitutional structure, and their difficulties).
102. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 107-08 (2005);
Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and Contemporary
Comment, 25 MINN. L. REv. 423, 466 (1941).
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bay. 103 As a policy matter, the early American Republic saw Indian affairs as
involving primarily three questions: who would acquire Indian lands,' 04 who
would regulate trade with remaining Indian people and tribes,05 and how to
avoid Indian wars. 06 Of the three, the most pressing by far involved Indian
lands,o7 and that fact alone demonstrates a major assumption of the Framers
and the leaders of the early Republic-Indian tribes were unnecessary to the
United States, and constituted a clear and direct competitor to the security of
America."0 s The second policy point, driven home most specifically by Thomas
Jefferson's efforts to regulate and develop trade with Indians, involved an effort
to make the presence of Indian people (not tribes) more palatable (and
valuable) to Americans.109 Jefferson and others fervently hoped that Indian
people would abandon their tribal relations and become civilized as a result of
this trade; and if not, to disappear along with the tribes."o The third policy
point, it goes without saying, again recognizes the serious threat that Indian
tribes posed to the United States, a young and relatively poor government."' In
103. See FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison) ("The regulation of commerce with the
Indian tribes is very properly unfettered from two limitations in the articles of Confederation,
which render the provision obscure and contradictory. The power is there restrained to
Indians, not members of any of the States, and is not to violate or infringe the legislative
right of any State within its own limits. What description of Indians are to be deemed
members of a State, is not yet settled, and has been a question of frequent perplexity and
contention in the federal councils. And how the trade with Indians, though not members of a
State, yet residing within its legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by an external
authority, without so far intruding on the internal rights of legislation, is absolutely
incomprehensible."); see also Robert N. Clinton, State Power over Indian Reservations: A
Critical Comment on Burger Court Doctrine, 26 S.D. L. REv. 434,435-36 (1981) (collecting
additional historical materials suggesting the Framers intended to make Indian affairs
exclusively a federal question).
104. See generally Robert A. Williams, Jr., Jefferson, the Norman Yoke, and American
Indian Lands, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 165 (1987) (analyzing the history of Indian lands purchases
from 1763 to the early American Republic).
105. See Abel, supra note 102, at 466; Clinton, supra note 103, at 435-36; Robert
Laurence, The Indian Commerce Clause, 23 ARIZ. L. REv. 203, 223-27 (1981).
106. See Kades, supra note 99, at 1131-41.
107. See generally THOMAS PERKINS ABERNETHY, WESTERN LANDS AND THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 162-361 (1937) (recounting American political maneuvers regarding Indian
lands in the west after the Revolution and before the Constitutional Convention).
108. See FEDERALIST No. 24 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The savage tribes on our Western
frontier ought to be regarded as our natural enemies, their [the British] natural allies, because
they have most to fear from us, and most to hope from them.").
109. See R.S. Cotterill, Indian Management in the South, 1789-1825, 20 MISS. VALLEY
HIST. REV. 333, 340-44 (1933).
110. See BERNARD W. SHEEHAN, SEEDS OF EXTINCTION: JEFFERSONIAN PHILANTHROPY
AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 3-4 (1973); Raymond Cross, American Indian Education: The
Terror of History and the Nation's Debt to the Indian People, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 941, 949 & n.31 (1999).
111. See generally ScoTT A. SILVERSTONE, DIVIDED UNION: THE POLITICS OF WAR IN
THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 25-118 (2004) (noting early American political concern
about Indian tribes and their potential military threat).
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sum, for the United States, Indian tribes, people, and lands constituted a
national question, and potentially a vast revenue-generating endeavor.I 2
Over the course of the next two centuries, American law and policy in
Indian affairs wavered from passive-aggressive efforts to undermine Indian
tribes, to overtly aggressive (even violent and viciously oppressive) attacks on
tribal governance. While the experience of every Indian tribe is unique, the
experience of tribal communities such as the Anishinaabek in the Great Lakes
region'13 and the Coast Salish communities cf the Pacific Northwest" 4 provide
excellent snapshots of the federal government's efforts to hasten the political
extinction of Indian tribes in the United States."
The story of the Anishinaabek (primarily Ojibwe, Odawa, and
Bodewadmi)"'6 in the Great Lakes differs again, in that the tribes established a
treaty relationship with the United States creating (but not necessarily)
guaranteeing reservations."' The key treaties involved the massive cessions of
lands by the tribes to the United States, the largest perhaps being the cession of
about one-third of what would become the State of Michigan in the 1836
Treaty of Washington.'" Hovering over these tribes during this period was the
ever-present threat of removal to the west,'9 though largely due to the short
growing season in their northernmost portions of their territories, the federal
government was successful in removing only a fraction of these tribal
communities. 120 These tribal communities remain in their home territories,
112. See Jennifer Roback, Exchange, Sovereignty, and Indian-Anglo Relations, in
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INDIAN ECONOMIES 5, 17-20 (Terry Lee Anderson ed. 1992).
113. E.g., Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark, Respect, Responsibility, and Renewal: The
Foundations of Anishinaabe Treaty Making with the United States and Canada, 34 AM.
INDIAN CULTURE & REs. J. 145 (2010).
114. E.g., Frank W. Porter, In Search of Recognition: Federal Indian Policy and the
Landless Tribes of Western Washington, 14 AM. INDIAN Q. 113 (1990).
115. Cf. generally W.G. Rice, The Position of the American Indian in the Law of the
United States, 16 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT'L L. (3D SER.) 78, 84 (1934) (suggesting that
American treaty rights would expire if the tribe expired).
116. See generally EDWARD BENTON-BENAI, THE MISHOMIS BOOK: THE VOICE OF THE
OJIBWE (1979); Stark, supra note 113.
117. See, e.g., CHARLES E. CLELAND, RITES OF CONQUEST (1992) (detailing histories of
Michigan Indian tribes); MELISSA L. MEYER, THE WHITE EARTH TRAGEDY: ETHNICITY AND
DISPOSSESSION AT A MINNESOTA ANISHINAABE RESERVATION 19 (1994) (mapping the
Minnesota Indian reservations); RONALD N. SATZ, CHIPPEWA TREATY RIGHTS: THE
RESERVED RIGHTS OF WISCONSIN'S CHIPPEWA INDIANS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 13
(1991); Benjamin Ramirez-Shkwegnaabi, The Dynamics of American Indian Diplomacy in
the Great Lakes Region, 27 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 53 (2003) (detailing
Anishinaabek treaty negotiations throughout the Great Lakes).
118. Treaty with the Ottawa, Etc. art. I, Mar. 28, 1836, 7 Stat. 491. For a general map
of treaty ceded waters, see CHIPPEWA OTTAWA RESOURCE AUTHORITY, 1836 TREATY
FISHERY 3, available at http://www.1836cora.org/documents/1836TreatyFishery.pdf. See
also United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 202 (W.D. Mich. 1979) (another map).
119. See United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. at 207-11.
120. Compare, e.g., James M. McClurken, Ottawa Adaptive Strategies to Indian
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though in reservations much smaller than the original homelands.12' Coupled
with aggressive cultural attacks such as boarding schools, 22 and through
immersion in large numbers of non-Indians, many of these tribal communities
(mostly those in Michigan) were unable to avoid administrative termination for
significant time periods. 23 However, the revitalization of these tribes has been
nothing short of remarkable in the last few decades. Starting in the late 1960s,
numerous Indians from these communities in Michigan, Wisconsin, and
Minnesota began exercising off-reservation treaty rights to hunt, fish, and
gather.124 These efforts have proven largely successful in cases such as United
States v. Michigan,' Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians v. Voigt,126 and Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,m
the only case from the Great Lakes area to reach the Supreme Court.
Similarly, the Coast Salish tribal communities in the Pacific northwest
128
executed land cession treaties, agreed to move to smaller reservation areas
(often crowding into small reservations with several other tribes),'129 and then
Removal, 12 MICH. HIST. REV., Spring 1986, at 29, 38-40 (detailing Michigan Ottawa
strategies to avoid removal), with, e.g., WILLIAM E. UNRAU, TRIBAL DISPOSSESSION AND THE
OTTAWA UNIVERSITY FRAUD 35-58 (1985) (detailing Ohio Ottawa removal to lands west of
the Mississippi River).
121. See, e.g., Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. State of Michigan, 784 F. Supp.
418, 420-21 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (recounting cession of lands via treaty by tribe); United
States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 231-33 (W.D. Mich. 1979) (describing cession of
lands and establishment of small reservations in 1836 treaty).
122. See THE TREE THAT NEVER DIES: ORAL HISTORY OF THE MICHIGAN INDIANS 52-54
(Pamela J. Dobson ed., 1978) (describing the Mount Pleasant Indian School, which was run
like a military school where students received punishments so severe that scarring resulted
from the beatings).
123. E.g., Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. Office of the U.S.
Attorney for the W. Dist. of Mich., 369 F.3d 960, 961-62 & n.2 (6th Cir. 2004) (detailing
administrative termination of the Grand Traverse Band); TOMAC v. Norton, 433 F.3d 852,
865 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting administrative termination of Pokagon Band of Potawatomi
Indians).
124. See generally LARRY NESPER, THE WALLEYE WAR: THE STRUGGLE FOR OJlBWE
SPEARFISHING AND TREATY RIGHTS (2002); Diane H. Delekta, State Regulation of Treaty
Indians Hunting and Fishing Rights in Michigan, 1980 DET. C. L. REV. 1097; Catherine M.
Ovsak, Reaffirming the Guarantee: Indian Treaty Rights to Hunt and Fish Off-Reservation
in Minnesota, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1177 (1994);
125. 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979), modified by, 653 F.2d 277 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981).
126. 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Besadny v. Lac Courte Oreilles
Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, 464 U.S. 805 (1983).
127. 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
128. See generally Michael C. Blumm & Brett M. Swift, The Indian Treaty Piscary
Profit and Habitat Protection in the Pacific Northwest: A Property Rights Approach, 69 U.
COLO. L. REv. 407, 426-33 (1998); Kent Richards, The Stevens Treaties, 1854-1855, 106
OR. HIST. Q. 342 (2005).
129. See 0. Yale Lewis III, Treaty Fishing Rights: A Habitat Right as Part of the
Trinity of Rights Implied by the Fishing Clause of the Stevens Treaties, 27 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 281, 289-90 (2002-2003).
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all but withered away' 3" until the 1960s when individual Indians began to assert
off-reservation treaty rights.' 3 ' But in cases such as United States v.
Washington, Sohappy v. Smith, 33 and various water rights cases such as the
Snake River general stream adjudication, 34 Indian tribes in the region were
able to re-establish the viability of their tribal governments.'3 1 In recent
decades, these tribes have been leaders in managing scarce fishing resources
and preserving fisheries and wildlife habitats in the region.136
The stories of these tribes and many others like them are indicative of the
incredible survival of tribal governments through the entirety of American
history. Despite a clear lineage of federal law and policy supporting the
extermination of Indian tribes, many hundreds of have survived.
C. Living with (and Incorporating) Indian Tribes
Currently, there are 566 federally recognized Indian tribes,'3 ' despite two
centuries Indian law and policy geared toward destroying tribal governments
and the cultures of Indian people.'" Starting in 1934, with the Indian
130. Cf. Blumm & Swift, supra note 128, at 433-35 (describing decline of Indian
fishing activities after the establishment of the treaty right); Donald L. Parman, Inconstant
Advocacy: The Erosion of Indian Fishing Rights in the Pacific Northwest, 1933-1956, 53
PAC. HIST. REV. 163, 166-72 (1984) (detailing challenges to Indian fishing rights).
131. See generally CHARLES WILKINSON, MESSAGES FROM FRANK'S LANDING: A STORY
OF SALMON, TREATIES, AND THE INDIAN WAY (2000) (a history of United States v.
Washington and Billy Frank, Jr., a key leader in the treaty fishing movement); Bradley G.
Shreve, "From Time Immemorial": The Fish-In Movement and the Rise of Intertribal
Activism, 78 PAC. HIST. REV. 403 (2009) (discussing the origins of the "fish-in movement").
132. 384 F. Supp. 312, 343 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676, 689 (9th Cir.
1975); Washington v. Wash. Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658
(1979).
133. 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969).
134. In re Snake River Basin Water Sys., 764 P. 2d 78 (Idaho 1988), cert. denied sub
nom., Boise-Kune Irr. Dist. v. United States, 490 U.S. 1005 (1989).
135. E.g., SHARON O'BRIEN, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS 189-95 (1989)
(detailing development of the Yakima tribal government in part as a result of treaty rights).
Cf. generally Daniel H. Israel, The Reemergence of Tribal Nationalism and Its Impact on
Reservation Resource Development, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 617 (1975).
136. See Blumm & Swift, supra note 128, at 460-62; Michael C. Blumm & Jane G.
Steadman, Indian Treaty Rights and Habitat Protection: The Martinez Decision Supplies a
Resounding Judicial Reaffirmation, 49 NAT. RESOURCES J. 653, 698-99 (2009). See also
Ronald L. Trosper, Northwest Coast Indigenous institutions that Supported Resilience and
Sustainability, 41 ECOLOGICAL EcON. 329 (2002) (articulating principles of tribal ecological
management).
137. See supra note 9.
138. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment); Frank Pommersheim, A Path Near the Clearing: An Essay on Constitutional
Adjudication in Tribal Courts, 27 GONz. L. REv. 393, 403 (1991-1992). Kaighn Smith, Jr.,
Tribal Self-Deternination and Judicial Restraint: The Problem of Labor and Employment
Relations within the Reservation, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REv. 505, 506 (2008).
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Reorganization Act,139 Congress legislated with an eye toward recognizing
Indian tribes as viable, permanent entities. 40 But Congress quickly deviated
from that path,' 4 ' and it was not until probably the late 1960s and early 1970s
that the federal government's policymaking branches of government finally
concluded through law and policy choices that Indian tribes were here to
stay. 42 Ironically, the Supreme Court acknowledged the permanent sovereignty
of Indian tribes and the likelihood that they would be around years before,
perhaps as early as 1959.143
The presence of Indian tribes within the borders of the United States has
139. Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act, Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984
(1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C §§ 461-479 (2006)).
140. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 476, 477 (2006) (reorganization of tribal governments as
constitutional entities and chartering federal corporations for tribal economic development
purposes).
141. Within a decade, Congress turned toward holding hearings in support of a repeal
of the Indian Reorganization Act. See Repealing the So-Called Wheeler-Howard Act, S. Res.
1031, 78th Cong. (1944); Kenneth R. Philp, Termination: A Legacy of the Indian New Deal,
14:2 W. HIsT. Q. 165, 171 (1983).
142. See generally Michael C. Walch, Terminating the Termination Policy, 35 STAN.
L.REv. 1181 (1983). The enactment in 1975 of the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2003 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 450), effectively establishes Indian tribes as federal administrators of federal programs in
Indian Country.
143. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). See generally Dewi lone Ball,
Williams v. Lee (1959) 50 Years Later: A Reassessment of One of the Most Important Cases
in the Modern-Era of Federal Indian Law, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 391 (2010); Bethany R.
Berger, Williams v. Lee and the Debate over Indian Equality, 109 MICH. L. REv. 1463
(2011). Professor Ball's unearthing of Supreme Court memoranda provides interesting
colloquies between the Justices in the Williams case that suggests the Court recognized tribal
sovereignty in the Navajo Nation:
[i]n 1953, Congress undertook some major legislation in this area. It passed a bill giving state
courts jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters involving Indians on reservations but it
specified the states involved-and Arizona was not included The legislative history of the
bill is most informative. In discussing the bill the House Committee stated: "As a practical
matter, the enforcement of law and order among the Indians in the Indian Country has been
left largely to the Indian groups themselves." This would appear to be persuasive proof of
Congress' intent and understanding of the present state of the law.
Ball, supra, at 398 (quoting Bench Memorandum, 1958 Term, Williams v. Lee, No. 39,
Certiorari to Supreme Court of Ariz. at 6-7 (on file with the Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C., Earl Warren Papers, Manuscript Division, Box 188)). See also id. at 399
("Importantly for the Navajo, Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William J. Brennan
supported the presumption of inherent tribal sovereignty. Without the introduction of state
legislation to confirm the actions of Congress, Warren said, '[the] 1953 Act gave jurisdiction
conditionally- [A]rizona does not want to carry expense of that change."') (quoting
Conference, Williams v. Lee, No. 39 (Nov. 21, 1958) (on file with the Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C., William 0. Douglas Papers, Manuscript Divisions, Box 1201)). Justice
Black expressed his support for tribal nations in the mid-1960s as well: "Justice Hugo
Lafayette Black was generally supportive of Native American rights, as was Justice William
0. Douglas. In a letter to Murray Lincoln, Chief Justice of the Navajo tribe, dated June 14 of
1965, Justice Hugo Black wrote, '[y]ou know, I am also sure, the great interest and
sympathy I feel for the Tribes that seek to preserve their ways of life."' Id.
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created a kind of constitutional conundrum. As noted earlier, the Framers
appeared to assume that at some point, Indian tribes would phase out of
existence. But here they are in the twenty-first century, many of them operating
robust and large government bureaucracies,' 44 enforcing criminal laws,'45 and
managing million- and billion-dollar business concerns. 46 Thousands, and
perhaps hundreds of thousands, of non-Indian Americans rely upon Indian
tribes for employment and business opportunities. 4 7 Even if the federal
government or anyone else desired to pursue the eradication of Indian tribes, it
would not be politically or economically viable. But while Indian tribes are
here to stay as political bodies, and as economic engines, it is not so clear how
they are incorporated into the American constitutional polity, if at all.
This last fact puts Indian tribes in a particular quandary. If they are not
"under" the Constitution, then what are they? They certainly are not "foreign
nations," and they even more certainly are not "States." 4 8
Despite all of the bad history of American Indian affairs, Indian tribal
sovereignty is at its peak since long before the establishment of the United
States. 49 Indian tribes retain enormous authority over their own territories and
members.'o They have immunity from suit in federal and state courts, '5 except
144. See FLETCHER, supra note 72, chap. 13 (examining tribal administrative
practices); JONATHAN B. TAYLOR, DETERMINANTS OF DEVELOPMENT SUCCESS OF NATIVE
NATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 4 (2008) available at
http://nni.arizona.edu/resources/inpp/determinants-of-development-success-english.pdf
("The demands of self government require performing certain jobs well. Without the staffs
to design the wildlife protection plan, maintain the land title records, or operate the police
dispatch system, Native nations fail to achieve their own objectives").
145. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); CARRIE E. GARROW & SARAH
DEER, TRIBAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (2004).
146. E.g., Nicholas M. Jones, Comment, America Clinches Its Purse Strings on
Government Contracts: Navigating Section 8(A) of the Small Business Act through a
Recession Economy, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 491, 491-92 (2008-2009) ("Specifically, the
Department of Defense granted and continues to grant billions of dollars worth of contracts
to tribal businesses through advantageous and often extremely truncated bidding
processes."); Alan P. Meister, Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven Andrew Light, Indian Gaming
and Beyond: Tribal Economic Development and Diversification, 54 S. D. L. REV. 375, 376
(2009) (noting billion-dollar Indian gaming enterprises).
147. About 3600 people work at the Seneca Nation's casinos alone. See Tom Precious,
Senecas Fear Job Loss Under Plan for Casinos, BUFF. NEWS, Sept. 7, 2011, available at
http://www.buffalonews.com/city/capital-connection/albany/article546967.ece. Thousands
more work at Foxwoods Resort Casino, owned by the Mashantucket Pequot Nation. See
DAVID W. WILKINS & HEIDI KilWETINEPINESIIK STARK, AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICS AND THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 147 (3rd ed. 2011).
148. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. I (1831).
149. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN
NATIONS (2005).
150. E.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (tribal membership);
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (criminal jurisdiction over tribal members);
Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 5 NICS App. 37 (Hoopa Valley Trib. Ct. App. 1998)
(zoning regulation over nonmember); Means v. Dist. Ct. of Chinle Jud. Dist., 7 Navajo Rptr.
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as against the United States. They prosecute Indian criminal offenders;'12 they
establish rules of contract,5 probate, 54 domestic relations,'5 and land use;'5 6
and they even partially regulate the activities of people who are not Indians. 57
Indian tribal courts have developed some of the most forward-thinking criminal
diversion courts, including drug courts'5 8 and the famous peacemaker courts at
Navajo, 59 in Alaska,16 0 and elsewhere.' 6'
Indian tribes are experts at administering federal programs and handling
federal and private grant money. Congress has repeatedly recognized the tribal
sovereignty of Indian tribes by listing them as sovereigns eligible to enforce the
Clean Air Act'62 and other federal environmental regimes. 63 Congress
authorized tribal courts to enforce court orders and judgments under the
Violence against Women Act'" and made federal and state courts grant full
383 (Navajo 1999) (criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers).
151. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998); Okla. Tax Comm'n v.
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509-10 (1991); Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1978).
152. E.g., People of the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians v. Champagne, 35 Indian
L. Rep. 6004 (Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Ct. App. 2007). And, occasionally, very
occasionally, tribes prosecute non-Indian offenders, too. See E. Band of Cherokee Indians v.
Torres, Nos. CR 03-1443, CR 03-1529, CR 03-1530, CR 03-1531, CR 03-1819, 2005 N.C.
Cherokee Sup. Ct. LEXIS 6 (Cherokee Sup. Ct. of N.C. 2005).
153. E.g., Pablo v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 1994 Mont. Salish &
Kootenai Tribes LEXIS 7 (Confederated Salish & Kootenai Trib. Ct. App. 1994).
154. E.g., Estate of Sampson, 3 Mash. Rep. 430, No. PB 2000-100, 2002 WL
34247993 (Mashantucket Pequot Trib. 2002).
155. E.g., Husband v. Wife, 3 Mash. App. 37, No. MPCA 2001-1065, 2003 WL
25586059 (Mashantucket Pequot Ct. App. 2003).
156. E.g., Gobin v. Tulalip Tribes of Washington, 6 NICS App. 120 (Tulalip Trib. Ct.
App. 2003).
157. E.g., Skokomish Tribe v. Mosbarger, 7 NICS App. 90 (Skokomish Trib. Ct. App.
2006) (traffic enforcement); Rose v. Adams, No. 95-27, 2000 Crow 1, (Crow Ct. App. 2000)
(tax); Hoover v. Colville Confederated Tribes, 29 Indian L. Rep. 6035 (Colville
Confederated Trib. Ct. App. 2002) (land use).
158. See Ronald Eagleye Johnny, The Duckwater Shoshone Drug Court, 1997-2000:
Melding Traditional Dispute Resolution with Due Process, 26 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 261
(2001-2002).
159. See Raymond D. Austin, Freedom, Responsibility and Duty: ADR and the Navajo
Peacemaker Court, 32 JUDGEs J. 8 (1993).
160. See Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, Kake Circle
Peacemaking (2003), available at
http://hpaied.org/images/resources/publibrary/Kake%20Circle%20Peacemaking.pdf.
161. See Nancy A. Costello, Walking Together in a Good Way: Indian Peacemaker
Courts in Michigan, 76 U. DET. MERCY L.REV. 875 (1999).
162. See 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) (2006); Arizona Public Service Co. v. EPA, 211 F.3d
1280 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
163. See GETCHES, ET AL., supra note 20, at 635-47. See generally JAMES M. GRIJALVA,
CLOSING THE CIRCLE: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY 143-73 (2008).
164. See 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) (2006); Sarah Deer & Melissa L. Tatum, Tribal Efforts to
Comply with VAWA's Full Faith and Credit Requirements: A Response to Sandra
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faith and credit to tribal court orders and judgments under the Indian Child
Welfare Act.165 Congress forced states to negotiate with Indian tribes over
casino-style gaming,166 despite the Supreme Court's efforts to preserve state
sovereign immunity in this area.'6 7 Even in areas where Congress hasn't
spoken, state and federal courts and governments grant enormous deference to
tribal law and court judgments, '6 though certainly not all the time.'69 For
example, some federal and state courts will count tribal court criminal
convictions and inmate ti:ne served in their own calculations in sentencing.170
Of note, many states and local governments have entered into agreements
with Indian tribes over taxation,' 7' law enforcement,72 jail space, land use
and zoning, Cconomic development, enforcement of foreign judgments,
Schmeider, 39 TULSA L. REV. 403 (2004); Melissa L. Tatum, A Jurisdictional Quandary:
Challenges Facing Tribal Governments in Implementing the Full Faith and Credit
Provisions of the Violence Against Women Acts, 90 KY. L.J. 123 (2001-2002).
165. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (2006); B.J. Jones, The Indian Child Welfare Act: In
Search of a Federal Forum to Vindicate the Rights of Indian Tribes against the Vagaries of
State Courts, 73 N. D. L. REV. 395, 434-48 (1997).
166. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3) (2006). See generally Ezekiel J.N. Fletcher,
Negotiating Meaningful Concessions from States in Gaming Compacts to Further Tribal
Economic Development: Satisfying the "Economic Benefits" Test, 54 S.D. L. REV. 419
(2009); Zeke Fletcher, Indian Gaming and Tribal Self-Determination: Reconsidering the
1993 Tribal-State Gaming Compacts, 89 MICH. B.J., Feb. 2010, at 38.
167. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
168. E.g., Attorney's Process and Investigation Servs., Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe, 609
F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2010) (recognizing tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmember business),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1003 (2011); Smith v. Salish Kootenai Coll., 434 F.3d 1127 (9th
Cir.) (en banc) (recognizing tribal court jurisdiction over nonmember tort defendant), cert.
denied, 547 U.S. 1209 (2006); State v. Native Village of Tanana, 249 P.3d 734 (Alaska
2011) (recognizing tribal court jurisdiction over Indian child welfare cases); see also In the
matter of review of Wis. Stat. § 80.1.54, discretionary transfer of cases to tribal court, 2011
WI 53 (2011), available at
http://www.wicourts.gov/sc/rulhear/DisplayDocument.pdfcontent=pdf&seqNo=67/97 (the
Wisconsin Supreme Court asked those affected by discretionary transfer of cases to tribal
court to comment in writing before 2016).
169. E.g., Strate v. A-I Contracting, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
170. E.g., United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2001); State v. Spotted
Eagle, 71 P.3d 1239 (Mont. 2003).
171. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Power to Tax, the Power to Destroy, and the
Michigan Tribal-State Tax Agreements, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. I (2004); Brief of Amici
Curiae National Intertribal Tax Alliance et al. at 6-8, 10-18, Wagnon v. Prairie Band
Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005) (No.04-631), 2005 WL 1673219, at *5-8, * 10-18.
172. E.g., State v. Manypenny, 682 N.W.2d 143 (Minn. 2004) (upholding county-tribe
law enforcement cooperative agreement); Mutual Aid Act, N. M. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-8-1 to -3
(West 2011) (authorizing any local government to enter into a law enforcement cooperative
agreement with an Indian tribe).
173. E.g., Contract for Prisoner Housing between the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa
and Chippewa Indians and the Benzie County Sheriff's Office (Jan. 1, 2006), reprinted in
31st Annual Federal Bar Association Indian Law Conference Course Materials at 195 (April
6-7, 2006).
174. E.g., Intergovernmental Agreement on Cooperative Land Use and Planning
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child welfare,"' and dozens of other subjects.17 8 Some states have even
published guides on tribal-state relations.179 Hundreds, if not thousands, of
these agreements exist and are in operation at this moment.
These factors point to a very real constitutional fact-Indian tribes have
somehow been incorporated into the American dual-sovereignty structure of
government without a constitutional amendment to define the incorporation.'8
The Supreme Court's decisions are the strongest legal authority establishing the
incorporation of Indian tribes into the American constitutional polity, though its
pronouncements are haphazard at best. The Court's major holdings are: (1) that
Indian tribes are not beholden at all to the Constitution;' 8 ' (2) Indian tribes are
immune from suit and from state and local taxation and regulation;182 (3)
inherent tribal sovereignty allows tribes to make laws on tribal membership and
other subjects that otherwise would be prohibited by state or federal law;'8 3 (4)
Indian tribes have the power to prosecute criminal offenders; 8 4 and (5) Indian
treaty rights are extant until Congress abrogates them.'8 5 Congress and the
Executive branch have largely acquiesced to these rulings, with rare
between the Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah) and the Town of Aquinnah (2006),
available at
http://www.wampanoagtribe.net/Pages/WampanoagNews/tribe%20approved%20MOU.pdf
; see also Cooperative Agreement between the U.S. Department of Interior-Bureau of Land
Management and the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians for the Santa Rosa and San
Jacinto Mountains (1999), available at http://www.standupca.org/off-reservation-
gaming/contraversial-applications-in-process/agua-
caliente/tribalcoop-agreement_1999.pdf.
175. Cf. Lore Graham, Securing Economic Sovereignty through Agreement, 37 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 523 (2003).
176. E.g., MICH. CT. R. 2.615 (2008) (reciprocal comity); MINN. GEN. R. PRAC., Rule
10.02 (2011) (discretionary); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 806.245 (2011) (full faith and credit).
177. E.g., Minnesota Dept. of Social Services, Tribal/State Indian Child Welfare
Agreement as Amended in 2007 (February 2007), available at http://www.icwlc.org/docs/9-
icwa_2007 tribal-state-agreement dhs-5022-eng-2-07.pdf.
178. E.g., Agreement for Animal Control Services (2004), reprinted in 31st Annual
Federal Bar Association Indian Law Conference Course Materials at 191 (April 6-7, 2006).
179. E.g., Governor's Office of Indian Affairs, State of Montana, Tribal Relations
Handbook: A Guide for State Employees on Preserving the State-Tribal Relationship (Dec.
2009), available at http://tribalnations.mt.gov/docs/TribalRelationsHandbook.pdf. See
SUSAN JOHNSON, JEANNE KAUFMANN, JOHN DOssETr, AND SARAH HICKS, GOVERNMENT TO
GOVERNMENT: UNDERSTANDING STATE AND TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS (Sia Davis, ed. 2009),
available at http://www.nijc.org/pdfs/TTAP/NCSLGovttoGovt.pdf.
180. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 53, at 139-43.
181. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
182. See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998); New Mexico
v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983); Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737 (1867).
183. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
184. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
185. See Washington v. Wash. Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658 (1979).
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exceptions. 86
The Supreme Court only recognizes tribal sovereign rights in tribes that are
federally recognized, however. Federal recognition of a tribe's sovereignty
grants a tribe the right to participate in the federal government's programs and
services provided to Indian people nationally, but it also amounts to a critical
political lifeline from the federal government to Indian tribes, who otherwise
would not be able to assert their sovereignty validly under federal law.'88
There are several ways Indian tribes can acquire the status of a federally
recognized tribe. The clearest road to federal recognition is through the creation
of a treaty relationship with the United States.189 A treaty relationship means
that the United States negotiated with an Indian tribe over issues of
fundamental sovereign interests, such as land and governmental authority and
responsibilities.' 90 The Senate then executed agreement, followed by a
Presidential declaration of the treaty's effective date.'91 All of this is conducted
under the procedures established in Article 11 of the Constitution, rendering
Indian treaties the supreme law of the land under Article VI (subject, of course,
to congressional amendment and abrogation).192
Other means by which Indian tribes can become recognized by the federal
government are through Acts of Congress,' 93 certain legal actions or opinions
of the Executive branch,194 and more recently through the Federal
Acknowledgment Process administered by the Bureau of Acknowledgment and
Research in the Bureau of Indian Affairs.' 95 Each of these requires some
affirmative act by the relevant Indian tribe to pursue federal recognition, just
like treaty tribes. It could be a lawsuit,196 a petition to the Bureau of Indian
186. E.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 199 (2004) (describing Congress's
efforts to overturn Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)).
187. Cf Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009) (holding that Indian tribes not
federally recognized in 1934 may not be eligible for certain federal services, including
having their lands held in trust by the federal government).
188. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.2 (2011); Samish Indian Nation v. United States, 419 F.3d
1355, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Roberto Iraola, The Administrative Tribal Recognition Process
and the Courts, 38 AKRON L. REv. 867, 867-68 (2005).
189. E.g., Treaty with the Ottawas, Etc., supra note 118.
190. See, e.g.,Treaty with the Ottawa, Etc., supra note 118, art. I (cession of Indian
claims to land); art. II (establishment of reservations); art. XIII (right to hunt on ceded
lands).
191. See Treaty with the Ottawa, Etc., supra note 118.
192. See U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2 (treaty clause); art. VI, cl. 2 (supremacy clause).
193. E.g., Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians and the Little River Band of
Ottawa Indians Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1300k (2006); Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians Act,
25 U.S.C. § 1300j (2006).
194. E.g., U.S. GENERAL ACcOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-49, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN
TRIBAL RECOGNITION PROCESS 25 (Nov. 2001) (Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians).
195. See id. at 25-26 (listing tribes recognized under 25 C.F.R. § 83).
196. E.g., Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370
(1st Cir. 1975).
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Affairs, 197 or support of a congressional bill. 98
It is important next to consider what exactly Indian tribes are agreeing to
when they acquire federal recognition. Treaty tribes-that is, signatories to the
treaties executed and ratified between the earliest treaty (1778)199 and the last
treaties (1868)200-generally consented to what Chief Justice Marshall
described in international law terms as "protection" under the federal
government. 201 Under international law, that meant basically that the tribe had
agreed to turn over its external sovereign rights to form military and other
alliances with nations other than the United States-and nothing more.202 Later
treaties would provide for a greater intrusion in the internal sovereignty of
Indian tribes, but not so much that they would lose their fundamental sovereign
existence.203
While tribal sovereignty for treaty tribes is reserved in the treaties, for
Indian tribes that are not treaty tribes, sovereignty could be ambiguous. The
solution to this problem comes from the means by which the Supreme Court
has decided its Indian cases over the years, and through congressional
enactments related to the Indian Reorganization Act.204 From the earliest Indian
law cases, the Court has applied a sort of "least favored nation" analysis to
205treaty terms. In large part, the Court will interpret tribal sovereignty and,
197. E.g., Petition of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians to the
Secretary of Interior for Acknowledgement of Recognition as an Indian Tribe (1978).
198. E.g., Michigan Indian Recognition, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Native
American Affairs of the Committee on Natural Resources, House of Representatives, 103rd
Cong. (1993).
199. See Treaty with the Delawares, U.S.-Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13.
200. See Treaty with the Nez Perc6s, U.S.-Nez Perc6s, Aug. 13, 1868, 15 Stat. 693;
Treaty with the Navajo, U.S.-Navajo, June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667; Treaty with the Northern
Cheyenne and Northern Arapaho, May 10, 1868, 15 Stat. 655; Treaty with the Crows, U.S.-
Crows May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649; Treaty with the Cherokee, U.S.-Cherokee, Apr. 27, 1868,
16 Stat. 727; Treaty with the Ute, U.S.-Ute, Mar. 2, 1868, 15 Stat. 619.
201. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 560-61 ("The very fact of repeated treaties
with them recognizes it; and the settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power
does not surrender its independence-its right to self government, by associating with a
stronger, and taking its protection. A weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may place
itself under the protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of
government, and ceasing to be a state. Examples of this kind are not wanting in Europe.
'Tributary and feudatory states,' says Vattel, 'do not thereby cease to be sovereign and
independent states, so long as self government and sovereign and independent authority are
left in the administration of the state.' At the present day, more than one state may be
considered as holding its right of self government under the guarantee and protection of one
or more allies.").
202. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 560-61; Siegfried Wiessner, American
Indian Treaties and Modern International Law, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 567, 574-77 (1995).
203. See Wiessner, supra note 202, at 577-80.
204. See Act of May 31, 1994, Pub. L. 103-263, § 5(b), 108 Stat. 707 (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 476(f), (g) (2006)).
205. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N. D. L.
REV. 627, 658 (2004) (discussing United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886)).
Apr. 2012] TRIBAL CONSENT 71
HeinOnline  -- 8 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 71 2012
72 STANFORD JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES [VIII: ]
often, treaty language in accordance with the least favorable (to tribes) federal
court precedents or with its own perceptions or knowledge of Indian affairs,
despite the actual language of the treaty or the factual realities on the ground.2 06
In short, when the Court limits the tribal governmental authority of one tribe,
all tribes suffer the same limitation whether they should be or not.2 07 Similarly,
though more happily for tribal interests, Congress's amendments to the Indian
Reorganization Act allowed tribes to take advantage of most of the Act's
favorable tribal government provisions even if they voted not to reorganize
under the Act (or were not allowed).20 8 In short, non-treaty tribes are looped in
with treaty tribes for purposes of determining the contours of tribal sovereignty,
for better or worse.
The reality of federal recognition is more complicated than mere eligibility
to run federal programs and coordinate with state and local governments on
community governance. Federal recognition comes with additional burdens, not
the least of which is a federal plenary power over Indian affairs201 9- including
the internal affairs of Indian tribes 2 o-that has created an enormous mess in
Indian Country.2 1' While some aspects of tribal sovereignty appear not to be
within the federal grasp-such as tribal citizenship rules212 or internal
206. See generally Dean B. Suagee, The Supreme Court's "Whack-A-Mole" Game
Theory in Federal Indian Law, A Theory that Has No Place in the Realm of Environmental
Law, 7 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 90 (2002); Philip P. Frickey, A Common Lawfor
Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over
Nonmembers, 109 YALE L. J. I (1999); David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural
Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1573 (1996).
207. For example, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), which
held the Suquamish Tribe could not exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, applies
to all Indian tribes.
208. See Act of May 24, 1990, Pub. L. 101-301, § 3(a), 104 Stat. 211 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 478-1 (2006)).
209. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004); Washington v. Confederated
Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 501 (1979); Clinton, supra
note 53, at 162-234; Alex Tallchief Skibine, Reconciling Federal and State Power Inside
Indian Reservations with the Right of Tribal Self-Government and the Process of Self-
Determination, 1995 UTAH L. REv. 1105, 1118-37 (1995).
210. E.g., Cohen, supra note 48 (describing many aspects of federal plenary power
over the day-to-day lives of American Indians in the early 1950s); Alex Tallchief Skibine,
Integrating the Indian Trust Doctrine into the Constitution, 39 TULSA L. REv. 247, 256-58
(2003) (describing the power of Congress to interfere with tribal self-government); see also
Clinton, supra note 53, at 235-252 (rejecting federal plenary power over internal Indian
affairs).
211. See generally Riley, supra note 59, at 827-30; Skibine, supra note 53, at 1137-
55.
212. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (membership); see also
id. at 55-56 ("They have power to make their own substantive law in internal matters, see
Roff v. Burney [168 U.S. 218 (1897)] (membership); Jones v. Meehan [175 U.S. 1, 29
(1899)] (inheritance rules); United States v. Quiver [241 U.S. 602 (1916)] (domestic
relations), and to enforce that law in their own forums, see, e. g., Williams v. Lee [358 U.S.
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governance disputeS213-virtually all aspects of tribal sovereignty even in the
modern era are subject to the review and occasionally control of federal (and
sometimes state) courts. The most egregious example of this review and control
is over civil disputes in tribal courts where the defendant is a nonmember. 214 No
Indian tribe has ever consented to such federal court review, and no Act of
Congress has ever authorized such review.215 And still, such review is
pervasive in Indian Country, with federal courts all over the country confronted
with complicated questions of tribal court jurisdiction, questions about which
federal court judges admit to having no special expertise or even experience.2 16
Federal intrusion on tribal sovereignty without the express (or even implied)
consent of those tribal nations is the core subject area of this Article.
We will return to a fundamental question-what exactly did Indian tribes
consent to in order to acquire what we now call federal recognition?
II. THEORIES OF FEDERAL CONTROL OVER INDIAN AFFAIRS
Congress has plenary control over Indian affairs, to the exclusion of the
States and other nations, according to the constitutional common law of the
Supreme Court.2 17 As a part of the exercise of its plenary power, Congress has
delegated enormous and general authority to deal in Indian affairs to the
President and to the Secretary of Interior.218 With virtually no significant
217 (1959)].").
213. E.g., Bowen v. Doyle, 880 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. N.Y. 1995) (enjoining state court
from asserting jurisdiction over internal tribal political affairs).
214. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316
(2008); Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987); National Farmers Union Ins.
Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
215. See National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 854-55 (quoting Attorney General
Cushing, 7 OP. ATry. GEN. 175, 179-81 (1855): "But there is no provision of treaty, and no
statute, which takes away from the Choctaws jurisdiction of a case like this, a question of
property strictly internal to the Choctaw nation; nor is there any written law which confers
jurisdiction of such a case in any court of the United States. . . . The conclusion seems to me
irresistible, not that such questions are justiciable nowhere, but that they remain subject to
the local jurisdiction of the Choctaw. . . . Now, it is admitted on all hands ... that Congress
has 'paramount right' to legislate in regard to this question, in all its relations. It has
legislated, in so far as it saw fit, by taking jurisdiction in criminal matters, and omitting to
take jurisdiction in civil matters. . . . By all possible rules of construction the inference is
clear that jurisdiction is left to the Choctaws themselves of civil controversies arising strictly
within the Choctaw Nation.") (emphasis added).
216. See Sarah Krakoff, Tribal Civil Jurisdiction over Nonmembers: A Practical Guide
for Judges, 81 U.COLO. L.REV. 1187 (2010).
217. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens,
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81
TEx. L.REV. 1, 25-80 (2002).
218. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9 (2006). See generally Robert McCarthy, The Bureau of
Indian Affairs and the Federal Trust Obligation to American Indians, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. I
(2004).
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exception, the Supreme Court has upheld every exercise of Congress's
legislative authority to deal in Indian affairs. 219 And, only in rare circumstances,
has the Court struck down an act of the Executive branch as lacking
authorization.220
The Constitution is all but silent as to Indian affairs, with the lone
provision authorizing federal action being the so-called Indian Commerce
Clause.221 Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 authorizes Congress to regulate
comierce with Indian tribes, along with commerce with foreign nations and
among the several States.222 Given the very broad definition of "commerce"
that the Supreme Court has recognized through the Necessary and Proper
Clause,223 Congress's authority in Indian affairs is mighty.
Congress might not have the incredible-well-nigh absolute in some
instances224 -authority that its plenary power confers over Indian affairs
without the authority voluntarily relinquished to it in hundreds of Indian
treaties. In fact, given the Supreme Court's "least favored nation" canon of
interpreting Indian treaties,225  the Court has significantly bolstered
congressional power over Indian affairs by asserting that Congress has acquired
additional authority to deal in Indian affairs via the treaty power. 226 While other
provisions of the Constitution, in particular the Property Clause 227 and the
Territory Clause,2 28 have been advanced as possible sources of congressional
authority, it is the Indian Commerce Clause and the treaty power that have been
the clearest sources of authority.229
219. E.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (Major Crimes Act). The
Supreme Court now employs the rational basis test in reviewing congressional enactments in
Indian affairs; see Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 83 (1977).
220. E.g., Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631 (2005) (rejecting
federal government's interpretation of self-governance compact legislation).
221. U.S.CONsT.art.I,§8,cl.3.
222. See id.
223. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 3.3,
at 247-78 (4th ed. 2011).
224. Professor Prakash quotes the Oklahoma Supreme Court for defining federal
plenary power as "absolute," labeling it "an undoubted overstatement." Prakash, supra note
59, at 1077 n.44 (quoting Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, 134 P.2d 976, 979 (Okla.
1942)).
225. Fletcher, supra note 205, at 658.
226. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200-01 (2004) (citing Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920)).
227. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 200 (citing FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 209-10 (1982 ed.)).
228. See Cleveland, supra note 217, at 26; Nathan Speed, Note, Examining the
Interstate Commerce Clause through the Lens of the Indian Commerce Clause, 87 B.U. L.
REv. 467,477-78 (2007).
229. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 200.
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A. A Quick History of the Rise of Congressional Plenary Power over Indian
Affairs
Congressional plenary power over Indian affairs has three components.
The first is probably the easiest as a matter of law, and perhaps the most
controversial as a matter of politics-the exclusion of states from Indian
affairs.230 As noted above, Chief Justice Marshall wrote that state law has "no
force" in Indian Country.231 The Indian Commerce Clause serves to exclude
state governments from enacting their own major Indian affairs laws, certainly
if they conflict with federal law or policy. 23 2 Moreover, the various Indian
treaties taken singly and together, at least since 1789 (the year the states ratified
the Constitution), completely foreclose state input into Indian affairs.233
Generally, courts usually will not recognize significant state authority into
Indian affairs without apparent consent (or at least clear acquiescence) from
Congress.234 While a small group of law professors and state attorneys general
debate whether this is the case,2 the law is clear in excluding states from
Indian affairs absent congressional consent.236
The second component is related, and is the congressional plenary power
over what I term external Indian affairs; that is, the relationship between Indian
tribes and the federal government and the states. Congressional plenary power
over external Indian affairs dates back to earliest days of the American
Revolution, when the Continental Congress first attempted to assert diplomatic
and military authority over Indian affairs.237 The nascent United States was
only doing what the British had been expressly doing since 1763, which was to
preclude the colonies and Americans from engaging Indian tribes and Indian
people in commerce, trade, and virtually all forms of "intercourse" without
230. E.g., Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901-1963 (2006); Bryan v. Itasca
County 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
231. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832).
232. E.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
233. For example, state agreements to purchase lands after 1789 are invalid on their
face. See Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Oneida County, 414 U.S. 661 (1974); Oneida
County v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226 (1985). See also Jack Campisi, The
Trade and Intercourse Acts: Land Claims on the Eastern Seaboard, in IRREDEEMABLE
AMERICA: THE INDIANS' ESTATE AND LAND CLAIMS 337 (1985).
234. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995); Okla. Tax
Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Tribe, 508 U.S. 114 (1993); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache
Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983). But see Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163
(1989).
235. See Robert G. Natelson & David Kopel, Commerce in the Commerce Clause: A
Response to Jack Balkin, 109 MIcH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONs 55, 59-60 (2010); Robert G.
Natelson, The Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause, 85 DENV. U. L. REV.
201 (2007); Prakash, supra note 59, at 1110-20.
236. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 9, § 6.01 [1], at 499.
237. See generally MOHR, supra note 76, at 37-91.
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national government consent and regulation. 238 The national authority carried
over into the Articles of Confederation period, though not without complexity,
given the contradictory character of Article IX, which seemed to grant
significant Indian-affairs power to both Congress and the states. 3 James
Madison's proposed fix to the Articles reached its final form in the Indian
Commerce Clause, preserving congressional authority over Indian commerce,
and thereby, through the Necessary and Proper Clause, all Indian affairs.240
Contrast this component with the third component-congressional plenary
power over internal Indian affairs, including the authority of Indian tribes to
govern themselves. 24 1 There is little controversy at all about the plenary power
of Congress over external Indian affairs, which tends to serve both the federal
government and Indian tribes well. But internal tribal affairs are another matter.
Congress and the federal government generally did not want, or need, to
control the inner workings of Indian tribes for many decades after the formation
of the Union. From the Founding until as late as 1885,242 Congress largely
refused to regulate Indian tribes themselves, instead focusing on forcing tribes
to cede land and remove to the west.243 Under the Constitution, this made sense.
The Constitution is written with an implied understanding that Indian tribes
usually are-and will remain-outside of the constitutional governance
structure and, outside of the geographic bounds of the United States.244
But by 1885, when Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act that extended
238. See MOHR, supra note 76, at 1-36. Congress eventually codified its policy
choices in the Trade and Intercourse Acts. See AMAR, supra note 102, at 108 n.* ("It also
bears notice that the First Congress enacted a statute regulating noneconomic interactions
and altercations-"intercourse"-with Indians; see An Act to regulate trade and intercourse
with the Indian tribes, July 22, 1790, 1 Stat. 137. Section 5 of this act dealt with crimes-
whether economic or not-committed by Americans on Indian lands."); Jack M. Balkin,
Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 24-26 (2010).
239. See FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison); Clinton, supra note 103, at 435.
240. See Clinton, supra note 81, at 1064-1164 (detailing the history of the adoption of
the Indian Commerce Clause).
241. E.g., Goodface v. Grassrope, 708 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1983) (rejecting federal
authority to decide internal tribal disputes); Kaighn Smith, Jr., Civil Rights and Tribal
Employment, 47 FED. LAW., March/April 2000, at 34 (summarizing tribal employment
scenarios). Compare Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (finding no federal
court cause of action to enforce the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.), with
Indian Bill of Rights, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006) (limiting tribal government authority over
persons within tribal jurisdiction).
242. Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act in 1885, the first significant federal
legislative incursion into internal Indian affairs. See Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal
Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 790-808 (2006) (describing history
leading to Major Crimes Act).
243. See Ralph W. Johnson, Indian Tribes and the Legal System, 72 WASH. L. REV.
1021, 1022-23 (1997); James R. Kerr, Constitutional Rights, Tribal Justice, and the
American Indian, 18 J. PUB. L. 311, 313-314 (1969).
244. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Preconstitutional Federal Power, 82 TUL. L. REV.
509, 561-62 (2007).
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federal criminal jurisdiction into Indian Country, the geographic reality was
that the remaining Indian tribes were within the territorial boundaries of the
United States. 245 Quickly following the Major Crimes Act, in 1887 Congress
passed the Dawes Act, or the General Allotment Act,2 4 6 which instructed the
Department of Interior to prepare to "allot" Indian reservations with the dual
purpose of "civilizing" Indians and of breaking up the tribal land mass within
the United States.247 Once again, Congress had legislated directly to interfere
with internal tribal relations, this time to rewrite the rules of land ownership
and possession inside of Indian Country. 248
The Executive branch, typically without congressional authorization, had
already been interfering with internal tribal affairs for years.2 49 The Bureau of
Indian Affairs enacted regulations creating Courts of Indian Offenses to enforce
the similarly promulgated Law and Order Codes applied to Indian
reservations.25 The Bureau appointed Indian people to serve both as tribal
judges and tribal police, giving the project the veneer of tribal sovereignty, but
the reality was that these legal structures were entirely of the Bureau's
concoction.51 The lower federal courts went along with the charade, rejecting
the claims of Indians prosecuted under the codes and in tribal courts who
alleged the court had no authority.252
The most recent, significant, overt effort to interfere with tribal affairs
came from the enaction of the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) 253 in which
Congress instructed Indian tribal governments to comply with an altered
245. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886) ("The power of the
general government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished
in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom
they dwell. It must exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else;
because the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States;
because it has never been denied; and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.")
(emphasis added).
246. Ch. 119 24 Stat. 388 (1887). See generally WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, THE
ASSAULT ON TRIBALISM: THE GENERAL ALLOTMENT LAW (DAWES ACT) OF 1887 (1975).
247. See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1,7-14 (1995).
248. See generally Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights
and the Myth of Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1559 (2001).
249. See American Indian Religious Freedom: Hearings before the United States
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong. (1978) (detailing federal interference
with American Indian religions); Cohen, supra note 48 (federal interference with day-to-day
lives of American Indians in the early 1950s).
250. See VINE DELORIA, JR., AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 113-16 (1983);
WILLIAM T. HAGEN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES 104-25 (1966); NATIONAL AMERICAN
INDIAN COURT JUDGES AssN., INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE 7-13 (David H. Getches, ed.
1979); Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N. M. L. REV.
225, 235 (1994).
251. See HAGEN, supra note 250, at 160-63; Kerr, supra note 243, at 321.
252. See United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575 (D. Or. 1888).
253. Pub. L. 90-284, Title II, § 201, 82 Stat. 77 (1968) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301 et
seq.).
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version of the Bill of Rights.254 Only in recent decades have Congress and the
Bureau loosened the reins on tribal governments, still reserving for themselves
significant apparent authority to direct interior tribal law and policy, especially
255
at early stages in a tribal government's formation and development.
The key Supreme Court cases that effectively ratified the authority of
Congress and the Executive branch to interfere in internal tribal relations were
United States v. Kagama,256 and Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.257 Kagama and Lone
Wolf rejected direct challenges to the authority of Congress to enact the Major
Crimes Act and to allot an Indian reservation, respectively. There are two key
modes of jurisprudence that undergird congressional plenary power over
internal tribal affairs, though they are closely related, and even a bit dependent
on each other, but the next two Parts will parse them out separately for clarity's
sake.
B. "Protection" and the Guardian-Ward Relationship-The Common Law
Authority for Congressional Plenary Power over Indian Affairs
The United States Supreme Court has supplied many common law
decisions announcing various forms of the political relations between the
United States and Indian tribes, articulating various forms of federal
dominance. In the Marshall Trilogy, Chief Justice Marshall introduced into the
American constitutional lexicon the notion that Indian tribes and Indian people
were like the little brothers and sisters to the federal government by comparing
federal-tribal relations to that of a guardian-ward relationship. 258 The original
source, generally speaking, of the notion that a national government could
control the lives and governments of Indigenous people in such a manner is the
Doctrine of Discovery, which presumes that Indian people are not legally (or
spiritually) competent to control their own destinies. 259 Robert A. Williams,
Jr.'s critically important work, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought,
254. See generally Arthur Lazarus, Jr., Title II of the 1968 Civil Rights Act: An Indian
Bill of Rights, 45 N.D. L. REv. 337 (1969); Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and
the Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1343 (1969).
255. See 25 U.S.C. § 476(c)(2)(B). See also Timothy W. Joranko & Mark C. Van
Norman, Indian Self-Determination at Bay: Secretarial Authority to Disapprove Tribal
Constitutional Amendments, 29 GoNZ. L. REv. 81 (1993-1994).
256. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
257. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
258. See Angelique EagleWoman, A Constitutional Crisis When the U.S. Supreme
Court Acts in a Legislative Manner? An Essay Offering a Perspective on Judicial Activism in
Federal Indian Law and Federal Civil Procedure Pleading Standards, 114 PENN ST. L. REV.
STATIM 41, 43 (2010), available at
http://www.pennstatelawreview.org/1 14/114_PennStatim_41.pdf (quoting Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1. 59 (1831)); Wenona T. Singel, Labor Relations and Tribal Self-
Governance, 80 N.D. L. REv. 691, 698 (2004) (same).
259. See generally ROBERT J. MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA, DISCOVERED AND
CONQUERED: THOMAS JEFFERSON, LEWIS & CLARK, AND MANIFEST DESTINY (2006).
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is the most thorough legal history of the origins of the Doctrine of Discovery.26
The British, and then the Americans, codified the major aspects of the
Doctrine of Discovery in the 1763 Proclamation 261 and in the Trade and
Intercourse Acts, first enacted in 1790.262 These statutes forbade any person
from engaging in trade (or intercourse) with Indians and Indian tribes without
the consent of the national government.263 Of note, all land sales and
transactions involving Indians or tribes were void, absent consent of the
national sovereign. 264 But, between the establishment of the United States and
the first Trade and Intercourse Act (approximately 1775-1790), there was a
gap, in which no valid statute controlled trade and land transactions with Indian
nations.
Chief Justice Marshall constitutionalized the Doctrine of Discovery in
Johnson v. M'Intosh,265 where the Supreme Court held that land transactions
between Indians and non-Indians, during the period in which, arguably, there
was no statutory prohibition, were still void as a matter of federal common
law. 66 Alternatively, Johnson stands for the proposition that Congress is
authorized to codify the Doctrine of Discovery, and that the United States
stands in the place of Britain in relation to any land transactions taking place
under the 1763 Proclamation. 267 The major take-away from Johnson is that
Indian tribes and Indian people cannot own clear title to their own lands; 268 that
260. See WILLIAMS, supra note 36. See also Williams, supra note 104; Kevin J.
Worthern, Sword or Shield: The Past and Future Impact of Western Legal Thought on
American Indian Sovereignty, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1372 (1991) (reviewing WILLIAMS, supra
note 36); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the Status of the
American Indian in Western Legal Thought, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1983).
261. See WILLIAMS, supra note 36, at 235-38.
262. See Indian Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2006) (originally enacted as
Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137). See generally FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA,
AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS: THE INDIAN TRADE AND INTERCOURSE
ACTS, 1790-1834 (1970).
263. E.g., Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 427 F. Supp. 899, 901-02 (D. Mass.
1977) (quoting Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 119
(1960)).
264. E.g., Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129, 138 (1922) ("The purchase by Ewert,
being prohibited by the statute, was void.") (quoting Waskey v. Hammer, 223 U.S. 85, 94
(1911)).
265. 21 U.S.543 (1823).
266. See id. at 604-05.
267. See id. at 598; see also id. at 592 ("This opinion conforms precisely to the
principle which has been supposed to be recognised by all European governments, from the
first settlement of America. The absolute ultimate title has been considered as acquired by
discovery, subject only to the Indian title of occupancy, which title the discoverers possessed
the exclusive right of acquiring.").
268. See id. at 587 ("An absolute, must be an exclusive title, or at least a title which
excludes all others not compatible with it. All our institutions recognise the absolute title of
the crown, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy, and recognise the absolute title of
the erown [sic] to extinguish that right. This is incompatible with an absolute and complete
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instead Indian tribes and people only have a "right of occupancy,"269 leaving
superior title to the lands to the United States. Johnson expressly holds that
Indian tribes and Indian people are inferior entities and people,270 justifying
congressional intervention in Indian affairs, and the limit on Indian land
titles.27 1
A decade later in the Cherokee Cases,272 the Supreme Court firmly and
expressly established the guardian-ward structure of federal Indian affairs.273
Chief Justice Marshall's lead opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia held
that Indian tribes were neither states nor foreign nations.274 The question
presented in Cherokee Nation was whether an Indian tribe could invoke a
provision in the Constitution that allows either a state or a foreign nation to sue
in the Supreme Court under the Court's original jurisdiction.275 Rather than
merely conclude that the Cherokee Nation was neither, and ending his opinion
there, Chief Justice Marshall added that he thought Indian tribes were better
described as "domestic dependent nations."276 The dissent relied upon concepts
of international law to find that the Cherokee Nation, in agreeing to place itself
title in the Indians.").
269. See id. at 574 ("Indian right of occupancy"); id. at 583 ("right of occupancy"); id.
at 585 (same).
270. See id. at 590 ("But the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce
savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the
forest. To leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness; to
govern them as a distinct people, was impossible, because they were as brave and as high
spirited as they were fierce, and were ready to repel by arms every attempt on their
independence.").
271. See id. ("What was the inevitable consequence of this state of things? The
Europeans were under the necessity either of abandoning the country, and relinquishing their
pompous claims to it, or of enforcing those claims by the sword, and by the adoption of
principles adapted to the condition of a people with whom it was impossible to mix, and who
could not be governed as a distinct society, or of remaining in their neighbourhood, and
exposing themselves and their families to the perpetual hazard of being massacred.").
272. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. I
(1831).
273. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 562 ("Will these powerful considerations avail the
plaintiff in error? We think they will. He was seized, and forcibly carried away, while under
guardianship of treaties guarantying the country in which he resided, and taking it under the
protection of the United States."); Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17 ("Though the Indians are
acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and, heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands
they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government;
yet it may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged
boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations.
They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They
occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect
in point of possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of
pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.").
274. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
275. See id. at 15-16.
276. Id. at 17.
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under the "protection" of the United States in various treaties, had merely
agreed to become a protectorate of the federal government, and retained all
other aspects of sovereignty. 27 7
Since only Justice M'Lean joined Chief Justice Marshall's opinion, it took
another case for the Court to parse out the status of Indian tribes under the
Constitution: Worcester v. Georgia,2 78 decided the next year. In Worcester,
Chief Justice Marshall held that Indian tribes were better understood to be
"distinct, independent political communities,"279 and expressly adopted the
Cherokee Nation dissenters' theories on Indian tribes retaining significant
internal sovereignty.280 Over a solitary dissent,28 ' the Worcester Court held that
277. See id. at 52-53 (Thompson, J., dissenting) ("The terms state and nation are used
in the law of nations, as well as in common parlance, as importing the same thing; and imply
a body of men, united together, to procure their mutual safety and advantage by means of
their union. Such a society has its affairs and interests to manage; it deliberates, and takes
resolutions in common, and thus becomes a moral person, having an understanding and a
will peculiar to itself, and is susceptible of obligations and laws. Vattel, 1. Nations being
composed of men naturally free and independent, and who, before the establishment of civil
societies, live together in the state of nature, nations or sovereign states; are to be considered
as so many free persons, living together in a state of nature. Vattel 2, § 4. Every nation that
governs itself, under what form soever, without any dependence on a foreign power, is a
sovereign state. Its rights are naturally the same as those of any other state. Such are moral
persons who live together in a natural society, under the law of nations. It is sufficient if it be
really sovereign and independent: that is, it must govern itself by its own authority and laws.
We ought, therefore, to reckon in the number of sovereigns those states that have bound
themselves to another more powerful, although by an unequal alliance. The conditions of
these unequal alliances may be infinitely varied; but whatever they are, provided the inferior
ally reserves to itself the sovereignty or the right to govern its own body, it ought to be
considered an independent state. Consequently, a weak state, that, in order to provide for its
safety, places itself under the protection of a more powerful one, without stripping itself of
the right of government and sovereignty, does not cease on this account to be placed among
the sovereigns who acknowledge no other power. Tributary and feudatory states do not
thereby cease to be sovereign and independent states, so long as self government, and
sovereign and independent authority is left in the administration of the state. Vattel, c. 1, pp.
16, 17.").
278. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
279. Id. at 559.
280. See id. at 560-61 ("The actual state of things at the time, and all history since,
explain these charters; and the king of Great Britain, at the treaty of peace, could cede only
what belonged to his crown. These newly asserted titles can derive no aid from the articles
so often repeated in Indian treaties; extending to them, first, the protection of Great Britain,
and afterwards that of the United States. These articles are associated with others,
recognizing their title to self government. The very fact of repeated treaties with them
recognizes it; and the settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not
surrender its independence-its right to self government, by associating with a stronger, and
taking its protection. A weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself under
the protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of government, and
ceasing to be a state. Examples of this kind are not wanting in Europe. 'Tributary and
feudatory states,' says Vattel, 'do not thereby cease to be sovereign and independent states,
so long as self government and sovereign and independent authority are left in the
administration of the state.' At the present day, more than one state may be considered as
holding its right of self government under the guarantee and protection of one or more
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the State of Georgia's efforts to undermine Cherokee sovereignty were
unenforceable, and that, as a general matter, state law had "no force" in Indian
Country.282 This watershed opinion raised the Constitution's Supremacy Clause
on a pedestal, and upheld the supremacy of all federal law-even Indian
treaties-over state law .283
Worcester is a prime example of analyzing the relationship between the
federal government, the states, and Indian tribes by the utilization of simple
consent theory. Chief Justice Marshall's soundest legal authority underlying the
relationship between the United States and the Cherokee Nation was the
Cherokee treaties themselves in which the Cherokee people agreed to place
themselves under the "protection" of the federal government. 284 Marshall
expressly adopted the international law definition of "protection," especially
the writings of Emer De Vattel,285 which were well known and accepted in the
allies.").
281. See id. at 596 (reporting that Justice Baldwin dissented without opinion).
282. Id. at 561 ("The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no
force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the
Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress.").
283. See id. at 559 ("The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct,
independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed
possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by
irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other European potentate
than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed: and this was a
restriction which those European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the
Indians. The very term 'nation,' so generally applied to them, means 'a people distinct from
others.' The constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made, to
be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the
Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among those powers who are capable of
making treaties."). See also Comment, Federal Plenary Power in Indian Affairs After Weeks
and Sioux Nation, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 235, 243 n. 49 (1982) ("Worcester and Cherokee
Nation both analyzed the specific terms of treaties with the Cherokee to decide questions of
federal law, and applied the supremacy clause to bind the states as well as the federal
government to the terms of the treaties.").
284. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 552 (1832) ("The general law of European sovereigns,
respecting their claims in America, limited the intercourse of Indians, in a great degree, to
the particular potentate whose ultimate right of domain was acknowledged by the others.
This was the general state of things in time of peace. It was sometimes changed in war. The
consequence was, that their supplies were derived chiefly from that nation, and their trade
confined to it. Goods, indispensable to their comfort, in the shape of presents, were received
from the same hand. What was of still more importance, the strong hand of government was
interposed to restrain the disorderly and licentious from intrusions into their country, from
encroachments on their lands, and from those acts of violence which were often attended by
reciprocal murder. The Indians perceived in this protection only what was beneficial to
themselves-an engagement to punish aggressions on them. It involved, practically, no claim
to their lands, no dominion over their persons. It merely bound the nation to the British
crown, as a dependent ally, claiming the protection of a powerfid friend and neighbour, and
receiving the advantages of that protection, without involving a surrender of their national
character." (emphasis added)).
285. See id. at 561 (citing I EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 16-17
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United States. 28 6 Simply put, the Cherokees had consented to the delegation of
their external sovereignty-that is, the right to seek alliances with any other
nation besides the United States and other foreign affairs powerS2 87-to the
United States. This was likely subject to recapture by the Cherokee Nation at
the termination of the treaties if that day ever came. The internal sovereignty of
the Cherokee Nation was expressly protected.
Of course, the political reality of the day foreclosed a future in the
American Southeast for the bulk of the Cherokee Nation, which the federal
government, under President Jackson and others, forced to undergo the
genocidal Trail of Tears.288 Moreover, Worcester's application of the
"protection" principle became a dead letter within years, perhaps as a partial
result of the Trail of Tears and the general degradation of Indian tribes under
the pressure and "tutelage" of the federal government.289
Worcester established a kind of trust relationship between the United States
and the Cherokee Nation, to borrow modern federal Indian law lingo.290 Instead
of Indian tribes being little brother governments to the United States, and
Indian people being literal wards (and rhetorical children) to the federal agents
and officials charged with supervising Indian affairs as Marshall described in
Johnson and Cherokee Nation, under a treaty or similar agreement the United
States would deal with Indian tribes more like partners in an international
arrangement.
But that understanding died almost immediately 291 (and so did Chief
Justice Marshall292). While the Supreme Court did not have occasion to revisit
Worcester for decades, it became clear by the end of the 19th century that the
Court had retreated to the more familiar guardian-ward dichotomy in describing
(Northampton, Thomas M. Pomroy 1805)).
286. See Helen K. Michael, The Role of Natural Law in Early American
Constitutionalism: Did the Founders Contemplate Judicial Enforcement of "Unwritten"
Individual Rights?, 69 N. C. L. REV. 421, 427 (1991); Donald S. Lutz, The Relative
Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century American Political
Thought, 78 AM. POL. Sci.REV. 189, 192-94 (1984).
287. See PRUCHA, supra note 262, at 61 (noting that the 1785 Treaty of Hopewell
provided that the Cherokees came under the protection of the Americans, and agreed not to
align with any other sovereign).
288. See Rennard Strickland & William M. Strickland, A Tale of Two Marshalls:
Reflections on Indian Law and Policy, the Cherokee Cases, and the Cruel Irony of Supreme
Court Victories, 47 OKLA. L. REv. 111, 122-26 (1994); Ronald N. Satz, The Cherokee Trail
of Tears: A Sesquicentennial Perspective, 73 GA. HisT. Q. 431 (1989); Carl J. Vipperman,
The Bungled Treaty of New Echota: The Failure of Cherokee Removal, 1836-1838, 73 GA.
HIST. Q. 540 (1989).
289. See Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711,746 (1835); Fletcher, supra note 205, at
647-48.
290. See Fletcher, supra note 205, at 658-61.
291. See Mitchel, 34 U.S.711 (1835).
292. The famed Chief Justice died in 1835. See I CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 806 (rev. ed. 1926).
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Indian affairs. In Ex parte Crow Dog,29 United States v. Kagama,294 Cherokee
Nation v. Hitchcock,295 and most especially in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,296 the
Supreme Court recognized an all-but-absolute plenary power over both internal
and external relations involving Indian tribes and Indian people 297-in large
part deriving from its own descriptions of the guardian-ward relationship
between the United States and Indian tribes and Indian people.298 Ironically,
293. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
294. ll8 U.S. 375 (1886).
295. 187 U.S. 294 (1902).
296. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
297. See generally ECHO-HAWK, supra note 19, at 161-86 (describing the import of the
Lone Wolf decision) POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE, supra note 53, at 125-51 (same);
ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS,
AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 71-87 (2005) (describing the rise of plenary
power).
298. E.g., Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565 ("In one of the cited cases it was clearly pointed
out that Congress possessed a paramount power over the property of the Indians, by reason
of its exercise of guardianship over their interests, and that such authority might be implied,
even though opposed to the strict letter of a treaty with the Indians."); Cherokee Nation, 187
U.S. at 302 ("As we have said, the title to these lands is held by the tribe in trust for the
people. We have shown that this trust is not being properly executed, nor will it be if left to
the Indians, and the question arises, What is the duty of the government of the United States
with reference to this trust? While we have recognized these tribes as dependent nations, the
government has likewise recognized its guardianship over the Indians and its obligations to
protect them in their property and personal rights.") (internal quotation marks omitted);
Kagana, 118 U.S. at 383-84 ("It will be seen at once that the nature of the offense (murder)
is one which in most all cases of its commission is punishable by the laws of the states, and
within the jurisdiction of their courts. The distinction is claimed to be that the offense under
the statute is committed by an Indian, that it is committed on a reservation set apart within
the state for residence of the tribe of Indians by the United States, and the fair inference is
that the offending Indian shall belong to that or some other tribe. It does not interfere with
the process of the state courts within the reservation, nor with the operation of state laws
upon white people found there. Its effect is confined to the acts of an Indian of some tribe, of
a criminal character, committed within the limits of the reservation. It seems to us that this is
within the competency of congress. These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are
communities dependent on the United States, dependent largely for their daily food;
dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the states, and receive from
them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where they are
found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so
largely due to the course of dealing of the federal government with them, and the treaties in
which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power. This
has always been recognized by the executive, and by congress, and by this court, whenever
the question has arisen."); Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 568-69 ("The pledge to secure to these
people, with whom the United States was contracting as a distinct political body, an orderly
government, by appropriate legislation thereafter to be framed and enacted, necessarily
implies, having regard to all the circumstances attending the transaction, that among the arts
of civilized life, which it was the very purpose of all these arrangements to introduce and
naturalize among them, was the highest and best of all,-that of self-government, the
regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace
among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs. They were
nevertheless to be subject to the laws of the United States, not in the sense of citizens, but, as
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there was very sparse support in either the Constitution or Indian treaties for
such incredible power,299 but that did almost nothing to dissuade the Court.oo
During the period following Worcester and leading up to Crow Dog, the
fortunes of Indian tribes nationally completely fell apart. The federal
government succeeded in forcing nearly all tribal communities in the American
southeast 30 1 and the Ohio River Valley302 to remove to the west of the
Mississippi, leaving only scattered remnants of tribal communities in the
swamps303 and the mountains, 304 as well as some Indian communities in the Old
Northwest that resided in areas that could not support mass agriculture.305
Indian people in California suffered incredible, almost unbelievable, torment
following the Gold Rush of 1849, including numerous massacres and mass
murders, disease, slavery, and cultural oppression.306 The Great Sioux Nation
that fought the United States military to a standstill by 1868 began almost
immediately to collapse as their hunting-dependent livelihoods disappeared
with the near-extinction of the buffalo herds, 307 and the federal government
illegally conducted a taking of their sacred Black Hills in favor of American
gold miners and land speculators. 308 Congressionally-approved "agreements"
between the Sioux leaders and the United States were negotiated under a cloud
of incredible duress, including threats of mass starvation, in the decades that
they had always been, as wards, subject to a guardian; not as individuals, constituted
members of the political community of the United States, with a voice in the selection of
representatives and the framing of the laws, but as a dependent community who were in a
state of pupilage, advancing from the condition of a savage tribe to that of a people who,
through the discipline of labor, and by education, it was hoped might become a self-
supporting and self-governed society.").
299. See Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378-79.
300. E.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (reaffirming congressional
plenary power in Indian affairs in modem cases).
301. See generally GRANT FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL: THE EMIGRATION OF THE FIVE
CIVILIZED TRIBES OF INDIANS (3rd ed. 1972).
302. See generally GRANT FOREMAN, THE LAST TREK OF THE INDIANS (1946).
303. E.g., Alanson Skinner, Notes on the Florida Seminole, 15 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST
(n.s) 63 (1913).
304. E.g., JOHN R. FINGER, THE EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEES, 1819-1900 (1984). Cf.
MALINDA MAYNOR LOWERY, LUMBEE INDIANS IN THE JIM CROW SOUTH: RACE, IDENTITY, &
THE MAKING OF A NATION (2010).
305. E.g., FLETCHER, supra note 41,at 1-55.
306. See EXTERMINATE THEM! WRITTEN ACCOUNTS OF THE MURDER, RAPE, AND
ENSLAVEMENT OF NATIVE AMERICANS DURING THE CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH (Clifford E.
Trafzer & Joel R. Hyer, eds. 1999); C. Hart Merriam, The Indian Population of California, 7
AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 594,599-606 (1905).
307. See Jeffrey Ostler, "They Regard Their Passing as Wakan": Interpreting Western
Sioux Explanations for the Bison's Decline, 30 W. HIST. Q. 475, 475 (1999); ROBERT M.
UTLEY, THE LAST DAYS OF THE Sioux NATION (1963). See generally JAMES V. FENELON,
CULTURICIDE, RESISTANCE, AND SURVIVAL OF THE LAKOTA 25-252 (1998).
308. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
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followed."'9
As the affairs of Indian tribes declined, the aggressiveness of Congress and
the Executive branch in undermining tribal communities increased. By the
1850s, the Executive branch had adopted as a matter of policy a method of
breaking up Indian land holdings by introducing the allotment of Indian lands
in various treaties involving the Anishinaabe communities of the Old
Northwest. 1 o In 1887, Congress adopted allotment as its official Indian affairs
policy goal, with the intent of breaking up the tribal land mass."' Congress and
the Executive branch targeted tribes that had negotiated the right not to be
allotted or otherwise give up their land ownership in strong treaty language for
allotment.'
The first two Supreme Court cases establishing a federal common law
justification of federal plenary power over Indian affairs arose tangentially out
of these disputes. Ex parte Crow Dog 313 arose out of the murder by Crow Dog
of Spotted Tail, a competing leader of the Lower Brule Sioux community.31
After Crow Dog's conviction in federal court, the Supreme Court granted a writ
of habeas corpus, declaring that the federal government had no authority to
prosecute Indian-on-Indian crime within Indian Country. 3 15 The Crow Dog
Court relied upon the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie, which included a "bad
men" clause that clearly established tribal authority to prosecute their own
members, and excluded federal authority.3 1 6 Of note, the Court added that
someone of Crow Dog's barbaric and uncivilized character could not possibly
hope to comprehend relatively sophisticated federal laws and political norms,
and could not have participated in the political process that established such
laws and norms.3 1 7 Here, the guardian-ward dichotomy rears its visible and
ugly head in the overt racism of the Supreme Court.3 1 1
The Bureau began a campaign promising lawlessness in Indian Country if
309. See Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror, 41 AM. U.
L. REV. 753, 821 n.411 (1992). ("The Government attached the 'sell-or-starve' rider to the
treaty during the winter when the Government prevented the tribe from hunting, moved most
of the members into stockades, and threatened to withhold rations if they did not agree to the
treaty.").
310. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A
POLITICAL ANOMALY 241-42 (1994).
311. See General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), repealed in part
by Wheeler-Howard Act, ch. 576, § 1, 48 Stat. 984 (1934).
312. E.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); ECHO-HAWK, supra note 19,
at 161-86 (describing the import of the Lone Wolf decision); POMMERSHEtM, BROKEN
LANDSCAPE, supra note 53, at 125-51 (same).
313. 109 U.S.556 (1883).
314. See SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROw DOG'S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY,
TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 108-15 (1994).
315. See Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 572.
316. See id. at 563.
317. See id. at 571-72.
318. See WILLIAMS, supra note 297, at 75-79.
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no federal prosecutor had authority in Indian Country, prompting Congress to
enact the Major Crimes Act in 1885."9 The first challenge to a federal
prosecution under the Major Crimes Act reached the Supreme Court the very
next year in United States v. Kagama,320 a case arising on the Hoopa Valley
Reservation, which had been established by an Executive Order of President
Grant.32'
Defending the Major Crimes Act in Kagama presented the government
with a slight problem-the Supreme Court had changed dramatically since the
Marshall Court,322 and was beginning to embark on a long campaign to
undermine congressional authority.323 The first holding of the Kagama Court
was to state that the Indian Commerce Clause simply did not authorize the
Major Crimes Act.324 Despite the original understanding of the First Congress,
which had established a kind of general criminal law for Indian Country as
applied to Americans,3 25 the Court casually held that the Commerce Clause
simply had nothing in it authorizing the assertion of federal criminal
jurisdiction in Indian Country.326 Moreover, since the Senate had never ratified
the 1850s treaty with the Hoopa Valley Tribe,327 there could be no
congressional authority arising from the consent of the Tribe itself.328
319. See HARRING, supra note 314, at 134-40 (discussing the legislative history of the
Major Crimes Act); Helen L. Peterson, American Indian Political Participation, 311
ANNALs AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC. 116, 118 (1957).
320. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
321. See Karuk Tribe v. Ammon, 209 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
532 U.S. 941 (2001); Parravano v. Babbitt, 70 F.3d 539, 542 (9th Cir. 1995).
322. See generally David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The
Protection of Economic Interests, 1889-1910, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 324, 324-25 (1985).
Professor Currie criticizes the Kagama Court for not relying on the Commerce Clause. See
id. at 337-38.
323. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause: A
Political Theory of American Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1355, 1378-85 (1994).
324. See Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378-79 ("The mention of Indians in the constitution
which has received most attention is that found in the clause which gives congress 'power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes.' This clause is relied on in the argument in the present case, the proposition being that
the statute under consideration is a regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes. But we
think it would be a very strained construction of this clause that a system of criminal laws for
Indians living peaceably in their reservations, which left out the entire code of trade and
intercourse laws justly enacted under that provision, and established punishments for the
common-law crimes of murder, manslaughter, arson, burglary, larceny, and the like, without
any reference to their relation to any kind of commerce, was authorized by the grant of
power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes.").
325. See Act of July 22, 1790, 1 Stat. 37.
326. See Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378-79.
327. See Robert F. Heizer, The Eighteen Unratified Treaties of 1851-1852 between the
California Indians and the United States Government, unpublished manuscript at 1 (1972);
see also id. at 91-95 (excerpting treaty).
328. See, e.g.,Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 549-55 (1831) (establishing history
of treaties with Indian tribes prior to 1831 and links to congressional powers deriving
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So what was left?
The Court upheld the Major Crimes Act not because of express authority
contained in the Constitution or a treaty, but because of a combination of the
geographic location of the Hoopa Valley Tribe within the territory of the
United States and the deeply degraded condition of Indian tribes and Indian
people everywhere.329 If the Major Crimes Act came to the Supreme Court
where a petitioner had challenged congressional authority to enact it in the
modern era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, as it sometimes does in the
lower federal courts, it is not so clear that the Supreme Court would uphold
congressional authority under the Indian Commerce Clause alone.33 (" But the
1886 Court refused to do so.
The Court's reasoning, if not its conclusion,' if remarkable. It held that
while no Constitution or treaty provision authorized the Major Crimes Act, a
combination of the mere geographic placement of the Hoopa reservation within
the exterior boundaries of the United States and the poor condition of Indian
people generally forced the Court to recognize congressional authority to enact
the statute. Now the guardian-ward served for Congress as a source legislative
authority.
Congress's authority to interfere in the interior affairs of Indian Country
reached its peak in a series of cases following Kagama that involved the
authority of Congress to control tribal property. 332 The Supreme Court's review
of congressional acts in this area reached a new level of deference, when it
finally held in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock333 that challenges to congressional
authority to regulate Indian affairs were foreclosed by what is now referred to
therefrom); cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (holding that the Treaty Power can
be used to expand federal authority).
329. See Kaganza, 118 U.S. at 383-84 ("It seems to us that this is within the
competency of congress. These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are
communities dependent on the United States, - dependent largely for their daily food;
dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the states, and receive from
them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where they are
found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so
largely due to the course of dealing of the federal government with them, and the treaties in
which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power. This
has always been recognized by the executive, and by congress, and by this court, whenever
the question has arisen.").
330. Cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down aspects of the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1996)
(striking down aspects of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990).
331. As Professor Currie suggested, this was probably an easy commerce clause case.
See Currie, supra note 322, at 337-38.
332. See generally Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust
Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1213, 1224-29 (1975); Reid Peyton Chambers &
Monroe E. Price, Regulating Sovereignty: Secretarial Discretion and the Leasing of Indian
Lands, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1061, 1068-75 (1974); Felix S. Cohen, Indian Rights and the
Federal Courts, 24 MINN. L. REV. 145, 195-99 (1940).
333. 187 U.S.553 (1903).
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as the political question doctrine.334
Lone Wolf, a case that arose out a direct challenge to the authority of
Congress to force the allotment of Indian reservations,33 came down after a
failed challenge by the Cherokee Nation to the Executive branch's
administration of tribal trust property, Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock.336 In
Cherokee Nation, the Supreme Court held that a long line of cases involving
the Cherokees had established congressional and Executive branch plenary
power over tribal property." The Court focused on Stephens v. Cherokee
Nation,3 for the proposition that "the United States practically assumed the
full control over the Cherokees as well as the other nations constituting the five
civilized tribes, and took upon itself the determination of membership in the
tribes for the purpose of adjusting their rights in the tribal property." 3 3 9
In Lone Wolf,34 0 members of the Kiowa and Comanche communities that
had executed the Medicine Lodge Treaty of 1867 challenged Congress's
authority to enact legislation that would allot the tribes' reservation lands,
arguing the allotment act at issue was a taking under the Fifth Amendment.341
In Lone Wolf, the Court built upon cases involving the Cherokee Nation and
334. The Lone Wolf Court wrote:
Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from
the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be
controlled by the judicial department of the government. Until the year 1871 the policy was
pursued of dealing with the Indian tribes by means of treaties, and, of course, a moral
obligation rested upon Congress to act in good faith in performing the stipulations entered
into on its behalf. But, as with treaties made with foreign nations ... , the legislative power
might pass laws in conflict with treaties made with the Indians. ***
The power exists to abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty, though presumably such
power will be exercised only when circumstances arise which will not only justify the
government in disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in the interest of
the country and the Indians themselves, that it should do so. When, therefore, treaties were
entered into between the United States and a tribe of Indians it was never doubted that the
power to abrogate existed in Congress, and that in a contingency such power might be
availed of from considerations of governmental policy, particularly if consistent with perfect
good faith towards the Indians.
Id. at 565-66 (citations omitted).
335. See id. at 564-65. See generally Ann Laquer Estin, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock: The
Long Shadow, in THE AGGRESSIONS OF CIVILIZATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY SINCE THE
1880s at 215, 216-34 (Sandra L. Cadwalader & Vine Deloria, Jr., eds. 1984).
336. 187 U.S. 294 (1902).
337. See id. at 306-07.
338. 174 U.S. 445 (1899).
339. Cherokee Nation, 187 U.S. at 306. Ironically, the Stephens Court merely
"assum[ed]" that Congress possessed plenary power at the time. Stephens, 174 U.S. at 478.
Moreover, the Cherokee Nation long had succumbed to federal intervention as a result of
their "adoption" of the Shawnees and the Delawares, not to mention their controversies with
the Cherokee Freedmen. See CIRCE STURM, BLOOD POLITICS: RACE, CULTURE, AND IDENTITY
IN THE CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLAHOMA (2002).
340. 187 U.S. 375 (1903).
341. See id. at 564.
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held that Congress's power is "undoubted,"342 and that Congress could delegate
authority to administer Indian property as it saw fit. The Supreme Court's
dictum in Lone Wolf that the sale of tribal lands was nothing more than "a mere
change in the form of investment" 343 recognized incredible federal authority to
control Indian property.344
Then, the Court also held that Congress is presumed to act in the best
interests of Indian tribes (as it would in a guardian-ward relationship).345 A
challenge to a decision by Congress (and by extension the Executive branch, as
the delegate of congressional power 346) in Indian affairs was not reviewable.
The Lone Wolf announcement that Congress possessed plenary power over.
Indian affairs and internal tribal relations was no announcement at all, but
instead was a declaration that the relationship between Congress and Indian
tribes was a political relationship within the exclusive discretion of Congress.
Congressional plenary power over Indian affairs between the federal
government, states, and Indian tribes has not been seriously questioned since
Lone Wolf, and really since Worcester, although the "absolute" character of
plenary power is no longer recognized by the courts. 347 But the Lone Wolf
Court brought the guardian-ward relationship to the forefront of American
Indian law, and forcefully ratified congressional action in interfering with the
internal affairs of Indian tribes and tribal property. However, after Lone Wolf,
rarely would the Supreme Court so directly rely upon the common law rule that
Congress and the federal government are the guardians of Indian tribes and
Indian people in a warship relationship. Instead, the Court would refocus its
jurisprudence on congressional Indian affairs power on the Constitution.
342. Cherokee Nation, 187 U.S. at 306 (noting that "[t]he plenary power of control by
Congress over the Indian tribes and its undoubted power to legislate, as it had done through
the act of 1898, directly for the protection of the tribal property").
343. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 568.
344. By the middle of the 20th century, however, federal courts began setting some
limits on federal power. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 423-24
(1980); Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States, 390 F.2d 686, 691 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
345. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 567-68 ("In view of the legislative power possessed by
Congress over treaties with the Indians and Indian tribal property, we may not specially
consider the contentions pressed upon our notice that the signing by the Indians of the
agreement of October 6, 1892, was obtained by fraudulent misrepresentations, and
concealment, that the requisite three fourths of adult male Indians had not signed, as required
by the twelfth article of the treaty of 1867, and that the treaty as signed had been amended by
Congress without submitting such amendments to the action of the Indians since all these
matters, in any event, were solely within the domain of the legislative authority, and its
action is conclusive upon the courts.") (emphasis added).
346. E.g., Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902).
347. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 423-24 (1980);
Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 83 (1977).
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C. The Indian Commerce Clause and the Treaty Power-The Constitutional
Authority for Congressional Plenary Power over Internal Indian Affairs
Challenges to congressional power over the internal workings of Indian
affairs have been made off and on throughout the twentieth century ,348 but since
Congress largely has stayed away from interfering from internal tribal affairs in
recent decades,349 there has been little to challenge. Scholars, however, have
established compelling research and argumentation suggesting that no such
congressional authority exists, 35 0 but the Supreme Court has not decided a
recent case involving such a direct challenge under these theories. Instead, the
Supreme Court has continued to recognize congressional plenary power in the
modern era without theorizing the justifications of such authority in great
detail, 35' and without delving into whether congressional authority extends into
the internal affairs of Indian tribes.
The first significant discussion of congressional plenary power over Indian
affairs came in a challenge to the so-called Duro fix,3 52 in which Congress
attempted to override Duro v. Reina via statute.354 The Supreme Court in
Duro held that Indian tribes had been implicitly divested of their sovereign
authority to prosecute all persons who were not members.5 In the Duro fix,
Congress sought to restore tribal authority to prosecute the limited class of
348. E.g., Shermoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting
challenge to Hoopa-Yurok Settlement Act), cert denied, 509 U.S. 903 (1993); Crain v. First
National Bank of Oregon, 324 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1963) (rejecting challenge to aspects of
Klamath Termination Act); Duncan v. Andrus, 517 F. Supp. I (N.D. Cal. 1977) (voiding
some aspects of implementation of California Rancheria Act of 1958); cf. Littlewolf v.
Lujan, 877 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (rejecting challenge to White Earth Land Settlement
Act), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1043 (1990); Iron Crow v. Oglalla Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge
Reservation, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956) (rejecting challenge to tribal prosecution); Lac
Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. United States, 259
F. Supp. 2d 783 (W.D. Wis. 1993) (rejecting challenge to aspects of Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act).
349. See generally GETCHES ET AL., supra note 20, at 216-24 (describing the era of
Indian self-determination, which officially began in 1970).
350. E.g., Clinton, supra note 53.
351. E.g., Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 103 (1993); Washington v. Confederated
Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470-471 (1979); United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974). See
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200-07 (2004).
352. Pub. L. 101-511, Title VIII, § 8077(b), (c), Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1892. See
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 216 (2004).
353. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
354. See generally Robert Laurence, Federal Court Review of Tribal Activity under the
Indian Civil Rights Act, 68 N. D. L. REV. 657 (1992); Nell Jessup Newton, Permanent
Legislation to Correct Duro v. Reina, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 109 (1992); Philip S. Deloria
& Nell Jessup Newton, The Criminal Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts over Non-Member
Indians: An Examination of the Basic Framework of Inherent Tribal Sovereignty Before and
After Duro v. Reina, 38 FED. B.NEWS & J. 70, 70-71 (Mar. 1991).
355. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 679.
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persons known as nonmember Indians through an amendment to the Indian
Civil Rights Act. 5 Congress had two options in enacting the Duro fix. It could
delegate federal authority to prosecute such persons," or recognize inherent
tribal authority to prosecute. Congress chose the second option, and reaffirmed
inherent tribal authority, something it had never done in the face of a Supreme
Court holding that the inherent tribal authority had not existed for decades (or
ever). 358
The Duro fix percolated in the lower federal courts for over a decade
before a circuit split arose in United States v. Lara over whether Congress had
authority to override the Supreme Court's decision.35' Finally, after Lara
reached the Court, a 7-2 majority affirmed Billy Jo Lara's conviction. 3 o The
majority opinion, authored by Justice Breyer, reiterated the congressional
plenary power doctrine, 36 ' but this time some Justices pressed the Court on the
real sources of congressional power.362 As noted in the previous subsection, the
majority noted several possible sources of constitutional authority for the Duro
fix. 363 But the real authority that supported congressional plenary power was
the long line of Supreme Court cases that had assumed without significant
discussion that Congress had such power, and of course Congress's assertion of
that power in dozens, if not hundreds, of Acts.364
356. The relevant provision is 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), which now reads (Duro fix
language in italics):
"powers of self-government" means and includes all governmental powers
possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial, and all offices,
bodies, and tribunals by and through which they are executed, including courts of
Indian offenses; and means the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized
and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians....
357. The Supreme Court confirmed congressional authority to delegate federal power
to Indian tribes in United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975). See also Bugenig v. Hoopa
Valley Tribe, 266 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that Congress delegated
federal power to regulate nonmembers to the tribe in the Hoopa-Yurok Settlement Act).
358. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (holding that tribal courts have no
inherent authority to adjudicate civil rights actions against state officials); Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding that Indian tribes had no inherent
authority to prosecute non-Indians).
359. E.g., United States v. Lara, 324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (striking down
Duro fix); United States v. Long, 324 F.3d 475 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 822 (2003)
(affirming Duro fix); United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc)
(affirming Duro fix), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 115 (2002); United States v. Weaselhead, 156
F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 1998) (striking down Duro fix), vacated by an equally divided court, 165
F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Means v. Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court, 154 F.3d
941 (9th Cir. 1998) (interpreting the Duro fix as a delegation of congressional power);
Mousseau v. U.S. Comm'r of Indian Affairs, 806 F. Supp. 1433 (D. S.D. 1992) (same).
360. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196.
361. See id. at 200.
362. See id. at 211 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) ("difficult question"); id. at
215 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) ("doubtful").
363. See id. at 200-02.
364. See id. at 202-07.
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Justices Souter, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented through reliance on the
Supreme Court's institutional authority to decide matters of inherent tribal
authority365 and Justice Kennedy concurred only in the judgment on procedural
grounds.366 But the real dissent came from Justice Thomas, who suggested that
the Supreme Court review its precedents on congressional plenary power in
light of recent precedents on the Interstate Commerce Clause.367 Justice
Thomas concurred for largely the same procedural reasons as Justice
Kennedy, 368 but proposed that Congress had no authority whatsoever to grant
Indian tribes the authority to prosecute anyone. 369 He further proposed that
Indian tribal sovereignty had been effectively extinguished in 1871 when
Congress (as a policy matter) chose to cease entering into treaties with Indian
tribes.370
Regardless of the merits of the preconstitutional source of authority or
Justice Thomas's disregard of a century of precedent, congressional plenary
power is alive and well. Congressional plenary power over the inner workings
of Indian tribes may also be alive and well, though not the subject of recent,
direct challenge. We now move to an important pivot point in this Article;
namely, a review of Supreme Court cases that have generated enormous
consternation by federal Indian law observers,' first from the vantage point of
365. See id. at 227 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Our precedent, then, is that any tribal
exercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers necessarily rests on a 'delegation' of
federal power and is not akin to a State's congressionally permitted exercise of some
authority that would otherwise be barred by the dormant Commerce Clause.....
366. See id. at 211 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
367. See id. at 224 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (citing United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1996)).
368. See id. at 215 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
369. See id. ("I cannot agree with the Court, for instance, that the Constitution grants to
Congress plenary power to calibrate the 'metes and bounds of tribal sovereignty.' Ante, at
1635; see also ante, at 1639 (holding that 'the Constitution authorizes Congress' to regulate
tribal sovereignty). Unlike the Court, ante, at 1633, I cannot locate such congressional
authority in the Treaty Clause, U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, or the Indian Commerce
Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. ").
370. See id. ("Additionally, I would ascribe much more significance to legislation such
as the Act of Mar. 3, 1871, Rev. Stat. § 2079, 16 Stat. 566, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71, that
purports to terminate the practice of dealing with Indian tribes by treaty. The making of
treaties, after all, is the one mechanism that the Constitution clearly provides for the Federal
Government to interact with sovereigns other than the States. Yet, if I accept that Congress
does have this authority, I believe that the result in Wheeler is questionable."); see also id. at
218 ("Further, federal policy itself could be thought to be inconsistent with this residual-
sovereignty theory. In 1871, Congress enacted a statute that purported to prohibit entering
into treaties with the "Indian nation[s] or tribe[s]." 16 Stat. 566, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71.
Although this Act is constitutionally suspect (the Constitution vests in the President both the
power to make treaties, Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and to recognize foreign governments, Art. II, § 3;
see, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228-230, 62 S.Ct. 552, 86 L.Ed. 796 (1942)), it
nevertheless reflects the view of the political branches that the tribes had become a purely
domestic matter.").
371. E.g., John P. LaVelle, Implicit Divestiture Reconsidered: Outtakes from the
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tribal consent, and the moving in Part III to the vantage point of nonmember
consent.
D. Implicit Divestiture and the Assertion of Federal Judicial Authority over
Indian Affairs
The end of the political question doctrine in Indian law in Delaware Tribal
Business Committee v. Weeks and United States v. Sioux Nation had an
interesting and undertheorized subplot-the rise of judicial authority over
Indian affairs, or what Frank Pommersheim has called "judicial plenary
power." 372 Beginning in 1978, the Supreme Court began to utilize a tool now
known as "implicit divesture" to manipulate the contours of tribal sovereignty
absent a statement from Congress on the question.37' The Court apparently took
its authority to do so from Marshall Trilogy-era cases, which held that Indian
tribes do not have authority to alienate Indian lands absent the consent of
Congress, amongst other things. 374 The judicial power to craft federal Indian
common law decisions in such striking ways had not been seriously considered
by many observers of federal Indian law375  until the Court simply took action
in Oliphant.376 Prior to Oliphant, the doctrine of reserved tribal authority, or
Cohen's Handbook Cutting-Room Floor, 38 CONN. L. REV. 731 (2006); Blake A. Watson,
The Thrust and Parry of Federal Indian Law, 23 U DAYTON L. REv. 437, 472-81 (1998).;
Laurie Reynolds, "Jurisdiction" in Federal Indian Law: Confusion, Contradiction, and
Supreme Court Precedent, 27 N.M. L. REv. 359, 361-76 (1997); Bruce Duthu, Implicit
Divestiture of Tribal Powers: Locating Legitimate Sources of Authority in Indian Country,
19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 353 (1994).
372. Pommersheim, At the Crossroads, supra note 53, at 52; Pommersheim, Tribal
Courts and the Federal Judiciary, supra note 53, at 328.
373. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (eliminating tribal
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians); see also Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)
(eliminating tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians); Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544, 564-65 (1981) (limiting tribal civil regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers).
374. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) ("Moreover, the
sovereign power of a tribe to prosecute its members for tribal offenses clearly does not fall
within that part of sovereignty which the Indians implicitly lost by virtue of their dependent
status. The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held to have
occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the
tribe. Thus, Indian tribes can no longer freely alienate to non-Indians the land they occupy.
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667-668, 94 S.Ct. 772, 777, 39
L.Ed.2d 73; Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 574, 5 L.Ed. 681. They cannot enter into
direct commercial or governmental relations with foreign nations. Worcester v. Georgia, 6
Pet. 515, 559, 8 L.Ed. 483; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet., at 17-18; Fletcher v. Peck, 6
Cranch 87, 147, 3 L.Ed. 162 (Johnson, J., concurring). And, as we have recently held, they
cannot try nonmembers in tribal courts. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,
98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209.").
375. E.g., NATIONAL AMERICAN INDIAN COURT JUDGES AssN., supra note 250; Tim
Vollman, Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Tribal Sovereignty and Defendants'
Rights in Conflict, 22 U. KAN. L. REV. 387, 392-93 (1974).
376. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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inherent authority, as articulated in the original Handbook of Federal Indian
Law, 37 7 was the law, and only Congress or an Indian tribe via treaty or other
sovereign-to-sovereign agreement could abrogate tribal governmental
powers.378
The Supreme Court's invocation of implicit divestiture has been the most
considerable source of interference in the internal workings of Indian tribes
since the Termination Era in the 1950s, during which Congress unilaterally
terminated the relationship between more than 100 tribes and the federal
government.379 It is noteworthy that the subject areas of tribal sovereignty with
which the Court has interfered- tribal criminal jurisdiction, 3o taxation,381
regulatory, 382 and adjudicatory383 jurisdiction over nonmembers- are areas of
sovereignty in which Congress has largely been silent or supportive of tribal
governance .384
The best argument for an Article III court asserting jurisdiction over an
internal tribal matter such as criminal jurisdiction, in my view, comes from the
Marshall Trilogy3 " and Kagama.38 6 In Johnson and in Worcester especially,
Chief Justice Marshall expressed the view that Indian tribes have generally
accepted federal governance over them through the notion of "protection," an
accepted international law doctrine with significant limits over the
377. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1941).
378. E.g., Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439, 1440-42 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (interpreting treaties and agreements involving tribal governance authority), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1010 (1989).
379. See generally Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 50.
380. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435
U.S. 191 (1978).
381. E.g., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005); Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
382. E.g., Bourland v. South Dakota, 508 U.S. 679 (1993); Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544 (1981).
383. E.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316
(2008); Strate v. A-I Contractors, Inc., 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
384. In the area of tribal criminal authority, Congress has acted to ratchet up tribal
sovereignty, most recently in the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010. See 25 U.S.C. §§
1302(7)(a)-(d). In the area of tribal regulatory jurisdiction, Congress has allowed the
Environmental Protection Agency to treat tribes as states for many purposes. See Ann E.
Tweedy, Using Plenary Power as a Sword: Tribal Civil Regulatory Jurisdiction under the
Clean Water Act after United States v. Lara, 35 ENVTL. L. 471 (2005); Jessica Owley, Tribal
Sovereignty over Water Quality, 20 J. LAND USE 61 (2004). In the area of tribal court civil
jurisdiction, Congress has frequently supported the development of tribal courts. See
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 NEB. L. REV.
121, 147-50 (2006). Congress largely has been silent about Indian taxation issues, but it
strongly supports tribal economic development, which runs counter to the Supreme Court's
views on state taxation in Indian Country. See id. at 144-47.
385. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. I
(1831); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
386. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
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"protector's" authority to control the inner workings of the "protected's"
governance. 87 Kagama expanded that dramatically by incorporating a much
broader definition of "protection" based on subjective factors such as
"depend[ence]" and "weakness."" But in either case, it is at least questionable
whether an Article III court can bootstrap its authority onto the power of
Congress. Moreover, the Supreme Court in cases like Oliphant is asserting
broad authority to determine the metes and bounds of tribal power, regardless
of tribal consent, and regardless of congressional direction.389 The Court's
broad pronouncements of law are lacking in humility in the Court's power,390
sympathy for the people potentially endangered by the Court's decisions, 9 ' or
deference to either Congress or Indian tribes.392 These cases appear to be
nothing more than lawmaking by fiat, despite their grounding in federal
common law.
1. Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction
Congress had not legislated on the criminal jurisdiction of Indian tribes at
all until it enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act in 1968,"" which purported to
extend major portions of the Bill of Rights into Indian Country, 394 attempting to
regulate tribal prosecutions and even obliquely recognizing tribal authority to
do so regardless of the membership status of the defendant. ICRA limited tribal
government discretion by applying this "Indian Bill of Rights" to tribes, and
did so without defining which persons could be subject to tribal governance.
In short, Congress left the question open by keeping silent about whether
387. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 560-61; Johnson, 21 U.S. at 592-93.
388. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383-84.
389. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206 (articulating the "commonly shared presumption"
of the federal government's three branches without reference to prior Supreme Court
precedent or Act of Congress); id. (noting that the Treaty of Point Elliott is "silent" on the
question).
390. See H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL
DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL DECISION (2008); Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Crampton,
Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94
CORNELL L. REv. 587, 607, 624 (2009) (citing POWELL, supra).
391. See Amnesty International, Maze of Injustice: The Failure to Protect Indigenous
Women from Sexual Violence in the USA (2007), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/MazeOflnjustice.pdf. Cf. Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins,
Why the Supreme Court Cares about Elites, Not People, 98 GEO. L. J. 1515 (20 10).
392. See Skibine, supra note 45, at 397-436.
393. Art. of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. 2, § 201, 82 Stat. 77 (1968) (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.).
394. See 25 U.S.C.§ 1302.
395. The original version of 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) read: "'powers of self-government'
means and includes all governmental powers possessed by an Indian tribe, executive,
legislative, and judicial, and all offices, bodies, and tribunals by and through which they are
executed . . . ." Section 1302 still begins: "No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-
government shall ... ," without reference to the persons under tribal government control.
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nonmembers could be subject to tribal criminal prosecutions. Many tribes acted
to modernize tribal justice systems as a result of the enactment of ICRA, and
within a decade, a few dozen tribes enacted laws purporting to extend criminal
jurisdiction authority over nonmembers.396
Throughout the history of American Indian law and policy, federal courts
only rarely addressed questions of tribal criminal jurisdiction, and there are
only three published federal court cases directly addressing the subject. Several
other cases address the question indirectly, though in important ways. The first
decision, Ex parte Kenyon, 397 from the latter half of the 19th century, is a
federal district court case that reached federal court (apparently) on a habeas
petition. It's not clear how the court could assert jurisdiction absent an act of
Congress or an authorizing Constitutional provision, and so that court's
decision (which went against tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians) is
somewhat questionable given the jurisdictional gray area in which the case
rests. 398 The second case, Oliphant 399 relied in part on Kenyon,"0 and many
other legal authorities (but obviously no precedential cases), in reaching the
same conclusion.40 ' In that case, Congress had expressly extended the federal
habeas right to criminal defendants in tribal court in 1968's Indian Civil Rights
Act,' 2 though even there the jurisdictional requisite-detention403-was not
396. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 196 ("The Suquamish Indian Tribe does not stand alone
today in its assumption of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Of the 127 reservation
court systems that currently exercise criminal jurisdiction in the United States, 33 purport to
extend that jurisdiction to non-Indians. Twelve other Indian tribes have enacted ordinances
which would permit the assumption of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.").
397. 14 F. Cas. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1878) (No. 7720).
398. Compare Armistead M. Dobie, Habeas Corpus in the Federal Courts, 13 VA. L.
REV. 433, 450, 452 (1926) (citing Kenyon and noting that federal judges could issue habeas
writs for persons within their territorial jurisdiction), with Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376
(1896) (holding the United States Constitution does not apply to Indian tribes), and Ex parte
Crow Dog, 119 U.S. 575 (1883) (holding federal prosecutors had no authority over Indian-
on-Indian crime within Indian Country).
399. 435 U.S. 191.
400. See id. at 200.
401. For cutting reviews on then-Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion and his legal
history, see WILLIAMS, supra note 297, at 97-114; Russel Lawrence Barsh & James
Youngblood Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting
of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REv. 609 (1979). But see United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 222
(2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting the Oliphant Court "carefully
examined the views of Congress and the Executive Branch").
402. See 25 U.S.C. § 1303 ("The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be
available to any person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by
order of an Indian tribe.").
403. Neither defendant in the case had been convicted, nor was either defendant
detained pending trial. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194:
Petitioner Mark David Oliphant was arrested by tribal authorities during the Suquamish's
annual Chief Seattle Days celebration and charged with assaulting a tribal officer and
resisting arrest. After arraignment before the tribal court, Oliphant was released on his own
recognizance. Petitioner Daniel B. Belgarde was arrested by tribal authorities after an alleged
97Apr. 2012]
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satisfied. The third case reaching the same conclusion, Duro v. Reina,4 04
involved nonmember Indians.4 05 Duro reached the Court in the same extra-
textual manner as Oliphant, prior to an actual conviction and resulting
detention.40 6 In all three cases, the courts held that the tribal court could not
exercise criminal jurisdiction over the defendants, all of whom were
nonmembers. In the all three cases, federal court jurisdiction was doubtful,
especially in the two modern cases;407 again demonstrating the Court's
willingness to go beyond Congress's mandate in Indian affairs. Importantly,
Congress overrode the Court's judgment (as discussed above 401 ) in Duro, but
not yet in Oliphant.409
In other cases, the Supreme Court has affirmed tribal criminal jurisdiction
over tribal members, most importantly in United States v. Wheeler, 41 which
was a double jeopardy challenge to a federal prosecution following a tribal
high-speed race along the Reservation highways that only ended when Belgarde collided
with a tribal police vehicle. Belgarde posted bail and was released. Six days later he was
arraigned and charged under the tribal Code with "recklessly endangering another person"
and injuring tribal property. Tribal court proceedings against both petitioners have been
stayed pending a decision in this case.
Id. (emphasis added).
404. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
405. See id. at 679.
406. See id. at 682:
Petitioner then was placed in the custody of Pima-Maricopa officers, and he was taken to
stand trial in the Pima-Maricopa Indian Community Court. The tribal court's powers are
regulated by a federal statute, which at that time limited tribal criminal penalties to six
months' imprisonment and a $500 fine. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1982 ed.). The tribal criminal
code is therefore confined to misdemeanors. Petitioner was charged with the illegal firing of
a weapon on the reservation. After the tribal court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss the
prosecution for lack of jurisdiction, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona, naming the tribal chief judge and
police chief as respondents.
Id. (emphasis added).
407. But see Dry v. CFR Court of Indian Offenses for Choctaw Nation, 168 F.3d 1207
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 815 (1999).
408. See supra note 352.
409. It seems like there is frequently an Oliphant-fix pending in Congress, but nothing
has come of it, despite being a frequent note topic for law students, e.g., Samuel E. Ennis,
Comment, Reaffirming Indian Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction over Non-Indians: An
Argument for a Statutory Abrogation of Oliphant, 57 UCLA L. REV. 553 (2009); Marie
Quasias, Note, Native American Rape Victims: Desperately Seeking an Oliphant Fix, 93
MINN. L. REV. 1902 (2009); cf. Will Trachman, Comment, Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction after
U.S. v. Lara: Answering Constitutional Challenges to the Duro Fix, 93 CAL. L. REV. 847,
852 (2005); and law professors and practitioners, e.g., D. Michael McBride Ill, The FBA's
Indian Law Section: Vetting the Important Issues Regarding Indian Country, FED. LAW.,
Mar.-Apr. 2008, at 4, 4 (2008) (describing efforts to persuade Congress to enact an
"Oliphant fix"); Elizabeth Ann Kronk, The Emerging Problem of Methamphetamine: A
Threat Signaling the Need to Reforn Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 82 N. D. L.
REV. 1249 (2006).
410. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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prosecution for the same crime.4 1' In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
decided Ex parte Crow Dog,4 12 where the Court held that the federal
government had no criminal jurisdiction over Indian-on-Indian crime in Indian
Country, 413 indirectly recognizing the inherent authority of Indian tribes to
prosecute their own for criminal law violations. Another nineteenth century
case, Talton v. Mayes,414 noted that tribal criminal prosecutions are not subject
to the dictates of the United States Constitution, 4 1 5 a legal fact that Congress
attempted to partially remedy in enacting the Indian Civil Rights Act.* The
most recent, United States v. Lara,417 was primarily an exercise in addressing
whether Congress had authority to reinstate inherent tribal powers, 418 and did
not involve a habeas action arising out of tribal court.
It is important to separate out the cases that arise out of federal common
law from the ones that arise out of the habeas provision of the Indian Civil
Rights Act (ICRA). No case arises from ICRA, except in the extra-textual
manner used in Oliphant and Duro. Because these cases arose out of pure
federal common law-meaning that an Article III court created the cause of
action and the individual right to be vindicated in the action4 '9-no Indian tribe
could ever be said to consent to such an outside intervention. Conversely, in
cases arising from ICRA, where tribal lobbying failed to prevent its enactment,
but still contributed important limitations on the reach of the statute,420 at least
some form of plausible implied tribal consent exists.
In sum, the Supreme Court directs federal policy on tribal criminal
jurisdiction, with some Justices conveying open hostility to congressional
preferences. The Court's exercise of jurisdiction outside of the limited scope of
the Indian Civil Rights Act further undermines congressional preferences, and
directly implicates the lack of tribal consent to the Court's jurisdiction. A
conflict may be brewing in coming years after Congress passed the Tribal Law
and Order Act and slightly expanded tribal criminal jurisdiction authority.
Congress may also consider revising the Supreme Court's holding in Oliphant
to allow for tribal jurisdiction over nonmember domestic violence offenders.422
411. See id.at 314.
412. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
413. Seeid.at571.
414. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
415. See id. at 382-85.
416. See Note, supra note 254, at 360; see also Burton D. Fretz, The Bill of Rights and
American Indian Tribal Governments,6 NAT. RES. J. 581 (1966).
417. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
418. See id. at 196.
419. See Lumen N. Mulligan, A Unified Theory of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 Jurisdiction, 61
VAND. L.REV. 1667, 1716-26 (2008).
420. See Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The Indian Bill of Rights at
Thirty Years, 34 IDAHO L. REv. 465, 469-70 (1998).
421. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(7)(a)-(d).
422. See Violence against Native American Women Act of 2011 -Draft Bill Released,
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2. Tribal Taxing, Regulatory, and Adjudicatory Authority
The Supreme Court also directs much of federal policy on tribal civil
jurisdiction, starting with Montana v. United States,423 decided in 1981. There,
the Court articulated a common law general rule with two exceptions,424 which
on their face were broad and vague. The general rule was that Indian tribes do
not possess civil regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers on non-Indian-
owned land. 425 The two exceptions, known as Montana 1 426 and Montana 2,427
involved consensual commercial agreements and nonmember actions that had a
dramatic impact on tribal governance, respectively. While the Court articulated
the general rule in 1981, it wasn't until the early 1990s that it became clear that
the Montana rule had largely won out over competing Supreme Court decisions
from the 1980s. 4 28 And it was not clear until 1997, when Justice Ginburg's
majority opinion in Strate v. A-I Contracting 429 labeled Montana with one of
her trademarks ("pathmarking") that Montana applied also to tribal court
jurisdiction.4
The standard identified by the Court in Oliphant that would justify the
judicial divestiture of tribal authority was any power "inconsistent with [the
tribe's] dependent status." 4 31 This is hardly much of a standard at all, and
TURTLE TALK BLOG POST (Aug. 19, 2011), available at
http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/20 11/08/19/violence-against-native-american-women-act-of-
2011 -draft-bill-released/.
423. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
424. See id. at 565-66.
425. See id. at 565 ("Stressing that Indian tribes cannot exercise power inconsistent
with their diminished status as sovereigns, the [Oliphant] Court quoted Justice Johnson's
words in his concurrence in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 147, 3 L.Ed. 162 -the first Indian
case to reach this Court-that the Indian tribes have lost any 'right of governing every
person within their limits except themselves."') (quoting Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978)).
426. See id. ("To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise
some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian
fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of
nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.").
427. See id. at 566 ("A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority
over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the tribe.").
428. See South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679,694-98 (1993).
429. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
430. See id. at 445.
431. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208 (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th
Cir. 1976)). At one point after Oliphant but before Montana, the Court noted in dicta that a
tribe might be implicitly divested of authority if it is in conflict with some sort of "overriding
interest of the National Government," Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville
Reservation, 447 U.S. 130, 154 (1980), a much different standard than "dependent status."
The Court does not appear to have returned to this standard.
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renders predictability about future cases almost impossible. And lack of
predictability in federal common law cases of course generates additional need
for Supreme Court review in future cases, which in turn generates additional
Supreme Court discretion and power. Oliphant was a bright-line rule and has
not generated many later cases on its contours, but Montana's test and
exceptions, along with Oliphant's standard, have generated enormous
unpredictability in the lower courts43 2 and even in the Supreme Court (at least
in terms of the cases it chooses to review4 33 ). The federal common law
questions on implicit divestiture have increased the Court's importance
dramatically in American Indian law and policy, so much so that even
Congress depends on the Court's pronouncements, 4 34 a very far cry from the
nearly two centuries of federal Indian law and policy that preceded the late
Burger and Rehnquist Courts' decisions in which the Court adopted a virtual
political question bar to tribal claims against Congress.435
Congress had not legislated broadly on the question of tribal civil
jurisdiction over nonmembers, leaving the door open to Supreme Court
interpretation via federal common law. The first tribal civil authority cases
following Montana upheld tribal authority to tax (Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe 436), to exclude undesirables from tribal lands (Merrion 437), and tribal
authority to regulate nonmember activity on tribal trust lands (New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe,438 a decision guided in part by federal regulatory
actions that supplied necessary federal Indian preemption authority to preclude
state authority over nonmembers on tribal lands 4 39). These cases relied on a
smattering of older cases and federal government opinions that upheld tribal
taxing authority in decades past, as well as treaty rights to protect reservation
boundaries and lands. It is important also that all of these cases arose on tribal
trust lands.
In 1985, however, the Supreme Court took an enormous step in arrogating
to itself judicial review over aspects of tribal court jurisdiction over
nonmembers, even on tribal trust lands. In National Farmers Union v. Crow
Tribe of Indians,4 40 the Court identified a federal right (for nonmembers only,
432. See generally Krakoff, supra note 216.
433. E.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless: The Certiorari Process as
a Barrier to Justice for Indian Tribes, 51 ARIz. L. REV. 933, 947 (2009) (discussing tribal
jurisdiction cases involving nonmembers).
434. E.g., Examining the Prevalence of and Solutions to Stopping Violence against
Indian Women, Hearing before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong., Ist
Sess., 41-62 (2007) (Testimony and Prepared Statement of Riyaz A. Kanji).
435. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 215-17 (1962).
436. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
437. See id. at 141.
438. 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
439. See id. at 348-51.
440. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
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presumably) to be free of tribal court civil jurisdiction, 441 and a federal
common law cause of action to vindicate this right.442 National Farmers Union
flew directly in the face of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,443 the case that
denied individuals a federal cause of action to sue Indian tribes under the
Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA).444 Martinez held that Congress had legislated
in the field of tribal civil rights completely, and Congress decided that the only
federal cause of action to vindicate an ICRA right was the federal habeas
provision available only to those that had been convicted of a crime in tribal
court.445 National Farmers Union ignored Martinez by identifying a federal
right outside of the scope of ICRA, and further ignored Martinez in identifying
441. See id. at 852 ("This Court has frequently been required to decide questions
concerning the extent to which Indian tribes have retained the power to regulate the affairs of
non-Indians. .. In this case the petitioners contend that the Tribal Court has no power to
enter a judgment against them. Assuming that the power to resolve disputes arising within
the territory governed by the Tribe was once an attribute of inherent tribal sovereignty, the
petitioners, in essence, contend that the Tribe has to some extent been divested of this aspect
of sovereignty. More particularly, when they invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court under
§ 1331, they must contend that federal law has curtailed the powers of the Tribe, and thus
afforded them the basis for the relief they seek in a federal forum."). Cf National Farmers
Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 468 U.S. 1315, 1318 (1984) ("But if because only
the National and State Governments exercise true sovereignty, and are therefore subject to
the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment, I cannot believe that Indian tribal courts are
nonetheless free to exercise their jurisdiction in a manner prohibited by the decisions of this
Court, and that a litigant who is the subject of such an exercise ofjurisdiction has nowhere at
all to turn for relief from a conceded excess.").
442. See Nat'I Farmers Unions, 471 U.S at 852-53 ("The question whether an Indian
tribe retains the power to compel a non-Indian property owner to submit to the civil
jurisdiction of a tribal court is one that must be answered by reference to federal law and is a
'federal question' under § 1331. Because petitioners contend that federal law has divested
the Tribe of this aspect of sovereignty, it is federal law on which they rely as a basis for the
asserted right of freedom from Tribal Court interference. They have, therefore, filed an
action 'arising under' federal law within the meaning of § 1331. The District Court correctly
concluded that a federal court may determine under § 133 1 whether a tribal court has
exceeded the lawful limits of its jurisdiction.").
443. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
444. See id. at 72 ("Congress retains authority expressly to authorize civil actions for
injunctive or other relief to redress violations of § 1302, in the event that the tribes
themselves prove deficient in applying and enforcing its substantive provisions. But unless
and until Congress makes clear its intention to permit the additional intrusion on tribal
sovereignty that adjudication of such actions in a federal forum would represent, we are
constrained to find that § 1302 does not impliedly authorize actions for declaratory or
injunctive relief against either the tribe or its officers.").
445. See id. at 70-71 ("Given this history, it is highly unlikely that Congress would
have intended a private cause of action for injunctive and declaratory relief to be available in
the federal courts to secure enforcement of § 1302. [The legislative history] indicates that the
ICRA was generally understood to authorize federal judicial review of tribal actions only
through the habeas corpus provisions of § 1303. These factors, together with Congress'
rejection of proposals that clearly would have authorized causes of action other than habeas
corpus, persuade us that Congress, aware of the intrusive effect of federal judicial review
upon tribal self-government, intended to create only a limited mechanism for such review,
namely, that provided for expressly in § 1303.").
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a federal common law cause of action to vindicate that right. The Court
additionally held that nonmembers must first exhaust tribal remedies before
bringing the.federal claim against the tribal court,4 4 6 a holding it buttressed a
few years later in Iowa Mutual v. LaPlante."'7 In Iowa Mutual, the Court
suggested that tribal court jurisdiction over nonmembers for cases arising on
tribal lands was "presumptive."" National Farmers Union supported this
notion by limiting federal court review of tribal court decisions to the question
of jurisdiction, rather than a de novo review.449 Neither case ever reached the
Court on the merits. And so no guidance on tribal court jurisdiction is available
from them, just procedure.4 50
Tribal court jurisdiction and tribal taxing authority over nonmembers
seemed to heading in a different path than that of tribal regulatory authority,
which the Supreme Court held was controlled by Montana. In the late 1980s,
the Court divided sharply in Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Tribes 451 over
what test to apply in cases involving tribal regulation of nonmember conduct.
Brendale was a case that frankly was a poor vehicle for deciding the question,
446. See Nat 'l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856-57 ("We believe that examination
should be conducted in the first instance in the Tribal Court itself. Our cases have often
recognized that Congress is committed to a policy of supporting tribal self-government and
self-determination. That policy favors a rule that will provide the forum whose jurisdiction is
being challenged the first opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal bases for the
challenge. Moreover the orderly administration of justice in the federal court will be served
by allowing a full record to be developed in the Tribal Court before either the merits or any
question concerning appropriate relief is addressed. The risks of the kind of 'procedural
nightmare' that has allegedly developed in this case will be minimized if the federal court
stays its hand until after the Tribal Court has had a full opportunity to determine its own
jurisdiction and to rectify any errors it may have made. Exhaustion of tribal court remedies,
moreover, will encourage tribal courts to explain to the parties the precise basis for accepting
jurisdiction, and will also provide other courts with the benefit of their expertise in such
matters in the event of further judicial review.").
447. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
448. Id. at 18 ("Civil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the. tribal
courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute. 'Because
the Tribe retains all inherent attributes of sovereignty that have not been divested by the
Federal Government, the proper inference from silence . . . is that the sovereign power ...
remains intact."') (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149, n.14
(1982)).
449. See Nat'l Farmers Union, 471 U.S at 853 (holding that "a federal court may
determine under § 1331 whether a tribal court has exceeded the lawful limits of its
jurisdiction"); see also id. at 855 (suggesting that the federal court's jurisdiction is limited to
"whether a tribal court has the power to exercise civil subject-matter jurisdiction over non-
Indians").
450. The Nat '1 Farmers Union Court importantly rejected an argument from the
nonmembers that the bright-line rule against tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
should be applied in the civil context as well. See id. at 853-57. Interestingly, part of the
legal authority against such a ruling suggested that tribes generally do have civil jurisdiction
over those within their territories. See Nat'l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 854-55 (quoting
Attorney General Cushing, 7 OP. ArrY. GEN. 175, 179-81 (1855)).
451. 492 U.S.408 (1989).
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given the enormously complex landownership pattern on the highly-
checkerboarded reservation.452 In 1993, the Court (with a different fact pattern)
decided South Dakota v. Bourland,4 53 holding that the Montana test applied to
tribal regulation of nonmember activity on nonmember land within the
reservation borders.454 The Court's analysis strongly suggested that, despite the
vague wording and textual broadness of the exceptions, it would be much
harder for a tribal government to meet the exceptions than previously assumed,
perhaps even by the Montana Court.455
The tribal lands/nonmember lands dichotomy, which at least generated a
semblance of doctrinal coherence, suffered serious blows in Strate v. A-1
Contractors 456 and Nevada v. Hicks.45 7 Strate involved a routine car wreck on
tribal trust lands and a resulting personal injury suit in tribal court. 458 Tribal
courts had begin hearing more and more tort claims, likely as a result of the
tribal court exhaustion doctrine.459 The plaintiff and defendant in Strate were
nonmembers, though the plaintiff owned property on the reservation, was
married to a tribal member, and had tribal member children .460 The highway on
which the accident occurred was located on a highway upon which the State of
North Dakota had an easement, and which it patrolled and maintained. 46 1
However, the land was still trust land, even with the easement, and the plaintiff
refused to exhaust tribal court remedies in accordance with National Farmers
Union.4 62 The Strate Court agreed with lower courts in holding that the tribal
court did not have jurisdiction,4 63 that Montana was the correct standard to
apply,4 64 and then most interestingly held that the state-maintained highway on
tribal trust lands was not Indian Country.465 Moreover, the Court held that tribal
452. See id. at 415 (describing the land ownership pattern of what is now known as the
Yakama Indian Reservation).
453. 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
454. See id. at 694-97.
455. See id. at 695-96.
456. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
457. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
458. See Strate , 520 U.S. at 442-44.
459. See generally Judith V. Royster, Stature and Scrutiny: Post-Exhaustion Review of
Tribal Court Decisions, 46 U. KAN. L. REv. 241 (1998); Blake A. Watson, The Curious Case
of Disappearing Federal Jurisdiction over Federal Enforcement of Federal Law: A Vehicle
for Reassessment of the Tribal Exhaustion/Abstention Doctrine, 80 MARQ. L. REv. 531
(1997).
460. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 444; Wambdi Awanwicake Wastewin, Strate v. A-1
Contractors: Intrusion into the Sovereign Domain of Native Nations, 74 N.D. L. REV. 711,
712 (1998).
461. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 455.
462. See id. at 444.
463. See id. at 442; A-1 Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
464. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 445-46 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,
565-66 (1981)); id. at 456.
465. See id. at 454-56.
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court exhaustion was not required because to force exhaustion in a minor tort
action involving nonmembers on non-Indian land would be futile.4 66 First, the
Court noted that there was no difference between tribal civil regulatory and
adjudicatory authority, 467 an issue that had remained open "[flor a long time."4 68
Then, in strong language, the majority noted that it would be well-nigh
impossible for a tribe to meet the Montana test once it applies. 469 Strate
obfuscated what is Indian land, and what is not. Strate further undercut the
plain language of Montana, which also stated, "[tlo be sure, Indian tribes retain
inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-
Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands."470
A few years later, the Court added additional confusion in Nevada v.
Hicks,4 7 1 where it held that an individual tribal member could not maintain a
civil rights action under § 1983 against state law enforcement officers in tribal
472 whrte
court, even where the incident arose on tribal trust lands and where
(arguably) the state had only been on tribal lands with the permission of the
tribal court.473 Once again, the Court applied Montana, but now for the first
time it applied Montana on tribal lands.474 On first glance, Hicks seems like a
dramatic incursion on tribal lands through the application of the Montana test.
Justice Ginsburg filed a short concurrence where she argued that Strate remains
the controlling law and Hicks should be limited to key procedural fact, which
was that the defendant was the State of Nevada.475 Justice O'Connor wrote a
466. See id. at 459 n. 14 (holding, in a footnote, that exhaustion of tribal court remedies
in this case would only serve to "delay" the outcome).
467. See id. at 453 ("As to nonmembers, we hold, a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction
does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction.").
468. See Katherine J. Florey, Choosing Tribal Law: Why State Choice-of-Law
Principles Should Apply to Disputes with Tribal Contacts, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 1627, 1646
(2006).
469. See id. at 457 ("Although A-1 was engaged in subcontract work on the Fort
Berthold Reservation, and therefore had a 'consensual relationship' with the Tribes, "Gisela
Fredericks was not a party to the subcontract, and the [T]ribes were strangers to the
accident."') (quoting A-) Contractors, 76 F.3d at 940); id. at 457-58 ("Undoubtedly, those
who drive carelessly on a public highway running through a reservation endanger all in the
vicinity, and surely jeopardize the safety of tribal members. But if Montana's second
exception requires no more, the exception would severely shrink the rule.").
470. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
471. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
472. See id. at 376.
473. See id. at 356.
474. See id. at 360 ("The ownership status of land, in other words, is only one factor to
consider in determining whether regulation of the activities of nonmembers is 'necessary to
protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations.' It may sometimes be a
dispositive factor. Hitherto, the absence of tribal ownership has been virtually conclusive of
the absence of tribal civil jurisdiction . . . .") (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565).
475. See id. at 386 (Ginsburg, J. concurring) ("As the Court plainly states, and as
Justice Souter recognizes, the 'holding in this case is limited to the question of tribal-court
jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law.' Ante, at 2309, n. 2 (opinion of the
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lengthy concurrence reading much like a dissent where she argued the case
really was not a Montana case at all, but involved the question of whether
Congress had waived the immunity of states in tribal courts by enacting Section
19 8 3 .476 Even Justice Scalia's majority opinion notes that the "presumption" of
tribal court jurisdiction over nonmembers noted in the dicta in Iowa Mutual
remains, although suggested that after Strate, whether the presumption remains
is an open question.477
Since Hicks, the Court has decided only one more tribal civil jurisdiction
case, Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co.,478 which
involved nonmember actions on nonmember lands within the reservation.479
Despite four votes 48 0 for the proposition that the tribe met the Montana test for
the action complained about (which involved race discrimination by a
nonmember bank against tribal member debtors48 1), the Court reaffirmed prior
holdings that it is exceptionally difficult for a tribe to meet the Montana test on
nonmember land. 482 The Court, importantly, did not go so far as to hold that a
tribe could never meet that test.483
What is clear after Strate, Hicks, and Plains Commerce is that tribal civil
jurisdiction over nonmembers on nonmember land is subject to the Montana
general rule and exceptions, and that those exceptions are exceptionally
difficult for a tribe to meet. On tribal lands, however, the "presumption" of
tribal jurisdiction likely remains, with cases such as Merrion,484 Mescalero,485
Court); ante, at 2318-2319 (Souter, J., concurring). The Court's decision explicitly "leave[s]
open the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general,"
ante, at 2309, n. 2, including state officials engaged on tribal land in a venture or frolic of
their own, see ante, at 2317 (a state officer's conduct on tribal land "unrelated to
[performance of his law-enforcement duties] is potentially subject to tribal control").").
476. See id. at 386-401 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
477. See id. at 380 (quoting Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987)).
478. 554 U.S. 316 (2008).
479. See id. at 320.
480. See id. at 342 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
481. See id. at 342-43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("I dissent from the Court's decision,
however, to the extent that it overturns the Tribal Court's principal judgment awarding the
Longs damages in the amount of $750,000 plus interest. See App. 194-196. That judgment
did not disturb the Bank's sale of fee land to non-Indians. It simply responded to the claim
that the Bank, in its on-reservation commercial dealings with the Longs, treated them
disadvantageously because of their tribal affiliation and racial identity. A claim of that genre,
I would hold, is one the Tribal Court is competent to adjudicate. As the Court of Appeals
correctly understood, the Longs' case, at heart, is not about 'the sale of fee land on a tribal
reservation by a non-Indian bank to non-Indian individuals," ante, at 2714. "Rather, this case
is about the power of the Tribe to hold nonmembers like the bank to a minimum standard of
fairness when they voluntarily deal with tribal members.").
482. See id. at 332-42.
483. See id. at 329-30 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981)).
484. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
485. 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
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and Brendale 486 supporting tribal taxing, regulatory, and adjudicatory authority
over nonmembers on Indian lands. Does Montana apply on Indian lands? Well,
Hicks suggests yes, but that holding was unnecessary to decide Hicks, and
Justice Scalia's footnote on Iowa Mutual's dicta conflicts with that holding.
Surely, it is an open question. 487
Lower courts, trying to predict what the Court might do in a future tribal
jurisdiction case on tribal lands, have applied Montana, usually to dispositive
effect against tribal jurisdiction. 488 However, in a few recent cases, the lower
courts have been confronted with several compelling fact patterns strongly
favoring tribal jurisdiction. 489 They continue to discuss Montana, but in a
manner that suspiciously looks like what a test applying the Iowa Mutual
"presumption" might look like. Most recently, the Ninth Circuit held that tribal
civil jurisdiction over nonmembers for claims arising on tribal lands may arise
from authority "independent from the power recognized in Montana."490 But
once such a case reaches the Court, no one can predict with any certainty what
test the Court will apply.
Since Congress hasn't legislated in the area, and Indian treaties are largely
silent on these questions, the Supreme Court is acting without much guidance.
Various Justices over the years have acted suspicious of tribal court procedures
and tribal laws in general,491 suggesting that nonmembers would be falling into
486. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
487. See LaVelle, supra note 371, at 762. See also Grant Christensen, Creating Bright-
Line Rules for Tribal Court Jurisdiction over Non-Indians: The Case of Trespass to Real
Property, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 527, 568 (2010-2011) (discussing Elliott v. White
Mountain Apache Tribal Court, 566 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 624
(2009)).
488. E.g., Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. King Mountain Tobacco Co., Inc., 569 F.3d 932
(9th Cir. 2009); Nord v. Kelly, 520 F.3d 848 (8th Cir. 2008); MacAuthur v. San Juan
County, 497 F.3d 1057 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1181 (2008); Big Horn
County Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2000); Burlington Northern R.
Co. v. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1110 (2000); Hornell
Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, 133 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 1998); Wilson v.
Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1074 (1998).
489. E.g., Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802 (9th
Cir. 2011) (nonmember business that refuses tribal orders to leave reservation after land
lease expires); Attorney's Process and Investigation Servs., Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of
Mississippi in Iowa, 609 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2010) (nonmember business that committed torts
while involved in tribal government dispute), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1003 (2011); Smith v.
Salish Kootenai College, 434 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (nonmember Indian
involved in an automobile wreck who initially sued others for tort in tribal court, then denied
tribal court jurisdiction over him in counterclaim against him), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1209
(2006).
490. Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 805.
491. Justice Souter's concurrence in Nevada v. Hicks is the most damning opinion of
tribal court jurisdiction over tribal members. See 533 U.S. 353, 375, 383-85 (2001) (Souter,
J., concurring):
The ability of nonmembers to know where tribal jurisdiction begins and ends, it should be
stressed, is a matter of real, practical consequence given "[t]he special nature of [Indian]
107Apr. 2012]
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some form of trap by going to tribal court. The Court usually acts without
knowledge about tribal governments, or on-the-ground realities.4 92 In one
occasion, Strate,4 93 some Justices appeared to be concerned by the allegations
of one amicus that a tribal court not a party to the underlying Supreme Court
case had played dirty pool with the amicus.4 94 The Court's most recent concern
is a general concern that the Constitution does not apply to tribal governments,
giving little weight to the presence of the Indian Civil Rights Act, and no
tribunals," ... which differ from traditional American courts in a number of significant
respects. To start with the most obvious one, it has been understood for more than a century
that the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment do not of their own force apply to
Indian tribes. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-385 ... (1896); F. Cohen, Handbook of
Federal Indian Law 664-665 (1982 ed.) . .. . Although the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968
(ICRA) makes a handful of analogous safeguards enforceable in tribal courts, 25 U.S.C. §
1302, "the guarantees are not identical," . . . and there is a "definite trend by tribal courts"
toward the view that they "ha[vel leeway in interpreting" the ICRA's due process and equal
protection clauses and "need not follow the U.S. Supreme Court precedents 'jot-for-jot,"'
Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 285, 344, n. 238 (1998). In any event, a presumption against tribal-court civil
jurisdiction squares with one of the principal policy considerations underlying Oliphant,
namely, an overriding concern that citizens who are not tribal members be "protected . . .
from unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty," 435 U.S., at 210, 98 S.Ct. 1011.
Tribal courts also differ from other American courts (and often from one another) in their
structure, in the substantive law they apply, and in the independence of their judges.
Although some modem tribal courts "mirror American courts" and "are guided by written
codes, rules, procedures, and guidelines," tribal law is still frequently unwritten, being based
instead "on the values, mores, and norms of a tribe and expressed in its customs, traditions,
and practices," and is often "handed down orally or by example from one generation to
another." Melton, Indigenous Justice Systems and Tribal Society, 79 JUDICATURE 126, 130-
131 (1995). The resulting law applicable in tribal courts is a complex "mix of tribal codes
and federal, state, and traditional law," National American Indian Court Judges Assn., Indian
Courts and the Future 43 (1978), which would be unusually difficult for an outsider to sort
out.
Id.
492. See Conference Transcript: The New Realism: The Next Generation of
Scholarship in Federal Indian Law, 32 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 4 (2007-2008) ("[T]he Court
has been engaging in an agonizing-I would say infuriating -case-by-case common law
model of trying to micromanage doctrine in this area, based on judicial hunches about what
is actually going on in Indian Country.") (Statement of Philip P. Frickey). See also id. at 6
("Consider, probably not so hypothetically, Justice Souter in Hicks. Presumably, he asked his
law clerk to research tribal courts and to give him things to read. The clerk sought help from
some of the best research librarians in the world, those who work at the Supreme Court
Library. They, in turn, in frustration, call upon their compatriots in the Library of
Congress.") (Statement of Philip P. Frickey).
493. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
494. See Brief for the American Trucking Ass'ns., Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 3, Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (No. 95-1872),
1996 WL 711202 (alleging that a tribal judge conspired to fix the jury in Estates of Red
Wolf and Bull Tail v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., No. 94-31 (Crow Court of Appeals, Feb. 21,
1996)); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6, Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Estate of Red Wolf,
522 U.S. 80 (1997) (No. 96-1853) (repeating allegation). During oral argument in Strate,
Justice O'Connor questioned the federal government's counsel about a hypothetical case
where a tribal court jury consists of "all the friends and relatives of the victim." Oral
Argument at 28, Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (No. 95-1872).
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weight whatsoever to tribal civil rights protections.4 95 Chief Justice Roberts'
majority opinion explicitly tied tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers to
consent:
Tribal sovereignty, it should be remembered, is "a sovereignty outside the
basic structure of the Constitution." . . . The Bill of Rights does not apply to
Indian tribes. . . . Indian courts "differ from traditional American courts in a
number of significant respects." . . . And nonmembers have no part in tribal
government-they have no say in the laws and regulations that govern tribal
territory.496
Once again, the Supreme Court is the leading policymaker, making federal
common law decisions, articulating vague standards requiring additional
pronouncements, and increasing its political might in this field, almost always
at the expense of Indian tribes, entities that attract significant skepticism from
the Court, which bases its skepticism on unreliable sources. Ultimately, Indian
tribes still have not consented to an Article III court's jurisdiction.
In sum, this Part is intended to demonstrate that tribal consent is, for the
Supreme Court, of little import in cases involving federal and state authority in
Indian affairs. Conversely, when tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers is at
issue, nonmember consent becomes the most important factor. Strangely, the
lack of tribal consent is consistent with a view propounded by the Supreme
Court more than fifty years ago in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States49-
that Indians were conquered, and so tribal consent to outside government
authority is irrelevant. 498 The concluding portions of this Article will show that
such a position is incorrect, and unnecessary to the adequate functioning of
Indian Country governance.
III.CONSENT AND NONMEMBERS
Consent theory has a different meaning and practical application in federal
Indian law when it comes to tribal assertions of governmental authority over
nonmembers. When the Supreme Court speaks about consent of nonmembers
to tribal governance, the Court robustly demands that the tribal government
produce literal, express consent by nonmembers to tribal authority.4 99 This
495. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316,
337 (2008).
496. Id. (quoting United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 212 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in judgment); citing Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-85 (1896); and quoting
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 383 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring)).
497. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
498. See id. at 289 ("Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this
continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and that, even when the Indians
ceded millions of acres by treaty in return for blankets, food and trinkets, it was not a sale
but the conquerors' will that deprived them of their land.").
499. E.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316,
337 (2008) (holding that nonmember consent over tribal court jurisdiction is paramount).
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requirement stands in great contrast to the implied, often illusory, consent that
the Court finds important in the context of federal assertions of authority over
Indian affairs, both internal and external."oo
This Part will not be arguing, as I have argued elsewhere,"' that
nonmember consent is irrelevant or somehow an improper means of analyzing
tribal authority over nonmembers. While the previous subsection suggested
there are numerous weaknesses in the Court's decisions in the various subject
areas of tribal authority over nonmembers, I will not argue for an overhaul of
the Court's federal Indian common law decisions. I will instead argue in the
second subsection below that tribal governments have learned lessons from
these cases, and slowly are adapting their laws to conform to the Supreme
Court's preferred regime. I propose that the Court should borrow from the
consent theory espoused in the nonmember cases and apply it elsewhere in
Indian law in a consistent fashion that does not assume tribal consent.
A. Cases Involving Nonmember Consent Questions
1. Montana 1 Consent Theory
In Montana v. United States,502 the Supreme Court held that Indian tribes
do not have civil regulatory authority over nonmembers as a general rule, with
two exceptions. The first exception detains us here. That exception reads: "A
tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of
nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members,
through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements."503 The
Court in later cases, notably Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley,5 narrowed
the exception to mean express consent and a "nexus" between the consent
arrangement and the commercial activity to be adjudicated, taxed, or regulated
by the tribe." 5 We know from Strate cases that nonmembers are not subject to
tribal court jurisdiction because they have been in an accident on nonmember
land unrelated to the business purposes for being on the reservation;506 we
500. E.g., Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852-
53 (1985) (holding that federal courts have authority to review tribal court jurisdiction over
nonmembers).
501. E.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Reviving Local Tribal Control in Indian Country,
FED. LAW., Mar./Apr. 2006, at 38, 40.
502. 450 U.S. 544 (198 1).
503. See id. at 565 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Citations are omitted for a
reason. In a later case, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the citations to this
language have much meaning, although the Court often will discuss these cited cases at
some length.
504. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
505. Id. at 656.
506. See 520 U.S. 438, 456-57 (1997).
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know from Atkinson Trading that nonmembers on nonmember land are not
subject to tribal taxation even if they accept public safety and other government
services from the local tribes;50 7 we know from Plains Commerce Bank that a
nonmember is not subject to tribal court jurisdiction in a case arising on
nonmember land merely because the nonmember defendant has previously
filed more than twenty civil suits in the local tribe's court system.0o All of
these cases, frankly, involve nonmembers who are outliers in Indian Country,
as will see in the next subpart.
First, we will discuss the so-called Montana I cases. The earliest Montana
1 case is, of course, Montana.50 9 Prior to Montana, many Indian tribes operated
on a theory of implied consent to tribal jurisdiction.1 o The theory seemed
sound, in that anyone entering Michigan from Wisconsin impliedly consented
to Michigan's authority over them, for example.5 " But the Montana Court
rejected that claim out of hand, and imposed the general rule instead.1 The
reservation of the Crow Nation, which was the tribe involved in the Montana
litigation, was perhaps a poor place to defend the implied consent theory in that
the reservation had been allotted by Congress, 5 13 giving rise to a powerful
argument that Congress had granted consent to the nonmembers living on
formerly Crow lands to be there, obviating any need for tribal consent.
Montana largely involved treaty rights and federal interest claims on the
Crow Reservation against the State of Montana, but the final portion of the
opinion involved tribal regulatory authority over nonconsenting nonmembers
on non-Indian owned land.5 14 There, the State of Montana and non-Indian
property owners objected to tribal authority on private property.5 15 The
nonmembers were not a part of the government decision-making that
established the regulations, though their actions (on their own property) had
wide impacts on the reservation. 516
Montana 1 consent cases that followed have all demanded that Indian
507. See Atkinson Trading, 532 U.S. at 656-57.
508. See Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 341-42; see also Brief for Amicus Curiae
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe in Support of Respondents 29-31 & n. 30, Plains Commerce
Bank, 554 U.S. 316 (2008) (No. 07-411) (cataloguing tribal court cases in which the Bank
appeared without questioning jurisdiction).
509. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
510. See NAT'L Am. INDIAN COURT JUDGES Ass'N, supra note I1, at 50-56.
511. See Fletcher, supra note 501, at 40.
512. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 564-65 ("Since regulation of hunting and fishing by
nonmembers of a tribe on lands no longer owned by the tribe bears no clear relationship to
tribal self-government or internal relations, the general principles of retained inherent
sovereignty did not authorize the Crow Tribe to adopt Resolution No. 74-05.").
513. See id. at 559 n. 9 (discussing Crow Nation allotment acts).
514. See id. at 564-66.
515. Cf. id. at 548-50 (noting the non-Indian activities on the river at stake).
516. Cf. id. at 558 & n. 6 (noting that the tribal interests had a treaty interest in fishing
but did not allege as such in the complaint).
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tribes produce evidence of some form of literal or express consent from
nonmembers before the Court will acknowledge tribal authority. The best
example is Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,"' in which a nonmember
business agreed via a lease agreement to pay royalties.s1 s While the majority in
Merrion did not discuss Montana,519 the express consent acquired by the tribe
now takes on greater significance than it did even in the original case. The
classic case on the other side is Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,520 where the
Navajo Nation's efforts to enforce a hotel tax against a nonmember owned
business on a postage stamp of non-Indian land failed for lack of express
consent.52 1
2. Duro Consent Theory
The second critical case involving nonmember consent came in 1990-Duro
v. Reina.52 2 The case involved tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians, or Indians who are not members of the tribe attempting to prosecute
them.5 23 Tribal members, who can chose to be tribal members of federally
recognized Indian tribes, have effectively consented to tribal jurisdiction.524
Nonmembers, who have not-and cannot-consent, according to Duro, therefore,
are not subject to tribal jurisdiction. 525 The notion of consent theory
propounded in Duro differs from the notion of consent theory propounded in
the Montana I exception in that Justice Kennedy appears to assume that
nonmembers are not and cannot ever become members because of the race and
ancestry requirements of tribal membership.526
517. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
518. See id. at 133 (noting the nonmember business had signed a lease, but challenged
the tribal tax).
519. See id. at 171-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing Montana).
520. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
521. See id. at 647-48.
522. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
523. See id. at 679.
524. See id. at 693 ("The retained sovereignty of the tribe is but a recognition of certain
additional authority the tribes maintain over Indians who consent to be tribal members.
Indians like all other citizens share allegiance to the overriding sovereign, the United States.
A tribe's additional authority comes from the consent of its members, so in the criminal
sphere, membership marks the bounds of tribal authority.").
525. See id. ("The special nature of the tribunals at issue makes a focus on consent and
the protections of citizenship most appropriate. While modern tribal courts include many
familiar features of the judicial process, they are influenced by the unique customs,
languages, and usages of the tribes they serve. Tribal courts are often 'subordinate to the
political branches of tribal governments,' and their legal methods may depend on 'unspoken
practices and norms.' . . . It is significant that the Bill of Rights does not apply to Indian
tribal governments.") (citing Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896)).
526. Cf. id. at 694 ("With respect to such internal laws and usages, the tribes are left
with broad freedom not enjoyed by any other governmental authority in this country. . . .
This is all the more reason to reject an extension of tribal authority over those who have not
[VIII: I
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Justice Kennedy's majority opinion harkened back to his dissent as a Ninth
Circuit Judge when he sat on the Oliphant case in the 1970s.527 The Duro
majority opinion evidences Judge Kennedy's view that tribal jurisdiction
depends heavily, if not exclusively on congressional authorization, was
incorrect by noting, through Justice Kennedy, that tribal sovereignty is retained
unless abrogated.528
The Duro consent theory is both narrower and broader than the Montana I
consent theory. The Duro theory allows tribal jurisdiction broadly over tribal
members, with literal or express consent unnecessary. 529 The Duro analysis
implies skepticism about whether nonmembers even have the legal capacity to
consent to tribal criminal jurisdictiono3 0 and perhaps even whether Congress
has constitutional authority to consent on behalf of nonmembers to criminal
jurisdiction over nonmembers." Congress did exercise its Indian affairs
authority to reverse Duro and recognize and reaffirm tribal criminal jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians, leading to the Supreme Court's decision in United
given the consent of the governed that provides a fundamental basis for power within our
constitutional system."). In a critical federal Indian law decision, the Supreme Court once
before held that nonmember consent is all but irrelevant. In United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S.
567 (1846), where a non-Indian man who had married into the Cherokee Nation and
submitted to the laws of the Cherokee Nation, ostensibly becoming a citizen of the Cherokee
Nation, remained subject to American criminal prosecution on grounds that his express,
literal consent to Cherokee law was insufficient to break his ties to the United States. See id.
at 573.
527. See Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
As one commentator noted about then-Circuit Judge Kennedy's Schlie dissent: "Judge
Kennedy then reached the following conclusions about tribal sovereignty: the tribal
sovereignty notion grew out of cases dealing with state encroachment and simply are not
applicable to the subject of tribal jurisdiction over an individual." Carol A. Mitchell, Note,
Oliphant v. Schlie: Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction of Non-Indians, 38 MONT. L. REV. 339, 349
(1977) (citing Schlie, 544 F.2d at 1015) (Kennedy, C.J., dissenting). That commentator then
argued that the "dissent's position on tribal sovereignty ignores a well settled rule of Indian
law which implicitly recognizes the original sovereignty of tribes, as well as the survival of
the remnants of that sovereignty." Id. at 350.'
528. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 684.
529. See id. at 694 ("Tribal authority over members, who are also citizens, is not
subject to these objections. Retained criminal jurisdiction over members is accepted by our
precedents and justified by the voluntary character of tribal membership and the concomitant
right of participation in a tribal government, the authority of which rests on consent.").
530. See id. at 689 ("Cases challenging the jurisdiction of modern tribal courts are few,
perhaps because 'most parties acquiesce to tribal jurisdiction' where it is asserted. . . . We
have no occasion in this case to address the effect of a formal acquiescence to tribal
jurisdiction that might be made, for example, in return for a tribe's agreement not to exercise
its power to exclude an offender from tribal lands") (quoting NATIONAL AMERICAN INDIAN
COURT JUDGES ASSocIATION, supra note 250, at 48).
531. See id. at 693 ("It is significant that the Bill of Rights does not apply to Indian
tribal governments. . . . The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 provides some statutory
guarantees of fair procedure, but these guarantees are not equivalent to their constitutional
counterparts. There is, for example, no right under the Act to appointed counsel for those
unable to afford a lawyer." (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6))).
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States v. Lara. 532
B. Applications of Nonmember Consent
Modem and sophisticated Indian tribes are working within the Supreme
Court's variations of consent theory. They seek express nonmember consent for
civil jurisdiction purposes, and they exercise increasingly advanced
governmental authority consistent with the implied consent over tribal
members the Supreme Court recognizes.
It is likely that the Supreme Court remains unaware how often
nonmembers engage in consensual arrangements with Indian tribes, but the
number of nonmembers who work for Indian tribes is staggering, 3 and very
well might be a large majority of all nonmembers who reside or otherwise
spend significant time in Indian Country. Indian tribes with highly successful
gaming enterprises such as the Mashantucket Pequot Nation, Mohegan Tribe,
Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians, Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians,
and other tribes in the same category each employees more than a thousand
nonmembers, and possibly several thousand.534 Indian tribes with diversified
and successful non-gaming business operations, such as the Southern Ute
Tribe, Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, and the
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians likely employ thousands of members and
nonmembers.3 And dozens upon dozens of other tribes with perhaps modest
economies but are located in rural areas often are the biggest (or one of the
biggest) local employers in whole regions, just because of the size of their tribal
government bureaucracies. 3 The Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians,
532. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
533. E.g., Unemployment on Indian Reservations at 50 Percent: The Urgent Need to
Create Jobs in Indian Country, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 111th
Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (Jan. 10, 2010) (statement of Conrad Edwards) ("The facts are that our
average tribal workforce is 50 percent to 70 percent non-Indian and our unemployment rates
are still 50 percent to 80 percent, depending on what reservation you are on and what time of
the year it is.").
534. See Precious, supra note 147. Overall, Indian gaming revenues have arisen
above $25 billion a year for several years now. See National Indian Gaming Commission,
2010 Industry Gross Gaming Revenue (July 18, 2011), available at www.nigc.gov. Indian
gaming generates enormous economic activity in non-Indian communities. See generally
Jonathan B. Taylor, Matthew B. Krepps, and Patrick Wang, The National Evidence on the
Socioeconomic Impacts of American Indian Gaining on Non-Indian Communities (Apr.
2000), available at
http://www.northforkrancheria.com/files/Taylor%20Kreps%2020002.pdf.
535. For example, the Umatilla Tribe and the Southern Ute Tribes are the biggest
employers in their regions. See Indian Tribal Good Governance Practices as They Relate to
Economic Development, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 107th Cong., Ist
Sess. 3 (July 18, 2011) (statement of Neal A. McCaleb) (Umatilla); id. at 5 (Statement of
Sen. Campbell) (Southern Ute).
536. See N. Idaho Tribe Emerges as Top Regional Employer, NAT. AM. TIMES, Sept.
21, 2011, available at http://www.nativetimes.com/news/tribal/3399-n-idaho-tribe-emerges-
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for example, is the single largest employer in Chippewa County in the Upper
Peninsula of Michigan.537
Thousands upon thousands (no one knows exactly how many, or can really
estimate) of nonmembers work for Indian tribes. They have all engaged in
some consensual relationship with an Indian tribe, usually work on tribal lands
(often for tribal businesses), and are paid for their work. Under a reasonable
interpretation of Montana 1,538 all of these nonmembers are subject to tribal
regulation, taxation, and adjudication for events arising on tribal lands or
anywhere within reservation boundaries or Indian Country.
Many more thousands of nonmembers live in tribal housing, which is
usually located on tribal trust lands and land owned in fee by the tribe, because
of intermarriage and other relationships. Under federal and tribal law, each of
these individuals must be accounted for in a lease, rental, or ownership
document and receive the consent of the tribe to live in tribal housing. All of
them have signed legal documents in which they expressly consent to tribal
regulation as a product of the housing agreement. Additional thousands of
nonmembers are eligible to receive tribal government services because they
may be the parent or guardian of tribal member children, elders, and others.
All of these thousands of nonmembers have consented in some manner
expressly to tribal regulation. Maybe under the Montana I line of cases a tribe
could not regulate the employment of a nonmember on nonmember land who
has merely signed a housing rental lease with the tribe, but there is significant
overlap in employment, housing, and tribal government services in that most
aspects of nonmember activity-even on nonmember land-meet the Montana
1 prescription. The nonmembers to whom Indian tribes likely cannot exercise
jurisdiction are outliers. There are fewer and fewer of them every day, and
since they are not engaging in consensual relations with Indian tribes, their
activities are becoming more inconsistent with tribal preferences. It bears
noting that the last few Supreme Court cases regarding tribal jurisdiction over
nonmembers involve nonmember tortfeasors, not merely nonmembers who
refuse to comply with tribal regulations or taxes. This trend is evident in lower
as-top-regional-employer; St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, Tribe Commissions Economic Impact
Study: Tribe Contributes $119 Million to State Economy, Press Release (Oct. 26, 2009),
available at http://images.bimedia.net/documents/Mohawk+Economic+Impact+Study.pdf.
537. See N. Michigan Univ. Center for Rural Cmty. and Econ. Dev., County Economic
Profiles from Michigan's Upper Peninsula 3 (Dec. 31, 2010), available at
http://www.iron.org/forms/UPEconProfiles.pdf.
538. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,565 (1981).
539. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316,
320 (2008) ("Following the sale, an Indian couple, customers of the bank who had defaulted
on their loans, claimed the bank discriminated against them by offering the land to non-
Indians on terms more favorable than those the bank offered to them."); Strate v. A-1
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 443 (1997) ("The accident occurred when Fredericks' automobile
collided with a gravel truck driven by Stockert and owned by respondent A-1 Contractors,
Stockert's employer.").
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courts as well. 540 Finally, all of this has begun to happen in earnest since the
mid-1970s, after Congress agreed to start turning over the primary
responsibility for providing government services to reservation residents to
Indian tribes.54' Likely, the number of nonmembers consenting to tribal
jurisdiction in some way grows every day. We will leave for another day all
those nonmembers who consent after the fact to tribal jurisdiction in civil
offense and other cases, though that number grows perhaps even faster than the
number of expressly consenting nonmembers.542
Consent theory, for all its vagaries and even confusion, has utility for
Indian affairs, as I will demonstrate in the next Part. In fact, the United Nations
Declaration for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples requires consent to be a
critical aspect of governmental affairs involving indigenous peoples. And most
importantly, it is a viable and realistic theory.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A THEORY OF TRIBAL CONSENT IN MODERN INDIAN
AFFAIRS
Indian tribes have either ownership or direct control over many millions of
acres throughout the United States, though mostly in the western half of the
continent.543 Hundreds of thousands of people live and work on that territory,
including tribal members, nonmember Indians, and non-Indians.544 With the
exception tribes located in the few states subject to Public Law 280,545 an Act
of Congress that extended aspects of state jurisdiction into Indian Country,
Indian tribes have significant control over tribal territories and those living and
working on those lands.546 But as this Article shows, that control is subject to
significant and artificial limitations and uncertainties relating to the relationship
between Indian tribes and nonmembers, as well as the interests of state
governments in on-reservation business activities.
Article 19 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples could force a paradigm shift if its public policy is applied as intended.
540. E.g., Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Court, 566 F.3d 842, 844 (9th Cir.
2009) (involving a claim that nonmember defendant started on-reservation forest fire that
"burned more than 400,000 acres of land and caused millions of dollars in damage"), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 624 (2009). See also cases discussed in note 489 (listing cases involving
nonmember tortfeasors).
54 1. See generally WILKINS & STARK, supra note 147, at 131-32.
542. See, e.g., Mandan, Hidatsa, & Arikara Nation, Press Release, Tribes Pass Special
Resolution Enforcing Civil Motor Vehicle Code on Reservation Roads After Family of Four
Dies on Highway (Sept. 20, 2011), available at
http://64.38.12.138/News/2011/09/21/mhaO9201 I.pdf.
543. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 20, at 12.
544. Interview with Wenona T. Singel, Assistant Professor of Law, Michigan State
University College of Law, in East Lansing, MI (Aug. 1, 2011).
545. See Public Law 280, codified in relevant part at 18 U.S.C. § 1162.
546. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 455, 464 (1981).
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But for Indian tribes, Article 19 consent is complicated by its own terms. It
reads:
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their
free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or
administrative measures that may affect them.5
As is noted by the Supreme Court, Congress has never legislated in a
comprehensive fashion on tribal authority to regulate the on-reservation
activities of nonmembers.548 As a result, the general question is one of federal
common law, ultimately decided by the United States Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court's jurisdiction, as a matter of federal law, is self-created under
Article III of the Constitution. Of course, no American Indian tribe has
effectuated "free, prior, and informed consent"5 49 to Supreme Court jurisdiction
over internal tribal affairs. Unfortunately, Article 19 neglects to mention
judicial decisions, possibly because judicial review in most countries is less
robust than it is here in the United States.55 0 So is Article 19 consent even
relevant to American Indian tribes in federal common law cases decided by the
federal judiciary?
In my view, yes, in that the Supreme Court should defer more to
Congress's silence on the question of tribal authority over nonmembers.
Congress has the institutional authority and capabilities to declare national
public policy in Indian affairs.' Congressional silence indicates at least one
important factor: the lack of a pressing national interest in a question, so much
so that Congress does not feel the need to act. If Congress makes no effort to
comprehensively legislate in the area of tribal authority over nonmembers, then
there would appear to be no national interest in the issue. Interestingly, the
Court, once articulated a rule closely approximating this view in dicta. In
Washington v. Colville Confederated Tribes,552 the Court noted that tribal
inherent authority is divested when the exercise of that authority is inconsistent
with the "overriding interests of the National Government."553 Congressional
action to comprehensively regulate tribal authority over nonmembers, after
Article 19, would require the "free, prior, and informed consent" of the
American Indian nations. Supreme Court decisions in the field should defer to
547. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 1, at
art. 19 (emphasis added).
548. See Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 854-55
(1985).
549. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 1, at
art. 19.
550. See MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18-36 (2008) (discussing
"weak form" judicial review in other nations).
551. See Fletcher, supra note 384, at 130-54.
552. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
553. Id. at 153.
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congressional silence in this area.
Douglas Sanderson's outstanding theory on institutional corrective
justice554 provides a helpful theoretical framework for contextualizing Supreme
Court deference under Article 19. Sanderson, writing about Canadian First
Nations and the Canadian justice system, notes that there are three views of
remedying historic wrongs against Indigenous peoples: (1) "land transfer," (2)
"subsistence," (3) and "institutional." 5 In the United States, it is fair to say
that "land transfer," except as provided for by Congress in a series of land
claims settlements,5 is anathema, especially to the federal judiciary.5'
"Subsistence" remedies, defined by Sanderson as a- remedy that allows
"Indigenous peoples to live the same kinds of lives as they once did with
respect to harvesting of resources traditionally relied upon,"55  has been
welcomed several times by the federal judiciary in treaty rights cases.559
Sanderson's recommendation, "institutional" remedies, which he defines as
recognition of Indigenous "ability to develop and maintain political, social, and
cultural institutions,"56 " has been roundly approved by Congress and the
Executive branch.16 1 But the Supreme Court, in its skepticism of tribal authority
over nonmembers, repeatedly declines to defer in this area. The Court's
common law decisions stunt tribal institutional development. Yet while it
shouldn't take much to ask the Court to step aside, it is clear the Court will not,
Effective implementation of what I call tribal consent theory-the notion
that tribal authority remains extant absent consensual abrogation of that
authority-is a tough nut. The Supreme Court retains final veto over any
governmental action by an Indian tribe in relation to nonmembers. But as a
practical matter, the Court cannot and will not review every case, and the Court
even declines to review some of the tougher cases. And that's where Indian
tribes can engage in the critical act of exercising defacto sovereignty.562 Tribes
554. See Douglas Sanderson, Redressing the Right Wrong: The Argument from
Corrective Justice, (Oct. 8, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1945380.
555. See id. at 19-20.
556. E.g., Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1701-16; Maine Indian
Claims Settlement, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-55; Connecticut Indian Land Claims Settlement, 25
U.S.C. 1751 et seq.; Massachusetts Indian Land Claims Settlement, 125 U.S.C. § 1771-71(i);
Seneca Nation (New York) Land Claims Settlement, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1774-74(a).
557. E.g., City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005); Tee-Hit-Ton
Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
558. Sanderson, supra note 554, at 27.
559. E.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999);
Washington v. Washington Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n., 443 U.S. 658
(1979); United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979).
560. Sanderson, supra note 554, at 32.
561. See generally Fletcher, 384, at 151-54.
562. See Stephen Cornell and Joseph P. Kalt, Sovereignty and Nation-Building: The
Development Challenge in Indian Country Today, 22 AM. INDIAN CULTURE AND RES. J., no.
3, 1998, at 187-88.
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can make their own consent regime. All it takes is one case.
Tribal consent theory, as I see it, would fundamentally-but gradually-
change the framework for analyzing the scope of tribal governance on tribal
lands. As noted earlier, more and more nonmembers are expressly consenting
to some form of tribal authority. More and more nonmembers depend
economically and politically on Indian tribes. Fewer and fewer nonmembers on
tribal lands have no consensual relationship with the local tribe. Even on
reservation lands owned by nonmembers, the nonmember population numbers
are declining.
Critically, the "open question" identified in Justice Scalia's majority
opinion-whether tribes have presumed civil jurisdiction over nonmembers on
tribal lands-should be an easy one once it reaches the Supreme Court. There
are two ways the Supreme Court can analyze the question when it arises. The
first is to apply the presumption, a decision that could require the Supreme
Court to articulate circumstances where tribal jurisdiction is unacceptable."'
When would tribal jurisdiction be fundamentally unfair or abusive toward
nonmembers, for example? Common law courts are not at their best when
trying to articulate exceptions to general rules, and so the exercise might be
confounding to the Court. That said, nonmembers living and doing business on
tribal lands very frequently have consented to being there, and there is solid
legal support dating back to the nineteenth century that nonmembers
voluntarily entering Indian lands are subject to tribal law."*
More likely than not, the Court will apply a form of the Montana general
rule and exceptions, even on tribal lands.' 65 The Justices are already familiar
with Montana and have labeled it "pathmarking."566 This would be a troubling,
but not unexpected, outcome. There is some very speculative evidence that the
Court tends to be interested only in cases where a nonmember plausibly claims
some form of abusive or irrational exercise tribal jurisdiction, 567 and as a result
is extremely unlikely to ever grant certiorari in a case where a nonmember
prevailed over a tribal interest below.16 1 Moreover, instances involving
consensual relationships between Indian tribes and nonmembers are unlikely to
be litigated at all.
563. See Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) ("Civil jurisdiction
over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a
specific treaty provision or federal statute.").
564. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845,
854-55 (1985) (quoting Attorney General Cushing, 7 Op. ATTy. GEN. 175, 179-81 (1855)).
565. Cf. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 359-60 (2001) (arguing that land ownership is
only one factor to consider).
566. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997).
567. Cf. Preliminary Memorandum at 7; FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 499 U.S.
943 (1991) (arguing against a cert. grant on grounds that the tribes' asserted jurisdiction over
a nonmember was not sufficiently "outrageous" to warrant Supreme Court review), available
at http://epstein.usc.edu/research/blackmunMemos/ 1 990/Denied-pdf/90-1146.pdf.
568. See Fletcher, supra note 433, at 935-36.
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The Supreme Court's certiorari practices, and propensity for aligning with
the Montana general rule, put tribal interests in a tough spot. Any Supreme
Court decision involving a nonmember on tribal trust or reservation lands that
applies Montana to the detriment of tribal interests would complicate tribal
governance considerably. Nonmembers who remain outliers in reservation
communities and areas would be all but free from governance, unless state
governments dramatically expand their activities in Indian Country. Frankly, no
state will do this,56 even if the legal complexities of such action were removed.
While it is plausible that the Supreme Court would hold in favor of tribal
interests in a case where a nonmember challenges tribal jurisdiction, the
Court's historic skepticism of tribal governance,5 coupled with its disregard of
the practical consequences of its decisions, 7 is likely too heavy a mountain to
move. Tribal interests might not win such a case.
In my view, however, the Supreme Court's ad hoc decision-making on
tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers is increasingly irrelevant. Even the most
recent case, Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co.,57 2
decided almost nothing. There, the bank still had to face the rest of the jury
verdict because it challenged the court's jurisdiction over only one cause of
action against it.573 The nonmembers challenging tribal jurisdiction are
increasingly behaving in unusual ways, and the impacts of their actions will
shrink over time as tribes acquire more and more express consents.574 The
short-term question is whether the Supreme Court will continue to side with
those nonmembers in Indian Country who are increasingly becoming
undesirable outliers.
Eventually, and that time may be years or decades away, Indian tribes will
have solved the problem of the nonconsenting nonmember. Enterprising tribes
will even find a way to incorporate non-Indians into the governance of the
reservation-with their consent.
569. The experience of Public Law 280 states and tribes is indicative of the extreme
unlikelihood that states will expand their governance much into Indian Country. See
generally Carole E. Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the Twenty-
First Century? Some Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REv. 697 (2006).
570. See generally David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's
Pursuit of States' Rights, Color-Blind Justice, and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV.
267 (2001).
571. E.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 698 (1990) ("If the present jurisdictional
scheme proves insufficient to meet the practical needs of reservation law enforcement, then
the proper body to address the problem is Congress, which has the ultimate authority over
Indian affairs.").
572. 554 U.S. 316 (2008).
573. See Bank of Hoven (Plains Commerce Bank) v. Long Family Land and Cattle
Co., 32 Indian L. Rev. 6001, (Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court of Appeals 2004) (noting
that the Bank had waived its challenges to the contract claims against it).
574. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, An Immigration Policy Solution for Tribal
Governments, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Sept. 14, 2007, at A3.
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More than 20 years ago, Professor Collins theorized that Indian nations
would move toward independence from the federal government as perhaps the
only conceivable means of achieving significant advances in strong and fair-
and consensual-Indian Country governance. Independence is a lofty goal,
one many tribes probably don't want. But that is no reason not to pursue tribal
consent theory. Indian tribes are in the best position in centuries to reestablish
important governance authority over all of the people and entities within Indian
Country and thoughtful tribal sovereigns have already begun to light the way.
Miigwetch.
575. See Collins, supra note 2, at 386-87.
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